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Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies
and Disasters includes essays that demonstrate several issues that are critical to understand‐
ing risk and hazard and the prospects for disasters. The book is organized to group the re‐
search that relates to specific periods of the disaster management continuum. The chapters are
original research reports by international scholars focused on unique aspects of disaster from
their unique perspectives. The first set of three chapters pertains to the conceptualization of
the issues that influence the distribution of hazard and the probabilities for disaster. The next
three chapters regard the use and management of data during the run up to crises, the chal‐
lenges to effective integration of information into management activities, and some potential
information management remedies. The final set of four chapters pertains to crisis manage‐
ment and recovery. The over-arching goal of disaster management, of course, is eventually to
solve the problems that make it necessary by eliminating risk, hazard and vulnerability; goals
that are generally unrecognized by most, usually unspoken and indeed ambitious.
Ciurean, Malek, Schröter, Glade and Patt begin this volume with a discussion of the employ‐
ment of vulnerability assessments to reduce disasters. Few terms have generated as much
confusion as vulnerability has among scholars and practitioners; this confusion undermines
its meaningful application. As often happens when concepts becomes popular, vulnerabili‐
ty’s meaning relative to disaster management has become obscured through its overuse as a
“hot button” and its misapplication in analyses. These authors attempt to clarify the notion
of vulnerability to offer a revised disaster risk analysis methodology. Their paper provides
rationale for choices that ought to be considered in the development of a practical vulnera‐
bility assessments.
The second chapter by Haque and Uddin presents a case study of an evolving disaster man‐
agement system in a developing nation. The authors critique the nature of the organization
of and present approach to disaster management used in Bangladesh. They find that, while
institutional partnership-building efforts have successfully integrated and strengthened
thinking about disaster management in Bangladesh, the real effect has been only a formal‐
ized policy; it has not been truly enacted in practice. The authors offer approaches for organ‐
izing not only governmental stakeholders, but also integrating the roles of local and non-
governmental players and more rational assessment of patterns of risk, hazard, and
vulnerability. The progression toward disaster management in the framework of progres‐
sive government is fraught with complexity, particularly in the circumstances of relatively
new states.
But even in states committed to progressive government, hazard mitigation and disaster man‐
agement are not easily accomplished. Jackman and Beruvides discuss the historical develop‐
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institutional partnership-building efforts have successfully integrated and strengthened
thinking about disaster management in Bangladesh, the real effect has been only a formal‐
ized policy; it has not been truly enacted in practice. The authors offer approaches for organ‐
izing not only governmental stakeholders, but also integrating the roles of local and non-
governmental players and more rational assessment of patterns of risk, hazard, and
vulnerability. The progression toward disaster management in the framework of progres‐
sive government is fraught with complexity, particularly in the circumstances of relatively
new states.
But even in states committed to progressive government, hazard mitigation and disaster man‐
agement are not easily accomplished. Jackman and Beruvides discuss the historical develop‐
ment of hazard mitigation and planning in the United States. Their evaluation of the
accomplishments and prospects for continued development of mitigation plans at state and
local levels demonstrates that there are still practical challenges and realities that exist even
within systems that apparently have been committed to disaster prevention for many decades.
The data and information management realms of modern life have exploded in volume and
complexity. The capacity to gather data and analyze it in real time not only benefits the dis‐
aster manager, but also makes decision making more complex. The second section of this
volume pertains to the use of increasingly automated data collection systems that provide
sophisticated measures of environmental conditions. These systems can not only increase
the amount and detail of the operation of natural and social systems, but the use of the data
requires increasing degrees of technical knowledge to use (extract facts, judge meaning, in‐
terpret and convert to messages for managers). The three papers included here discuss the
cutting edge of the application of data in emergency planning and disaster management.
Houser’s chapter reviews data assimilation theory and discusses several diverse applica‐
tions of data that can be employed in spatial decision support for disaster management. Da‐
ta networks increase not only the capacity to monitor the developments across a greater
space, but in combination with advanced modeling, can yield views into the near future that
promote proactive management rather than simply enabling faster reactions to the outcomes
of hazardous events.
While data may typically amount to numbers reflecting measures of depth, height, strength,
speed and other physical phenomena, their collection and tabulation rarely provides effective
understanding for users of the information they contain. With the dramatic increases of speed
and capacity that we have witnessed in the realm of computing resources, it has become in‐
creasingly possible to convert the data to visual products that make their meaning more appa‐
rent. The chapter by Allen, Sanchagrin and McLeod describe the coupled advances of
modeling with geovisualization, techniques that enable spatial views of the implications of
changing environments. Specifically, they discuss and exemplify the prospects for improving
hurricane storm-surge risk predictions to advance the meaningfulness and spatial precision of
the perceptions of coastal residents and disaster managers. They demonstrate the benefits and
costs of choices among models, statistical techniques and graphical capabilities of the technol‐
ogies, but exhibit the great value that such advances can provide.
Indeed, though the advanced technology that enables detailed geovisualization exists in
some of the most modern parts of the world, there are regions that are relatively undevel‐
oped in terms of their capacity to quickly and efficiently gather data across vast areas and
use those data to guide disaster response. Ajami’s chapter reviews the prospects for an
earthquake information management system (EIMS) in Iran by deriving lessons from the
challenges experienced in Afghanistan, India, Japan and Turkey. National-scale systems are
particularly important for regions that are dependent upon centralized decisions, as is the
case in Iran. When response, relief and coordination of recovery is dependent upon not only
a centralized government and but also non-governmental organizations that are constrained
by that government, it becomes even more critical to establish stronger data-gathering sys‐
tems that extend to the hinterlands. In the context of developing nations, the lack of coordi‐
nated response based on near-real time data, information management systems may be the
key to reducing the tolls of extreme events from catastrophic levels to mere disasters.
XII Preface
In our final section of the text, we examine four topics that pertain to the period of emergen‐
cy or crisis and its aftermath. In the first chapter, Niininen examines disasters from the per‐
spective of the host of non-resident populations during emergencies. The hoteliers in tourist
destinations play an important role during sudden-onset hazardous events. Niininen re‐
ports the results of a survey of hotel managers from three very different contexts: London,
Hong Kong and Finland. The analysis provides for a list of best management practices for
hotel managers vis á vis their guests, their staff and their local municipal governments. It is
vital for hotel managers to recognize the roles they have assumed in emergencies and crises
by virtue of their attraction of visitors to their destinations.
The aftermath of disasters reveal much about the role societies play in creating the potential
for disasters. Centuries of experience that modern societies have with disasters, particularly
in urbanized or developed regions, has prompted activities aimed at managing risk, reduc‐
ing hazard, preparing for disaster and to enabling faster recovery. The final three chapters
examine aspects of the responses to disaster that either attenuate or magnify disruptions
and suffering.
Brand and Nicholson examine the aftermath of the Lisbon, Portugal earthquake of 1755 and
consider the lessons that contemporary urban systems might consider in their own respons‐
es to city-wide destruction they might experience. Indeed, the authors evaluate equivalent
actions that have been (or have not been) taken by the city of Christchurch, New Zealand in
their responses to two significant earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. The authors emphasize the
value that urban design principles can provide for the improvement of not only the city’s
functional quality but for mitigation of hazards and increasing resilience. Their review of the
Christchurch government’s approach stresses that the lessons learned have not been ade‐
quately applied.
Bryant and Allen similarly consider urban form after earthquake devastation reduces the
urban architecture to rubble. In their chapter, they examine the emergence of open space in
the tightly constructed confines of Kobe, Japan. Modern urban design principles promote
humanization of the built landscape, and in the processes of destruction one can find the
creation of opportunities for the greening of the brick and mortar landscapes of cities, the
mitigation of hazard, prospects for bottom-up governance, revitalization of communities
and the augmentation of resilience.
And in the final chapter in the text, McIntosh takes the analysis deeper into the process of
recovery in an examination of the provision of affordable housing for victims of Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans. An imperfect process in responses to most disasters, housing the
displaced populations is often treated as a structural issue (in that it only requires roofs and
walls). The author here shows that not only is the approach reflected in the response to Ka‐
trina insufficient, it was inefficient, ineffective and not sustainable. While the government’s
actions to meet the needs of the victims was largely a reaction to public outrage at the enor‐
mity of the calamity and the government’s own failures, the eventual housing solutions
were superficial and unsatisfactory. The lesson it leaves is that disaster recovery is not sim‐
ply a matter of providing “temporary” material improvements for impacted communities,
but it requires a deeper and more permanent effort to restore the community itself.
So in summary, this volume evidences that successful disaster management is rooted in
both disaster prevention and, when necessary, effective, thoroughly planned actions that not
only look to reduce the impacts of hazard events but also incorporate activities that improve
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other aspects of social systems and human spaces. While disaster management had its be‐
ginnings in simplified notions of engineering of the natural environments that generate risk,
it has become abundantly clear that it must be a multifaceted ecological response between
people, nature and our management systems. Where people and risk cannot be separated,
they must be managed in ways that lesson the need for disaster management and improve
the freedoms of both people and nature to live their lives unencumbered by the needs or
torment of the other.
Dr. John P. Tiefenbacher
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Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55538
1. Introduction
The last few decades have demonstrated an increased concern for the occurrence of natural
disasters and their consequences for leaders and organizations around the world. The EM-
DAT International Disaster Database [1] statistics show that, in the last century, the mortality
risk associated with major weather-related hazards has declined globally, but there has been
a rapid increase in the exposure of economic assets to natural hazards.
Looking into more detail, UNISDR’s Global Assessment Report 2011 (GAR11) [2] indicates
that disasters in 2011 set a new record of $366 billion for economic losses, including $210 billion
as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the accompanying tsunami alone, and $40
billion as a result of the floods in Thailand. There were 29,782 deaths linked to 302 major
disaster events including 19,846 deaths in the March earthquake/tsunami in Japan (figures
presented by other disaster databases for 2011 summary e.g. NATCAT Service – MunichRE,
are slightly different but in general agreement). Disaster databases, such as the ones referred
to above, represent key resources for actors involved in policy and practice related with
disaster risk reduction and response. However, considering their diversity and recognizing
their different roles, one can identify at least one limitation in their use i.e. the inclusion criteria
which inherently results in many hazard events not being registered. Compiling and analyzing
an extensive natural disaster data set for the period 1993 – 2002, Alexander [3] showed that,
for example, in the Philippines in 1996 there were 31 major floods, 29 earthquakes, 10 typhoons
and 7 tornadoes. Due to population pressure, large areas of Luzon and other islands were
denuded of their dense vegetation cover resulting in landslide prone slopes. Twelve major
episodes of slope failure causing high damages to infrastructure and build up areas were
registered in the archipelago during 1996. Although documentation of the Government
expenditures to finance relief efforts for natural disasters during the 1996 – 2002 period is not
© 2013 Ciurean et al.; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2013 Ciurean et al.; licensee InTech. This is a paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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completely contained in Figure 1 [4], one can observe that 1996 stands out as a particular year
with high costs of rehabilitation.
Experience has shown that considering the frequency of disasters affecting the Philippines, its
socio-economic context, and risk culture, the disaster management system tends to rely on a
response approach. However, studies indicate that efforts are being made to engage more
proactive approaches, involving mitigation and preparedness strategies [4]. In order to achieve
this it is thus important to investigate not only the nature of the threat but also the underlying
characteristics of the environment and society that makes them susceptible to damage and



























Figure 1. Philippines – annual expenditure under the National Calamity Fund (1996 – 2002) (Based on GDP at price
market) [4]
BOX 1: Vulnerability – One term many meanings
In everyday use of language, the term vulnerability refers to the inability to withstand the effects of a hostile environment.
The definition of vulnerability for the purpose of scientific assessment depends on the purpose of the study – is it to get
a differential picture of global change threats to human well-being in different world regions? Is it to inform particular
stakeholders about adaptation options to a potential future development? Is it to show that likelihood of harm and cost
of harm have changed for a specific element of interest within the human-environment system? In scientific assessment
the term vulnerability can have many meanings, differentiated mostly by (a) the vulnerable entity studied, (b) the
stakeholders of the study.
The design of scientific assessment (as opposed to scientific research) has to respond to the scientific needs of the particular
stakeholder who might use it [5]. An integral part of vulnerability assessment therefore is the collaboration with its
stakeholders [6], [7]. Thus, the specific definition and the method of vulnerability assessment is specific to each study and
needs to be made transparent in the specific context. An example set of definitions on vulnerability used in natural hazards
risk assessment and global change research is presented in section 2.2, Table 1.
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The  objective  of  this  work  is  to  discuss  and  illustrate  different  approaches  used  in
vulnerability assessment for hydro-meteorological hazards (i.e. landslides and floods, incl.
flash floods) taking into account two perspectives: hazard vulnerability and global change
vulnerability,  which  are  rooted  in  the  technical  and  environmental  as  well  as  social
disciplines.  The study is based on a review of recent research findings in global change
and natural hazards risk management. The overall aim is to identify current gaps that can
guide the development of future perspectives for vulnerability analysis to hydro-meteoro‐
logical  hazards.  Following  the  introduction  (section  1),  the  second section  starts  with  a
definition of vulnerability within the context of risk management to natural hazards (sub-
section 2.1).  Subsequently,  various conceptual  models  (sub-section 2.2)  and vulnerability
assessment  methodologies  (sub-section  2.3)  are  analyzed  and  compared  based  on  their
different disciplinary foci. In the third section, the importance of addressing uncertainty in
vulnerability  analysis  is  discussed  and  lastly  general  observations  and  concluding  re‐
marks are presented.
2. Conceptual frameworks
2.1. Vulnerability and risk management to natural hazards
According to the UN International  Strategy for  Disaster  Reduction (UNISDR) Report  [8],
there  are  two  essential  elements  in  the  formulation  of  risk  (Eq.  1):  a  potential  event  –
hazard,  and  the  degree  of  susceptibility  of  the  elements  exposed  to  that  source  –
vulnerability.
RISK = HAZARD X VULNERABILITY (1)
In UNISDR terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction [9], «risk» is defined as the combination
of the probability of an event and its negative consequences”. A «hazard» is “a dangerous
phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other
health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic
disruption, or environmental damage”.
Within the risk management framework, vulnerability pertains to consequence analysis. It
generally defines the potential for loss to the elements at risk caused by the occurrence of a
hazard, and depends on multiple aspects arising from physical, social, economic, and envi‐
ronmental factors, which are interacting in space and time. Examples may include poor design
and construction of buildings, inadequate protection of assets, lack of public information and
awareness, limited official recognition of risks and preparedness measures, and disregard for
wise environmental management.
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completely contained in Figure 1 [4], one can observe that 1996 stands out as a particular year
with high costs of rehabilitation.
Experience has shown that considering the frequency of disasters affecting the Philippines, its
socio-economic context, and risk culture, the disaster management system tends to rely on a
response approach. However, studies indicate that efforts are being made to engage more
proactive approaches, involving mitigation and preparedness strategies [4]. In order to achieve
this it is thus important to investigate not only the nature of the threat but also the underlying
characteristics of the environment and society that makes them susceptible to damage and



























Figure 1. Philippines – annual expenditure under the National Calamity Fund (1996 – 2002) (Based on GDP at price
market) [4]
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BOX 2: Risk management frameworks are generally designed to answer the following
questions [10]:
What are the probable dangers and their magnitude? (Danger Identification)
How often do the dangers of a given magnitude occur? (Hazard Assessment)
What are the elements at risk? (Elements at Risk Identification)
What is the possible damage to the elements at risk? (Vulnerability Assessment)
What is the probability of damage? (Risk Estimation)
What is the significance of the estimated risk? (Risk Evaluation)
What should be done? (Risk Management)
2.2. Vulnerability models
There are multiple definitions, concepts and methods to systematize vulnerability denoting
the plurality of views and meanings attached to this term. Birkmann [11] noted that ‘we are
still dealing with a paradox: we aim to measure vulnerability, yet we cannot define it precisely’.
However, there are generally two perspectives in which vulnerability can be viewed and which
are closely linked with the evolution of the concept [12]: (1) the amount of damage caused to
a system by a particular hazard (technical or engineering sciences oriented perspective –
dominating the disaster risk perception in the 1970s), and (2) a state that exists within a system
before it encounters a hazard (social sciences oriented perspective – an alternative paradigm
which uses vulnerability as a starting point for risk reduction since the 1980s). The former
emphasizes ‘assessments of hazards and their impacts, in which the role of human systems in
mediating the outcomes of hazard events is downplayed or neglected’. The latter puts the
human system on the central stage and focuses on determining the coping capacity of the
society, the ability to resist, respond and recover from the impact of a natural hazard [13].
While the technical sciences perspective of vulnerability focuses primarily on physical aspects
[14], the social sciences perspective takes into account various factors and parameters that
influence vulnerability, such as physical, economic, social, environmental, and institutional
characteristics [8]. Other approaches emphasize the need to account for additional global
factors, such as globalization and climate change. Thus, the broader vulnerability assessment
is in scope, the more interdisciplinary it becomes.
The different definitions of vulnerability can also be viewed from a functional and subject/
object-oriented perspective i.e. considering the end-user of the scientific assessment results
(e.g. technical boards, administration officers, representatives from the civil protection,
international organizations, etc.) and the vulnerable entity (e.g. critical infrastructure, elderly
population, communication networks, mountain ecosystems, etc.).
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters6
Vogel and O’Brien [17] emphasize that vulnerability is: (a) multi-dimensional and differential
(varies for different dimensions of a single element or group of elements and from a physical
context to another); (b) scale dependent (with regard to the unit of analysis e.g. individual, local,
regional, national etc.) and (c) dynamic (the characteristics that influence vulnerability are
continuously changing in time and space). With regards to the first characteristic, there are
generally five components (or dimensions) that need to be investigated in vulnerability
assessment: (1) the physical/functional dimension (relates to the predisposition of a structure,
infrastructure or service to be damaged due to the occurrence of a harmful event associated
with a specific hazard); (2) the economic dimension (relates to the economic stability of a region
endangered by a a loss of production, decrease of income or consumption of goods due to the
occurrence of a hazard); (3) the social dimension (relates with the presence of human beings,
individuals or communities, and their capacities to cope with, resist and recover from impacts
of hazards); (4) the environmental dimension (refers to the interrelation between different
ecosystems and their ability to cope with and recover from impacts of hazards and to tolerate
stressors over time and space); (5) the political/institutional dimension (refers to those political
or institutional actions e.g. livelihood diversification, risk mitigation strategies, regulation
control, etc., or characteristics that determine differential coping capacities and exposure to
hazards and associated impacts).
During the last decades, various schools of thinking proposed different conceptual models
with the final aim of developing methods for measuring vulnerability. The following sub-
sections give a short overview of some of the conceptual models presented in [11], such as the
double structure of vulnerability, vulnerability within the context of hazard and risk, vulner‐
ability in the context of global environmental change community, the Presure and Release
Model and a holistic approach to risk and vulnerability assessment. Other models not
discussed herein are: The Sustainable Livelihood Framework, the UNISDR framework for
disaster risk reduction, the ‘onion framework’, and the ‘BBC conceptual framework’, the last
two developed by UNU-EHS (UN University, Institute for Environment and Human Security).
Working definitions(s): Vulnerability is… Source
The degree of loss to a given element at risk or a set of elements at risk resulting from the
occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude and expressed on a scale from 0 (no
damage) to 1 (total damage)
[14]
The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes,
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards
[8]
The characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist
and recover from impacts of a hazard
[13]
The intrinsic and dynamic feature of an element at risk that determines the expected damage/
harm resulting from a given hazardous event and is often even affected by the harmful event
itself. Vulnerability changes continuously over time and is driven by physical, social, economic
and environmental factors
[11]
The degree to which geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems are susceptible to, and
unable to cope with, adverse impacts of climate change
[15], [16]
Table 1. General definitions of vulnerability used in risk assessment due to natural hazards and climate change
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2.2.1. The double structure of vulnerability
According to Bohle [18] vulnerability can be seen as having an external and internal side
(Figure 2). The external side is related to the exposure to risks and shocks and is influenced by
Political Economy Approaches (e.g. social inequities, disproportionate division of assets),
Human Ecology Perspectives (population dynamics and environmental management capaci‐
ties) and the Entitlement Theory (relates vulnerability to the incapacity of people to obtain or
manage assets via legitimate economic means). The internal side is called coping and relates
to the capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard and is
influenced by the Crisis and Conflict Theory (control of assets and resources, capacities to
manage crisis situations and resolve conflicts), Action Theory Approaches (how people act
and react freely as a result of social, economic or governmental constrains) and Model of Access
to Assets (mitigation of vulnerability through access to assets). The conceptual framework of
the double structure indicates that vulnerability cannot adequately be considered without
taking into account coping1 and response capacity2.
Figure 2. Bohle’s conceptual framework for vulnerability analysis [18] in [11]
1 Coping capacity is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to face and
manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters [8]
2 Capacity is the combination of all the strengths attributes and resources available within a community, society or
organization that can be used to achieve agreed goals [8]
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2.2.2. Vulnerability within the framework of hazard and risk
The disaster risk community defines vulnerability as a component within the context of hazard
and risk. This school usually views vulnerability, coping capacity and exposure as separate
features. One example within this approach is Davidson’s [19] conceptual framework, adopted
in [20] and illustrated in Figure 3. This framework views risk as the sum of hazard, exposure3,
vulnerability and capacity measures. Hazard is characterized by probability and severity,
exposure is characterized by structure, population and economy, while vulnerability has a
physical, social, economic and environmental dimension. Capacity and measures are related
with physical planning, management as well as social – and economic capacity.
Figure 3. Conceptual framework to identify risk [20] in [11]
2.2.3. Vulnerability in the global environmental change community
Turner [21] developed a conceptual framework considered representative for the global
environmental change community primarily due to its focus on the coupled human-environ‐
ment systems. Their definition of vulnerability encompasses exposure, sensitivity and
resilience. Exposure contains a set of components (i.e. threatened elements: individuals,
households, states, ecosystem, etc.) subjected to damage and characteristics of the threat
(frequency, magnitude, duration). The sensitivity is determined by the human (social capital
and endowments) and environmental (natural capital or biophysical endowments) conditions
of the system which influence its resilience4. The last component is enhanced through adjust‐
ments and adaptation.
A system’s vulnerability to hazards consists of (Figure 4) (i) linkages to the broader human and
biophysical (environmental) conditions and processes operating on the coupled system in
3 Exposure is defined as the totality of people, property, systems or other elements present in hazard zones that are
thereby subject to potential losses [8]
4 Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and
recover from the effects of a hazard in timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration
of its essential basic structures and functions [8]
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question; (ii) perturbations and stressors/stresses5 that emerge from this conditions and process‐
es; and (iii) the coupled human – environment system of concern in which vulnerability resides,
including exposure and responses (i.e. coping, impacts, adjustments, and adaptation) [21].
Figure 4. Vulnerability conceptual framework [21] in [11]
2.2.4. The Pressure and Release model (PAR model)
The model operates at different spatial (place, region, world), functional and temporal scales
and takes into account the interaction of the multiple perturbations and stressor/stresses [22].
Hazards are regarded as being influenced from inside and outside of the analyzed system;
however, due to their character they are commonly considered site-specific. Thus, given their
complexity, hazards are located within and beyond the place of assessment. The Pressure and
Release model (PAR model) is based on the commonly used equation which defines risk as a
function of the hazard and vulnerability (Eq. 1). It emphasizes the underlying driving forces of
vulnerability and the conditions existent in a system that contribute to disaster situations when
a hazard occurs. Vulnerability is associated with these conditions at three progressive levels: (1)
Root causes, which can be, for example, limited access to power, structures or resources; or related
with political ideologies or economic systems; (2) dynamic pressures represented, for example,
by demographic or social changes in time and space (e.g. rapid population decrease, rapid
5 Stress is a continuous or slowly increasing pressure, commonly within the range of normal variability. Stress often originates
and stressors (the sources of stress) often reside within the system [21]
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urbanization, lack of local institutions, appropriate skills or training); and (3) unsafe conditions
posed by the physical environment (e.g. unprotected buildings and infrastructure, dangerous
slopes) or socio-economic context (e.g. lack of local institutions, prevalence of endemic diseas‐
es). In Birkmann’s opinion [11], this conceptual framework is an important approach which goes
beyond identification of vulnerability towards addressing its root causes and driving forces
embedded in the human-environment system.
2.2.5. A holistic approach to risk and vulnerability
In this approach vulnerability is conditions by three categories of factors [23]:
• Physical exposure and susceptibility – regarded as hazard dependent
• Fragility of the socio-economic system – non hazard dependent
• Lack of resilience to cope and recover – non hazard dependent
The authors emphasize the importance of measuring vulnerability from a comprehensive and
multidisciplinary perspective. The model (Figure 5) takes into account the consequences of
direct physical impacts (exposure and susceptibility) as well as indirect consequences (socio-
economic fragility and lack of resilience) of potential hazardous event. Within each category,
the vulnerability factors are described with sets of indicators or indices. The model includes a
control system which alters indirectly the level of risk through corrective and prospective
interventions (risk identification, risk reduction, disaster management).
Figure 5. Conceptual framework for holistic approach to disaster risk assessment and management [23] in [11]
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The conceptual frameworks described above are different in scope and thematic focus. The
vulnerability definition encompasses exposure, coping capacities, sensitivity and adaptation
responses in the model of double structure of vulnerability [18] and the global environmental
change school model [21], while within the framework of hazard and risk, vulnerability is
separated from these characteristics. The holistic approach and the PAR Model indicate factors
and conditions of vulnerability able to measure direct physical impacts as well as indirect
consequences of disasters. It is obvious that different vulnerability frameworks serve for
different disciplinary groups and consequently there is no generally applicable model that can
satisfy all specific needs. While our ability to understand vulnerability is enhanced by these
conceptual models, only some of them result in paradigms of quantitative or qualitative
vulnerability assessment. An illustration of the methods used in physical and social vulnera‐
bility evaluation is presented below.
2.3. Vulnerability assessment methods
In the last decades, methods of vulnerability assessment have been developed and tested
within the framework of risk analysis, most of them designed for a specific hazard. Research
has demonstrated that irrespective of the type of assessment (natural - or social science based),
there are some key issues related with the definition of the vulnerable system that must be
addressed. Of particular importance is to establish the objective and (time/space) scale of
analysis. This will dictate the type of approach (method) employed taking into account data
and resource availability. The most detailed vulnerability assessments are conducted at local
level, often of individuals or households, but the data required at this level is not readily
available. For decisional purposes, regional or national-level assessment can be employed,
resulting though in inherent loss of information. An additional issue is the problem of down
or up-scaling which implies different levels of generalization and assumption making. This is
particularly important when the quality and quantity of data is low because it influences
greatly the certainty of the outcome.
Vulnerability is not only site-specific and scale dependent but also varies for different types
of hazards (e.g. floods, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis), due to process characteristics (e.g.
generation mode, rate of onset, intensity, area affected, temporal persistence in the environ‐
ment, etc.) and type of element (or set of elements) at risk. Consequently, the methods used
for the evaluation of earthquake vulnerability are not directly transferable to droughts, for
example. Vulnerability of exposed objects or systems may vary also for similar processes ([24],
[25]). Furthermore, it is acknowledged ([3], [24], [26]) that various types of the same process
(e.g. debris flow vs. rock falls for landslide processes, fluvial floods vs. pluvial floods for flood
processes) can result in different damage patterns.
An additional factor that must be considered in vulnerability assessment is the target of
analysis i.e. the elements at risk. In general terms, these are the objects or systems which pose
the potential to be adversely affected [27] by a hazardous event. In [28] the elements at risk are
defined as the objects, population, activities and processes that may be differently affected by
hazardous phenomena, in a particular area, either directly or indirectly.
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Damages or losses caused by the occurrence of hazards can be manifold. In short term, when
a disaster strikes, the primary concern are the potential losses due to casualties (fatalities,
injuries and missing persons), physical (functional) consequences on services, buildings and
infrastructure and direct economic loss. In long term, indirect economic consequences, social
‘disturbance’ and environmental degradation may become of greater importance. Many
consequences cannot be measured or quantified easily. These are referred to as intangible
losses (e.g. loss of social cohesion due to disruption of community, loss of reputation, psycho‐
logical consequences resulting from disaster impacts, cultural effects, etc.). In vulnerability
assessment, tangible losses (which can be measured, quantified) are mostly evaluated whereas
intangible losses are at best described. The difference between the two types of losses makes
their aggregation in a comprehensive consequence analysis very challenging.
In general vulnerability can be measured either on a metric scale, e.g. in terms of a given
currency, or a non-numerical scale, based on social values or perceptions and evaluations [24].
Direct human-social and physical losses can be described and quantified using different
methodological approaches. A non-exhaustive description of frequently used methods for
physical and social vulnerability assessment is given below.
2.3.1. Social vulnerability assessment
The concept of social vulnerability is complex. A number of studies developed within research
projects specifically dedicated to measuring social vulnerability to natural hazards (for
example, see [29]) showed that there are fundamental differences between the main types of
assessment approaches. These are largely based on qualitative or quantitative research
traditions which have important differences in their related paradigms.
There are two distinct perspectives on the social dimension in vulnerability assessment: (1)
one refers to intangible losses and the related elements at risk whose value cannot be easily
counted or valued in economic terms. Such factors may be categorized, for example (but are
not limited to) in environmental (biodiversity, natural scenery/tourist attractions, environ‐
mental assets used in economic activity, etc.), cultural (structures, historical material, sites of
particular cultural value/importance, etc.), institutional (loss of both human and material
resources related to the functioning of public institutions including health, law enforcement,
education and maintenance). Another interpretation refers to (2) the underlying socio-economic
factors in a society causing or producing vulnerability. Methods in this category may look into the
fabric of society to assess its preparedness and coping/adaptive capacity. A wide range of
factors may be considered and there is no generally accepted methodology that covers all
aspects of social vulnerability. A review of methodologies can be found in [11].
One central role in social vulnerability assessment is attributed to indicator based methods. In
[11] a vulnerability indicator for natural hazards is defined as as ‘a variable which is an opera‐
tional representation of a characteristic or quality of a system able to provide information
regarding the susceptibility, coping capacity and resilience of a system to an impact of an albeit
ill-defined event linked with a hazard of natural. Social and environmental indicators research
is common in the field of sustainable science. For example, United Nations Development
Program’s Human Development Index [30], proposes a composite indicator of human well-
Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability Assessments for Natural Disasters Reduction
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55538
13
The conceptual frameworks described above are different in scope and thematic focus. The
vulnerability definition encompasses exposure, coping capacities, sensitivity and adaptation
responses in the model of double structure of vulnerability [18] and the global environmental
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[25]). Furthermore, it is acknowledged ([3], [24], [26]) that various types of the same process
(e.g. debris flow vs. rock falls for landslide processes, fluvial floods vs. pluvial floods for flood
processes) can result in different damage patterns.
An additional factor that must be considered in vulnerability assessment is the target of
analysis i.e. the elements at risk. In general terms, these are the objects or systems which pose
the potential to be adversely affected [27] by a hazardous event. In [28] the elements at risk are
defined as the objects, population, activities and processes that may be differently affected by
hazardous phenomena, in a particular area, either directly or indirectly.
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consequences cannot be measured or quantified easily. These are referred to as intangible
losses (e.g. loss of social cohesion due to disruption of community, loss of reputation, psycho‐
logical consequences resulting from disaster impacts, cultural effects, etc.). In vulnerability
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intangible losses are at best described. The difference between the two types of losses makes
their aggregation in a comprehensive consequence analysis very challenging.
In general vulnerability can be measured either on a metric scale, e.g. in terms of a given
currency, or a non-numerical scale, based on social values or perceptions and evaluations [24].
Direct human-social and physical losses can be described and quantified using different
methodological approaches. A non-exhaustive description of frequently used methods for
physical and social vulnerability assessment is given below.
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The concept of social vulnerability is complex. A number of studies developed within research
projects specifically dedicated to measuring social vulnerability to natural hazards (for
example, see [29]) showed that there are fundamental differences between the main types of
assessment approaches. These are largely based on qualitative or quantitative research
traditions which have important differences in their related paradigms.
There are two distinct perspectives on the social dimension in vulnerability assessment: (1)
one refers to intangible losses and the related elements at risk whose value cannot be easily
counted or valued in economic terms. Such factors may be categorized, for example (but are
not limited to) in environmental (biodiversity, natural scenery/tourist attractions, environ‐
mental assets used in economic activity, etc.), cultural (structures, historical material, sites of
particular cultural value/importance, etc.), institutional (loss of both human and material
resources related to the functioning of public institutions including health, law enforcement,
education and maintenance). Another interpretation refers to (2) the underlying socio-economic
factors in a society causing or producing vulnerability. Methods in this category may look into the
fabric of society to assess its preparedness and coping/adaptive capacity. A wide range of
factors may be considered and there is no generally accepted methodology that covers all
aspects of social vulnerability. A review of methodologies can be found in [11].
One central role in social vulnerability assessment is attributed to indicator based methods. In
[11] a vulnerability indicator for natural hazards is defined as as ‘a variable which is an opera‐
tional representation of a characteristic or quality of a system able to provide information
regarding the susceptibility, coping capacity and resilience of a system to an impact of an albeit
ill-defined event linked with a hazard of natural. Social and environmental indicators research
is common in the field of sustainable science. For example, United Nations Development
Program’s Human Development Index [30], proposes a composite indicator of human well-
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being, as well as gender disparity and poverty among nations. Similarly, the World Bank
develops indicators that stress the links between environmental conditions and human
welfare, especially in developing nations, in order to monitor national progress toward a more
sustainable future [31]. In natural hazards risk management framework, many of the indicator
based vulnerability studies are relying on measuring attributes or factors influencing vulner‐
ability rather than understanding relationships or processes [32].
The composition and selection of vulnerability indicators is complex. Ideally, there are nine
different phases in the development of indicators (Figure 6) [33]: first, a relevant goal must be
selected and defined. Then, it is necessary to perform a scoping process in order to identify the
target group and the associated purposes for which the indicators will be used. The third phase
presumes the identification of an appropriate conceptual framework, which means structuring
the potential themes and indicators. The fourth phase implies the definition of selection
criteria for the potential indicators (see below). The fifth phase is the identification of a set of
potential indicators. Finally, there is the evaluation and selection of each indicator (phase 6)
taking into account the criteria developed at an earlier stage, which results in a final set of
indicators. The outcome of previous phases must be validated against real data, which in many
cases proofs to be the most challenging part of the process due to difficulties in measuring or
quantifying some of the intangible elements or aspect of vulnerability (e.g. social cohesion,
confidence, etc.). The last phases of the indicator development imply the preparation of a report



























Figure 6. Development process of vulnerability indicators (based on the general figure according to [33] in [11])
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Some important quality criteria for indicator and indicator development, as presented in [34],
are: sensitivity (sensitive and specific to the underlying phenomenon), relevance, measurabil‐
ity, analytical and statistical soundness, validity/ accuracy, reproducibility, and cost effective‐
ness. The indicators should also measure only important key-elements instead of trying to
indicate all aspects, and permit data comparability (across areas and/or over time).
In order to facilitate the use of indicators for decision-makers and summarize complex or multi-
dimensional issues, sets of indices or composite indicators were developed. These are mathe‐
matical combinations of sub-indicators that can be easier to interpret than trying to find a trend
in many separate indicators. However, there are no generally accepted methods of index
aggregation (index construction) and their interpretation is not unique. An extensive descrip‐
tion of construction methods and issues related with the combination of indicators is presented
in [34].
An example set of factors used to assess social vulnerability at country level based on four
main indices is [11]:
• Disaster Deficit Index (DDI; expected financial loss and capacity). The key factors describing
economic resilience are insurance and reassurance payments, reserve funds for disasters,
aid and donations, new taxes, budgetary reallocations, external credit and internal credit.
• Local Disaster Index (LDI; cumulative impact of smaller scale natural hazard events). A
uniform distribution of disasters in the area under consideration gives a high value, whereas
a high concentration of disasters in a low number of places a low value.
• Prevalent Vulnerability Index (PVI; composed of exposure, socio-economic fragility and lack
of social resilience). Each of the three components has eight sub-indices. The indices are for
example related to population and urban growth, poverty and inequality, import/exports,
arable land/land degradation, unemployment, debts, human development index, gender
inequality, governance and environmental sustainability.
• Risk  Management  Index  (RMI;  disaster  management/mitigation strategies/systems).  This
index is composed of four factors estimating capacity related to risk identification, risk
reduction, disaster management and financial protection. Sub-indices are related to the
quality of,  amongst others, loss inventories,  monitoring and mapping, public informa‐
tion and training,  land use planning,  standards,  retrofitting,  emergency planning and
response,  community  preparedness,  reconstruction,  decentralized  organization  and
budget allocation.
2.3.2. Physical vulnerability assessment
If in social vulnerability assessment the focus is on determining the indicators of societies’
coping capacities to any natural hazard and identifying the vulnerable groups or individuals
based on these indicators, in physical (or technical) vulnerability assessment the role of hazard
and their impacts is emphasized, while the human systems in mediating the outcomes is
minimized. In the technical/engineering literature for natural hazards, physical vulnerability
is generally defined on a scale ranging from 0 (no loss/damage) to 1 (total loss/damage),
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being, as well as gender disparity and poverty among nations. Similarly, the World Bank
develops indicators that stress the links between environmental conditions and human
welfare, especially in developing nations, in order to monitor national progress toward a more
sustainable future [31]. In natural hazards risk management framework, many of the indicator
based vulnerability studies are relying on measuring attributes or factors influencing vulner‐
ability rather than understanding relationships or processes [32].
The composition and selection of vulnerability indicators is complex. Ideally, there are nine
different phases in the development of indicators (Figure 6) [33]: first, a relevant goal must be
selected and defined. Then, it is necessary to perform a scoping process in order to identify the
target group and the associated purposes for which the indicators will be used. The third phase
presumes the identification of an appropriate conceptual framework, which means structuring
the potential themes and indicators. The fourth phase implies the definition of selection
criteria for the potential indicators (see below). The fifth phase is the identification of a set of
potential indicators. Finally, there is the evaluation and selection of each indicator (phase 6)
taking into account the criteria developed at an earlier stage, which results in a final set of
indicators. The outcome of previous phases must be validated against real data, which in many
cases proofs to be the most challenging part of the process due to difficulties in measuring or
quantifying some of the intangible elements or aspect of vulnerability (e.g. social cohesion,
confidence, etc.). The last phases of the indicator development imply the preparation of a report
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Some important quality criteria for indicator and indicator development, as presented in [34],
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ness. The indicators should also measure only important key-elements instead of trying to
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aggregation (index construction) and their interpretation is not unique. An extensive descrip‐
tion of construction methods and issues related with the combination of indicators is presented
in [34].
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aid and donations, new taxes, budgetary reallocations, external credit and internal credit.
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a high concentration of disasters in a low number of places a low value.
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• Risk  Management  Index  (RMI;  disaster  management/mitigation strategies/systems).  This
index is composed of four factors estimating capacity related to risk identification, risk
reduction, disaster management and financial protection. Sub-indices are related to the
quality of,  amongst others, loss inventories,  monitoring and mapping, public informa‐
tion and training,  land use planning,  standards,  retrofitting,  emergency planning and
response,  community  preparedness,  reconstruction,  decentralized  organization  and
budget allocation.
2.3.2. Physical vulnerability assessment
If in social vulnerability assessment the focus is on determining the indicators of societies’
coping capacities to any natural hazard and identifying the vulnerable groups or individuals
based on these indicators, in physical (or technical) vulnerability assessment the role of hazard
and their impacts is emphasized, while the human systems in mediating the outcomes is
minimized. In the technical/engineering literature for natural hazards, physical vulnerability
is generally defined on a scale ranging from 0 (no loss/damage) to 1 (total loss/damage),
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representing the degree of loss/potential damage of the element at risk (see Table 1). The
evaluation of vulnerability and the combination of the hazard and the vulnerability to obtain
the risk differs between natural phenomena. However, the majority of models see vulnerability
as being dependent both on the acting agent (physical impact of a hazard event) and the
exposed element (structural or physical characteristics of the vulnerable object). The most
common expressions of physical vulnerability for different types of hazards (landslides,
floods, earthquakes) are: vulnerability curves (stage-damage functions), fragility curves,
damage matrices and vulnerability indicators [35]. In recent decades, research on flood
vulnerability assessment has advanced substantially (especially with the aid of computational
techniques) and different modeling approaches ranging from post-event damage observations
to laboratory-based experiments and physical modeling have been developed. One major
applications of flood vulnerability analysis is the development of guidelines for reducing
structural vulnerability for different types of properties. Likewise, the results of these studies
are used in spatial development strategies (spatial planning) and for identification of the
elements or areas where damages would be expected in case of flood occurrence. There are
two main approaches of flood vulnerability assessment: one (1) focuses on the economic
damage and is essentially a quantification of the expected or actual damages to a structure
expressed in monetary terms or through an evaluation of the percentage of the expected loss;
(2) the other, deals with the physical vulnerability of individual structures and on the estima‐
tion of the likelihood of occurrence of physical damages or collapse of a single element (e.g. a
building). Within the last category, two general methods can be identified:
Empirical methods are based on the analysis of observed consequences (collection of actual
flood damage information after the event) through the use of interviews, questionnaires and
field mapping. The main advantage of these methods is the use of real data. However, the
results are very much dependent on the respondents’ risk perception for the first two - and
data availability (especially for deriving stage-damage curves) for the last collection method.
In analytical methods (i) different flood parameters (duration, velocity, impact pressure, etc.)
are directly controlled during laboratory experiments and their effects on the structures are
quantified; (ii) numerical models and computer simulation techniques are used to estimate the
reliability of a structure and/or calculate its probability of failure (usually hydrologic and
hydraulic modeling of the floodplain is a pre-requisite) [36]. This type of approaches are
resource demanding (time and money) but allow for a better understanding of the relation
between flood intensity and degree of damage for an exposed structure with definite charac‐
teristics. Moreover, due to data/resources requirement, they can only be used for assessment
of individual structures.
The key parameters used in order to quantify physical vulnerability to floods are related with
the forces (buoyancy, hydrostatic pressure and dynamic pressure) that flooding is likely to
exert on a structure (e.g. building, bridge, dam, etc.). Directly linked with these forces are the
characteristics of the damaging agent (water) which are reflected in a number of actions on the
exposed structure: hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, erosion, buoyancy, etc. ([37] in [38]).
The most  used approach for  assessing and modeling direct  flood damages is  the stage-
damage functions which relates the relative or absolute damage for a certain class of objects
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to  the inundation depth (Figure 7).  One limitation in their  use is  the assessment  of  the
degree  of  damage  based  solely  on  one  characteristic  of  the  exposed  element/group  of
elements  (e.g.  building  type).  Likewise,  the  flood  damage  influencing  parameter  e.g.
inundation depth, may not be the only hazard indicator that contributes to the quantity of
losses [39]. In [40] the importance of further influencing factors like ‘duration of inunda‐
tion, sediment concentration, availability and information content of flood warning and the
quality of external response in a flood situation’ are emphasized. For static floods (slow
moving water) the depth is considered to be sufficient for the analysis,  but for dynamic
floods, velocity is regarded as more important.
Figure 7. Example of flood damage curves showing damage to structures, contents and total damage as a function of
inundation depths [41]
In HAZUS-MH Flood Model [42] the latter parameter is directly considered. A velocity-depth
function is included indicating if building collapse has to be assumed. A threshold for collapse
corresponding to 100% damage is set, while below this threshold the damage is estimated
based on the inundation level only. The model also takes into account the effect of warning
which is assessed based on a ‘day-curve’. If a public response rate of 100% is assumed, a
maximum of 35% of damage reduction can be achieved depending on the time of warning [26].
The flood hazard module addresses both riverine and coastal floods; flash-floods are not
included in the model’s capability.
The Swiss risk concept from the Nationale Platform Naturgefahren (PLANAT) defines three
intensity classes for flood vulnerability analysis, based on flood depth and velocity which are
used in spatial planning regulations (Table 2).
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the forces (buoyancy, hydrostatic pressure and dynamic pressure) that flooding is likely to
exert on a structure (e.g. building, bridge, dam, etc.). Directly linked with these forces are the
characteristics of the damaging agent (water) which are reflected in a number of actions on the
exposed structure: hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, erosion, buoyancy, etc. ([37] in [38]).
The most  used approach for  assessing and modeling direct  flood damages is  the stage-
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In HAZUS-MH Flood Model [42] the latter parameter is directly considered. A velocity-depth
function is included indicating if building collapse has to be assumed. A threshold for collapse
corresponding to 100% damage is set, while below this threshold the damage is estimated
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Low h < 0.5 m or
v x h < 0.5 m2/s
Persons are barely at risk and only low damages at buildings or disruption
have to be expected
Middle 2 m > h > 0.5 m or
2 m2/s > v x h > 0.5
m2/s
Persons outside of buildings are at risk and damage to buildings can occur
while persons in buildings are quite safe and sudden destruction of
buildings is improbable
High h > 2 m or
v x h > 2 m2/s
Persons inside and outside of buildings are at risk and the destruction of
buildings is possible or events with lower intensity occur but with higher
frequency and persons outside of buildings are at risk
Table 2. Intensity classes based on flood depth and velocity from PLANAT in [26]
Damages caused by landslides to population, environment and built-up areas are significantly
less than for other natural hazards due to the inherent characteristic of the process. However,
the extent of these losses is frequently underestimated especially when landslides are associ‐
ated with the occurrence of floods or earthquakes (their consequences tend to be aggregated).
Generally, vulnerability to landslides depends on a variety of factors like: runout distance;
volume and velocity of sliding; pressure caused by the movement; height of deposition;
elements at risk (e.g. different structures), their nature and their proximity to the slide; elements
at risk (e.g. persons), their proximity to the slide, the nature of the building/roads they are in
[43].
Research in the field of landslide hazard and risk ([24], [44], [45],[46]) has demonstrated that
in contrast to other natural processes (flooding, earthquakes) landslide vulnerability is more
difficult to assess due to a number of reason, such as:
i. The complexity and the wide range of variety of landslide processes (landslides are
determined by different predisposing and triggering factors which results in various
mechanisms of failure and mobility, size, shape, etc.)
ii. The lack of systematic methods for expressing landslide intensity - there is no general
indicator of landslide intensity (e.g. for rock falls, impact pressure or volume can be
used whereas for debris flow deposit height is common; other indicators such as flow
velocity are rarely considered) and in practice data scarcity reduces their number
significantly
iii. The quantitative heterogeneity of vulnerability of different elements at risk for
qualitatively similar landslide mechanisms due to their intrinsic characteristics (here,
human life constitutes a special case)
iv. The variability in spatial and temporal vulnerability
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v. The lack of historical damage databases – usually only events which cause extensive
damage are recorded and data about the type and extent of damage is often missing
vi. Non-physical factors influence the vulnerability of people (e.g. early warning, hazard
and risk perception, etc.)
Landslide vulnerability assessment approaches range significantly due to various foci and
objectives addressed. Some consider vulnerability within the landslide risk management
framework, others evaluate exclusively physical vulnerability. Three general types of meth‐
odologies can be identified (without excluding the possibility of other classification schemes):
Qualitative methods ([47], [48], [35]) - given a particular landslide type and the characteristics
of the elements at risk, the appropriate vulnerability factor is assessed by expert judgment,
field mapping or based on historical records. These methods are flexible (e.g. indicator based
methods) valuable and easy to use/understand by decision makers. However, a major
limitation of this approach is that most of the data have to be assumed and there is no direct
(quantified) relation between hazard intensities and degree of damage.
As an example, in [47] an empirical GIS-based geomorphological approach for landslide and
risk analysis was proposed, using stereoscopic aerial photographs and field mapping in order
to represent the changes in distribution and shape of landslides and assess their expected
frequency of occurrence and intensity. The damages were classified in three classes using a
qualitative relationship between landslide intensity/type and their consequences: superficial
(aesthetic, minor) damage where the functionality of the elements at risk is not compromised
and damage can be repaired, rapidly and at low costs; functional (medium) damage, where the
functionality of the structures is compromised, and the damage takes time and large resources
to be fixed; structural (total) damage, where buildings or transportation routes are severely or
completely damaged, and require extensive (and costly) work to be fixed (demolition and
reconstruction may be required).
Semi-quantitative methods are reducing the level of generalization in comparison with
qualitative methods. They are flexible and can, to a certain degree, reduce subjectivity,
compared with the methods mentioned above. Within this category, damage matrices, for
example, are composed by classified intensities and stepwise damage levels. In [49] damage
matrices were suggested based on damaging factors and the resistance of the elements at risk
to the impact of landslides. Figure 8 shows a correlation, in terms of vulnerability, between
exposed elements and the characteristics of the hazard. The applicability of this method,
requires statistical analysis of detailed records on landslides and their consequences [50]. This
proves to be a challenge in data scarce environments.
Quantitative methods ([51], [52], [53], [54]) are mostly applied at local scale (often, for
individual structures) due to complexity of procedures involved and detailed data require‐
ments. Quantitative methods are usually employed by engineers or actors involved in
technical decision making, as they allow for a more explicit objective output. The results can
be directly integrated in a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) also taking into account the
uncertainty in vulnerability analysis. The procedures involved can rely on i) expert judgment
(heuristic), ii) damage records (empirical) or iii) statistical analysis (probabilistic).
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have to be expected
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One example of quantitative expert judgment used to evaluate physical vulnerability of roads
to debris flows was used in [55]. 147 respondents from 17 countries were asked to use their
expert knowledge to assess the probability of a certain damage state being exceeded given that
a volume of debris impacts a road (Table 3).
Description of probabilities
Descriptor Description Values for analysis
Highly improbable Damage state almost certainly exceeded, but cannot be
ruled out
0.000001
Improbable(remote) Damage state only exceeded in exceptional circumstances 0.00001
Very unlikely Damage state will only be exceeded in very unusual
circumstances
0.001
Unlikely Damage state may be exceeded, but would not be
expected to occur under normal circumstances
0.001
Likely Damage state expected to be exceeded 0.01
Very likely Damage state almost certainly exceeded 0.1
Table 3. Damage state definition [55]
Figure 8. Structural vulnerability matrix [49]
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Based on the questionnaire results, fragility curves were produced which relate the flow
volume to damage probabilities (Figures 9). It should be noted that in this study probabilites
were derived based on the respondents experience only (qualitative data) with no statistical
processing of damage observations or analytical/numerical modeling. The results were
compared to known events in Scotland (UK) and the Republic of Korea. The major limitation
of this method is the high degree of subjectivity, however it advances expert knowledge which
might be in some cases the only/most appropriate source of information about damages caused
by the impact of landslides.
Figure 9. Fragility curves ‘forced’ to unity and manually extrapolated to the next order of magnitude for volume (local
roads). The vertical lines are added at 200, 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 m3 (illustration only for ‘limited damage’
curves) [55]
In reference [53], the author performed a study of a well-documented debris flow event which
occurred in the Austrian Alps (August, 1997) and derived vulnerability curves for buildings
located on the fan of the torrent based on the intensity of the phenomenon and the damage
ratio. The intensity was approximated by deposit height and the susceptibility of the element
at risk (i.e. buildings) by material of construction (brick, masonry, and concrete). Figure 10
shows the curve produced together with other existing curves for comparison. The application
of this vulnerability function is limited to process intensities expressed as deposit height ≤ 2.5
– 3 m which means that the curve is not relevant for intensities which exceed this value.
Nevertheless, the authors argue that such high process intensities generally result in a total
loss of the building since the reparation costs will exceed the expenditure necessary for a new
construction [53].
Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability Assessments for Natural Disasters Reduction
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55538
21
One example of quantitative expert judgment used to evaluate physical vulnerability of roads
to debris flows was used in [55]. 147 respondents from 17 countries were asked to use their
expert knowledge to assess the probability of a certain damage state being exceeded given that
a volume of debris impacts a road (Table 3).
Description of probabilities
Descriptor Description Values for analysis
Highly improbable Damage state almost certainly exceeded, but cannot be
ruled out
0.000001
Improbable(remote) Damage state only exceeded in exceptional circumstances 0.00001
Very unlikely Damage state will only be exceeded in very unusual
circumstances
0.001
Unlikely Damage state may be exceeded, but would not be
expected to occur under normal circumstances
0.001
Likely Damage state expected to be exceeded 0.01
Very likely Damage state almost certainly exceeded 0.1
Table 3. Damage state definition [55]
Figure 8. Structural vulnerability matrix [49]
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters20
Based on the questionnaire results, fragility curves were produced which relate the flow
volume to damage probabilities (Figures 9). It should be noted that in this study probabilites
were derived based on the respondents experience only (qualitative data) with no statistical
processing of damage observations or analytical/numerical modeling. The results were
compared to known events in Scotland (UK) and the Republic of Korea. The major limitation
of this method is the high degree of subjectivity, however it advances expert knowledge which
might be in some cases the only/most appropriate source of information about damages caused
by the impact of landslides.
Figure 9. Fragility curves ‘forced’ to unity and manually extrapolated to the next order of magnitude for volume (local
roads). The vertical lines are added at 200, 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 m3 (illustration only for ‘limited damage’
curves) [55]
In reference [53], the author performed a study of a well-documented debris flow event which
occurred in the Austrian Alps (August, 1997) and derived vulnerability curves for buildings
located on the fan of the torrent based on the intensity of the phenomenon and the damage
ratio. The intensity was approximated by deposit height and the susceptibility of the element
at risk (i.e. buildings) by material of construction (brick, masonry, and concrete). Figure 10
shows the curve produced together with other existing curves for comparison. The application
of this vulnerability function is limited to process intensities expressed as deposit height ≤ 2.5
– 3 m which means that the curve is not relevant for intensities which exceed this value.
Nevertheless, the authors argue that such high process intensities generally result in a total
loss of the building since the reparation costs will exceed the expenditure necessary for a new
construction [53].
Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability Assessments for Natural Disasters Reduction
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55538
21
Figure 10. Relationship between debris flow intensity and vulnerability is expressed by a second order polynomial
function for flow height > 2.5 m. Results from the study are indicated by black dots, the corresponding mean vulnera‐
bility is indicated by red dots [53]
In another study [51], a scenario-based method derived from a probabilistic approach to
regional vulnerability assessment [56] was used. The authors defined vulnerability as a
function of landslide intensity and the susceptibility of vulnerable elements (see Eq. 2).
V = I S· (2)
Susceptibility is defined as ‘the lack of inherent capacity of the elements in the spatial extension
under investigation to preserve their physical integrity and functionality in the course of the
physical interaction with a generic sliding mass’ and is independent of the characteristics of
the landslide [51]. The susceptibility model is able to accommodate any factor dictated by the
analyzed category of elements at risk. In this study, the susceptibility factors taken into account
are: (a) resistance and state of maintenance for structures, and (b) persons in open space and
vehicles, population density, income, age, and persons in structures, for individuals. For
landslide intensity, a composite parameter is derived based on the kinetic – (related with the
damage caused by the impact energy of the sliding mass) and kinematic (accounts for the
effects of size-linked features of a reference landslide) characteristics of the interaction between
the sliding mass and the reference area proposed. Models for quantification of susceptibility
(Eq. 2) and intensity (Eq. 3) are illustrated below:
S =1 -  ∏
i=1
ns
(1 -  ϑi) (3)
where,
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ϑi is the i-th on ns susceptibility factor (each defined in the range) contributing to the category
susceptibility
and,
I =ks ∙ (rK ∙ IK + rM ∙ IM ) (4)
where,
ks is the spatial impact ratio (equal to the ratio between the area pertaining to the category that
is affected by the landslide and the total area pertaining to the category); rK  and  IK  are kinetic
factors and  rM  and IM  are kinematic factors. The proposed methodology provided a
framework for the quantification of uncertainties in vulnerability assessment.
3. Uncertainty in vulnerability analysis
In natural hazards risk management, decisions regarding the risk associated with a particular
hazard are essentially enacted based on limited information and resources. In order to improve
this process, experts started to investigate the effects of uncertainty on risk (and its determi‐
nants) qualitatively or quantitatively and communicate their results to decision-makers. This
one-way approach toward finding solutions for advancing decision making proves out to be
insufficient in contrast to the complexity of the problems at hand, especially when dealing with
inherent uncertainties or unforeseen changes in the human-environmental system. Neverthe‐
less, effort are being made to reduce the effects of uncertainty on vulnerability (and conse‐
quently, risk), particularly related with the data and models used. For example, representing
hazard damage potential by only one parameter (e.g. for floods – depth of inundation) can
result in overestimations of vulnerability and subsequently in un-economic investments in
mitigation countermeasures. One possibility to overcome this problem would be to reduce the
uncertainty in the input data by using data-mining approaches (e.g. tree-structured models)
for the selection of the most important damage-influencing parameters [39]. Other examples
would be the use of scenario analysis for seismic vulnerability and its probable damages in
order to develop a hierarchy of effective factors in earthquake vulnerability [57] or testing the
performance of different structures (reliability analysis) subjected to the impact of landslides
with various intensities through the use of traditional methods like Monte Carlo Simulation
(MCS), First Order Second Moment (FOSM), First Order - /Second Order Reliability Method
(FORM/SORM). However, the selection of the most appropriate uncertainty modeling
approach depends on the level of complexity required by the scope of analysis or the use of
the final results.
Generally, uncertainties in decision and risk analysis can be divided into two categories [10]:
those that stem from ‘real’ variability in known (or observable) processes or phenomena (e.g.
height or the ethnicity of an arbitrary individual in a specified population or the distribution
of velocities in a sliding mass, etc.) and those which reside from our limited knowledge about
fundamental phenomena (e.g. the nature of some earthquake mechanism, the effect of water
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level fluctuation on clay slope stability, etc.). The former is known as aleatory (inherent or
stochastic) uncertainty and cannot be reduced. The latter, epistemic uncertainty, includes
measurement uncertainty, statistical uncertainty (due to limited information), and model
uncertainty, which can be reduced, for example, by increasing the probing samples or by
improving the measurement methods or modeling algorithms. Other types of classification
systems, together with a review of methods and simulation techniques for uncertainty
treatment are critically discussed and illustrated in a work performed by the Norwegian
Geotechnical Institute (NGI), in [34]. Uncertainty can be addressed from (1) an integrative
perspective, where vulnerability is registered by exposure to hazards but also resides in the
resilience of the system experiencing the hazard [58] (bottom-up oriented vulnerability
assessment). In this context, uncertainty is associated with future changes (in frequency and
magnitude of hazards but also in climatic, environmental and socio-economic patterns)
characterized by unknowable risks to which communities must learn to adapt. This approach
is centered on the human systems’ coping capacity and promotes vulnerability reduction
through enhancing resilience to future change. Conversely, (2) a direct approach towards
reduction of (epistemic) uncertainty is developed within the technical field (assimilated to
deductive, top-down vulnerability assessments), where uncertainty models are defined for
each component of vulnerability and the sources of uncertainty categorized [45]. Figure 11
shows how these two approaches of dealing with uncertainty can inform climate adaptation
policy: one is (epistemic) uncertainty ‘reducer’ while the other is uncertainty ‘accepting’ (due
to issues like, for example, timescale and planning horizons, the unit of analysis being
considered and the development status of the region or country) [59].
Figure 11. “Top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches used to inform adaptation to climate change [59]
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Table 4 illustrates an example of uncertainty sources in physical vulnerability analysis of
buildings. It is obvious that these will vary with the methodology used and the quality and
quantity of data available.
Type Source
Epistemic Intensity assessment (using proxies e.g. depth of material, velocity, volume, impact pressure, etc.)
Characterization of elements at risk (e.g. structural-morphological characteristics, state of
maintenance, strategic relevance, etc.)
Estimations of buildings’ value and damage costs
Vulnerability model (selection of parameters, mathematical model, calculation limitations)
Expert judgement
Aleatory Spatial variability of parameters* (e.g. landslide intensities, population density, etc.)
*also related with the scale of investigation
Table 4. Sources of uncertainty in physical vulnerability to landslides (e.g. for buildings)
Within the general risk assessment framework, uncertainty propagates not only from one
component of risk to another but also within the process stages of vulnerability analysis. This
is schematically described in a classification system for vulnerability estimation proposed in
[34] and represented in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Classification system for vulnerability estimation. Uncertainty is associated with each process stage [34]
According to the authors, uncertainty associated with the input data (depending on the type,
quantity and quality), propagates through the model, which also contains a degree of uncer‐
tainty due to, for example, expert judgment, mathematical model or basic assumptions. The
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uncertainty in the output depends on the two previous process stages as well as the uncertainty
related with the interpretation of the results.
4. Conclusions
The most important goal in developing tools for measuring vulnerability is their use in natural
hazards risk reduction strategies, thus applying them in decision making processes. In this
context, it is necessary to know what is the objective of the assessment, what is the target group
of any particular approach, who is using the results and what is their understanding of the
outcome. The methods of vulnerability assessment presented herein are mere exemplification
of the complexity and wide range of approaches that can be applied in natural hazards disaster
risk management. However, based on these a number of observations may be formulated.
Vulnerability  defined  considering  physical  exposure  or  social-economical  determinants
only cannot encompass the complexity of effects caused by the impact of a natural hazard
on an element  or  group of  elements  at  risk  (especially  for  systems like  urban develop‐
ments,  communities,  etc.).  In  an  editorial  for  vulnerability  to  natural  hazards  [60]  ad‐
dressed the question of integration between natural and social scientific approaches based
on a number of research studies. Their findings show that,  studies that are dedicated to
different  components  of  vulnerability  (e.g.  frequency  and  magnitude  of  a  hazard,  ele‐
ments at  risk,  exposure,  coping and adaptation capacities,  etc.)  and therefore use differ‐
ent  methodological  approaches,  are  relatively  similar  in  scope.  Hence it  is  important  to
clearly describe and define which components of risk and/or vulnerability assessment are
considered in each individual case study. The aim is to communicate without losing the
perspective either of the approaches advances. Thus, a step forward towards an integra‐
tive vulnerability assessment might be to strengthen the dialogue between different groups
of experts in natural hazard vulnerability/risk assessment through exchange of views about
definitions, concept and underlying worldviews and values [60].
In terms of vulnerability/risk assessment outcomes, there are three main types of methods
(results) - quantitative, semi-quantitative and qualitative, all with benefits and drawbacks. The
main difference between quantitative and qualitative methods lies in the fact that quantitative
assessments provide a more explicit objective framework which may be conducive to improv‐
ing decision making process. However, the most appropriate tool depends on the decision
problem at hand (for example, qualitative vulnerability assessment can be more cost effective,
less time consuming and easier to understand for non-technical stakeholders), the objective
(including scale) of the analysis and the quality/quantity of available data. Hence there is no
general preference for qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative approaches [61]. One must
also acknowledge that there is no quantitative vulnerability/risk assessment totally devoid of
expert judgment; quantitative vulnerability/risk analysis rather provides a framework for
making systematic judgment [62]. It is the quality and quantity of subjectivity that affects the
overall outcome of the analysis.
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assessment’. However, progress has been done, for example, in the field of technical (struc‐
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1. Introduction
The discourse of disaster management has undergone significant changes in recent deca‐
des and their  effects  have been profoundly felt  in the developing world,  particularly in
terms of reduction in the loss of human lives. In this chapter, we concentrate on the evo‐
lution of disaster management approaches in Bangladesh and the method of their imple‐
mentation by mobilizing institutions as a case in the developing world. The geographical
location of Bangladesh in South Asia, at the confluence of three large river systems – the
Brahmaputra, the Ganges, and the Meghna – and north of the Bay of Bengal,  renders it
one of the most vulnerable places to floods and cyclones. Human-induced climate change
exacerbates the problem, with its already manifested effects and the predicted rise in sea
level of 0.3 m to 0.5 m by 2050 [1, 2, 3]. Climate models have revealed that the effects of
climate change are not only affecting individual countries,  but resulting in increased cli‐
mate variations at regional levels [4]. Bangladesh, as part of South Asia, is likely to experi‐
ence more variations in climate regimes, as well as more extreme weather events.
Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world, except city states, with more
than 1,000 people per sq km [5]. Agriculture, which provides a quarter of the gross domestic
product (GDP), depends largely on timely monsoon rainfall and regularity in seasonal fluctua‐
tions. In the period 1970–2004, about 0.7 million people lost their lives due to natural disasters,
and economic losses totaled about US $5.5 billion [6, 7, 8, 9]. The cyclone of 1970, in the coastal
areas of what was then East Pakistan, alone claimed over half a million lives. Again, the 1991 and
2007 cyclones caused the loss of about 149,000 and 3,406 people respectively. In recent years, the
frequency of extreme floods has increased, as has the corresponding economic loss. The flood in
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July 2004 was the most devastating – with an economic loss of about US $2.2 billion [5]. In terms
of GDP, this loss was less than what the world’s poorest countries faced during the 1985–99 dis‐
asters – a loss of 13.4% of combined GDP [10]. But the loss in Bangladesh amounted to an im‐
mense step backwards in development efforts. The floods in 2007 inundated about 36% of the
total area in 57 out of 64 districts [11] and affected at least 4.5 million people [12].
Because of the extreme vulnerability of the people in general and of the economy to natural dis‐
asters, various regimes of the government of Bangladesh (pre- and post-independence) have
developed an institutional infrastructure to deal with natural hazards and their potential losses
[13, 14]. Traditionally, the disaster management approach in the country has been to respond to
disaster in the aftermath of the events. Nonetheless, the ever-increasing human and economic
costs have raised serious questions about such approaches. Also, flood-disaster management
has relied heavily on structural engineering and post-flood relief operations. Overall, such a
post-facto approach has failed to effectively deal with the problems of disaster loss.
In recent years, there has been a shift to recognize the critical roles of non-structural measures as
well as pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness. These initiatives recognize the roles of differ‐
ent stakeholders. For example, the Disaster Management Act of 1998 acknowledges the capaci‐
ty of affected populations [15]: “An event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, that
seriously disrupts the functioning of a society, causing … such severity that the affected com‐
munity has to respond by taking exceptional measures and is on a scale that exceeds the ability
of the affected people to cope with using only its own resources.” Disaster management war‐
rants more than relief and recovery: it should be part of development planning, without which
the loss of life and property is likely to intensify. It is recognized that institutional partnerships
can be effective when they involve all stakeholders – government, local communities, NGO/
CBOs, media, the private sector, academia, neighboring countries, and donor communities.
In this study, we examine the extent and effectiveness of institutional partnership from the
perspective of a shift from a managerial approach to an approach using participatory, collective
decision-making and resource-sharing to manage disaster risk. Since community members are
the direct and most seriously affected victims, effective and sustainable partnership requires
a change from a partnership approach based on equality to a focus on the community [16].
Our central concerns are to assess who decides, at what level, and how. There has been only
very limited analysis of the shifting approaches and of how institutions at different levels are
presently functioning in Bangladesh. Is this mechanism based on partnership, with collective
decision-making? Is a culture of working together on a national cause such as disaster
management evolving? How functional are these elaborate institutional mechanisms? What
is the role of the private sector or the knowledge stakeholders? How can an effective partner‐
ship be built into disaster management? These are questions we examine in this chapter.
2. Methodology
Our research examines whether the elaborate institutional mechanisms of disaster manage‐
ment in Bangladesh reflect the partnership of stakeholders. For this purpose, social science
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policy analysis seemed useful. Obtaining reliable quantitative data on activities of both
government and NGOs is a chronic problem in Bangladesh; our research therefore applied
qualitative, rather than quantitative, tools and techniques.
Both primary and secondary data sources were used for empirical investigation and policy
analysis. To collect the primary data from local communities, we applied a case study approach
which employed participatory rural appraisal tools, such as focus group discussions (FGDs),
household interviews and key informant interviews, in two coastal communities of Bangla‐
desh severely affected by Cyclone Sidr. We analyzed data procured from a total of 162
households distributed across eight villages, which were randomly selected to conduct the
interviews and FGDs. We received 100% response from the targeted households for household
interview. A random sampling procedure was followed to select households from the
complete list of households in the selected villages for interview. Households were propor‐
tionately selected according to the size of the villages, and household heads were interviewed.
Eight FGDs were carried out by administering a semi-structured questionnaire to each village.
For policy analysis, we relied chiefly on secondary data, which were supplemented by primary
data. Because Bangladesh has experienced numerous devastating cyclones, as well as long-
lasting floods that have caused immense suffering to people and damage to properties in recent
decades, we relied on secondary data on the relevant disaster response and management
policies. Official documents from the government and donors, study reports from NGOs and
other organizations, journal articles, newspaper clippings, TV reports and documentaries, and
internet resources from reliable and responsible sources provided additional information for
our analysis. To ensure openness in discussing sensitive issues, we used informal discussions
with stakeholders at different levels. Through personal contacts and over the internet we
collected reports and documents from government agencies, NGOs, and donors in Bangla‐
desh, such as the Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Centre (BDPC), the Disaster Forum, the
Disaster Management Bureau, the Sustainable Development Resource Centre, and the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP).
3. Shifting approaches in disaster management
In recent decades, government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local
communities in Bangladesh have undertaken various measures to mitigate the impacts of
natural disasters, including floods and cyclones, on the people, economy and society. The
concept of developing national preparedness, as opposed to post-event response, to disasters
like floods and cyclones evolved after the floods of 1988 and the devastating cyclone of 1991.
The main argument behind this shift was that if people were well prepared for frequent
disasters they would minimize their impacts, resulting in a reduced need for relief and
rehabilitation. It was also strongly felt by the public institutions that if disaster preparedness
could be integrated in the socio-economic development process at household, community,
regional and national levels, it would build the long-term capacity of the community to
mitigate risk and vulnerability to disasters [17]. The aim of the shift also included changing
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disaster management approaches and measures from structural engineering interventions to
the social dimensions and community partnerships.
The  stated  significant  change  in  emergency  and  disaster  management  approaches  de‐
manded institutional  restructuring  in  the  governance  portfolios.  Consequently,  the  gov‐
ernment  of  Bangladesh,  led  by  the  Ministry  of  Disaster  Management  and  Relief,  has
undertaken  various  steps  in  the  form of  policy,  strategy  and programs considering  the
concept of disaster management through mitigation, preparedness, recovery and rehabili‐
tation.  The  government  established  the  Disaster  Management  Bureau  (DMB)  under  the
Ministry of Disaster Management in 1993 to promote disaster prevention, mitigation and
preparedness; to provide guidelines; and to organize training and awareness for the con‐
cerned people and stakeholders to mitigate the impacts of disasters. Currently, the DMB
has  focused  on  risk  reduction  through  community  mobilization,  capacity-building  and
linking risk reduction with the socio-economic development of  the poor and vulnerable
groups  and  with  developing  the  DMB’s  partnership  with  other  government  agencies,
NGOs and international organizations.
Alongside the development thinkers, international development partners (such as UNDP,
DFID, Oxfam GB, USAID, Care International, Caritas) and local NGOs which are concerned
with, and are experienced in, disaster management in Bangladesh, the government has
promoted the approach of capacity-building and disaster preparedness at all levels. A call for
institutional partnerships therefore stemmed from both the government as well as non-
governmental and civil society organizations. A few key policy planners and senior govern‐
ment officials have also favored this new thinking and reflected this through the renaming of
the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief.
In 1993, the Ministry of Disaster Management then established the Disaster Management
Bureau (DMB) and the government set up a national council and various committees at
national, district, upazila (sub-district) and union (local council) levels, for overall disaster
management preparedness [17]. The implications of this institutional restructuring were
manifold, and evolved through a sequence of placing increasing emphasis on institutional
partnership and community-based disaster management (CBDM).
3.1. Institutional Restructuring to Reflect a Shift in Disaster Management
In order to manage the consequences of natural disasters, formal public policymaking
institutions in Bangladesh have formulated a well-developed mechanism (Figure 1) at national
and field levels. The factors that led to such a development can be explained as follows:
a. the severity of the consequent casualties has led to motivations at local, national and
international levels to address the issue;
b. the recurrent disasters created serious development setbacks: loss in the production and
infrastructure sectors set back the affected regions and the country; and
c. in order to attract external investment, the minimization of disaster risks and vulnerabil‐
ities warranted intervention at the policy level.
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In Bangladesh, at the national level, four high-profile bodies were established for the multi-
sectoral coordination of emergencies associated with environmental disasters as well as
disaster management in general: the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), headed
by the prime minister; the Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Coordination Committee
(IMDMCC), led by the minister of food and disaster management; the National Disaster
Management Advisory Committee (NDMAC), headed by a specialist nominated by the prime
minister; and a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Disaster Management to supervise
national policies and programs. The common missions of these bodies have been to provide
policy and management guidance and the macro-coordination of activities, particularly relief
and rehabilitation.
Presently, the lead actor in disaster management is the Ministry of Disaster Management and
Relief (MoDMR) until 2002. It has the role of inter-ministerial planning of disaster management
and coordination and of responding in the event of a disaster. Under the MoDMR, there are
two line agencies, the Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) and the Directorate of Relief and
Rehabilitation (DRR). The DMB is a small professional unit at the national level that performs
specialist functions, working with district and upazila (sub-district) administrations and line
ministries under the overall guidance of the IMDMCC. It is a catalyst for planning, for
arranging public education, and for organizing the systematic training of government officers
and other personnel from the national down to the union (local council) or community level.
The DRR manages the post-disaster provision of relief and rehabilitation. At present, it leads
risk reduction at the local community level.
Among all the other ministries, the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) plays a vital role in
flood management. It is involved in the planning of water resources, including planning for
water-related natural disasters such as cyclone protection, flood proofing, riverbank erosion
control and drought management, although the mitigation of disasters remains beyond their
mandate. The Flood Forecasting and Warning Center (FFWC), under the Bangladesh Water
Development Board (BWDB) of the MoWR, plays an important role in providing early warning
about impending floods to the agencies involved.
In the areas of both cyclone and flood hazards, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BRCS)
and various donor agencies play important roles. The Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP)
was established in 1972 following the devastating cyclone of 1970, under an agreement
between the BRCS and the government of Bangladesh, with an aim to undertake effective
cyclone preparedness measures in the coastal areas. CPP, under the BRCS, has a joint man‐
agement structure, with two committees, viz. a 7-member Policy Committee headed by the
Minister of MoFDM, and a 15-member Implementation Board led by the Secretary of the
MoFDM. Now the CPP has about 33,120 trained volunteers, including 5,520 women [18].
Besides, the government has a “standing order” for natural disasters (mainly for floods and
cyclones), which was last updated in August 1999. The standing orders are followed by all
ministries, divisions/departments and government agencies during normal times, precau‐
tionary and warning stages, the disaster stage and the post-disaster stage.
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minister; and a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Disaster Management to supervise
national policies and programs. The common missions of these bodies have been to provide
policy and management guidance and the macro-coordination of activities, particularly relief
and rehabilitation.
Presently, the lead actor in disaster management is the Ministry of Disaster Management and
Relief (MoDMR) until 2002. It has the role of inter-ministerial planning of disaster management
and coordination and of responding in the event of a disaster. Under the MoDMR, there are
two line agencies, the Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) and the Directorate of Relief and
Rehabilitation (DRR). The DMB is a small professional unit at the national level that performs
specialist functions, working with district and upazila (sub-district) administrations and line
ministries under the overall guidance of the IMDMCC. It is a catalyst for planning, for
arranging public education, and for organizing the systematic training of government officers
and other personnel from the national down to the union (local council) or community level.
The DRR manages the post-disaster provision of relief and rehabilitation. At present, it leads
risk reduction at the local community level.
Among all the other ministries, the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) plays a vital role in
flood management. It is involved in the planning of water resources, including planning for
water-related natural disasters such as cyclone protection, flood proofing, riverbank erosion
control and drought management, although the mitigation of disasters remains beyond their
mandate. The Flood Forecasting and Warning Center (FFWC), under the Bangladesh Water
Development Board (BWDB) of the MoWR, plays an important role in providing early warning
about impending floods to the agencies involved.
In the areas of both cyclone and flood hazards, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BRCS)
and various donor agencies play important roles. The Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP)
was established in 1972 following the devastating cyclone of 1970, under an agreement
between the BRCS and the government of Bangladesh, with an aim to undertake effective
cyclone preparedness measures in the coastal areas. CPP, under the BRCS, has a joint man‐
agement structure, with two committees, viz. a 7-member Policy Committee headed by the
Minister of MoFDM, and a 15-member Implementation Board led by the Secretary of the
MoFDM. Now the CPP has about 33,120 trained volunteers, including 5,520 women [18].
Besides, the government has a “standing order” for natural disasters (mainly for floods and
cyclones), which was last updated in August 1999. The standing orders are followed by all
ministries, divisions/departments and government agencies during normal times, precau‐
tionary and warning stages, the disaster stage and the post-disaster stage.
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The National Water Management Plan also underlines the importance of implementing
effective non-structural measures to reduce the impact of floods and erosion. Thus, as opposed
to the structur l measures ag inst floods (like ams, river embankments, and flood control
and drainage projects) and riverbank erosion control projects (like the building of hard points,
canalization and revetment), the recent policies and plans have recognized the importance of
participatory planning that focuses on sustaining people’s livelihoods.
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At the field level (Figure 1), disaster management and related mechanisms start with the
district administrations covering all 64 districts of Bangladesh. The District Disaster Manage‐
ment Committee (DDMC) is chaired by the deputy commissioner, the chief civil administrator
of the district. The members of the committee include departmental officers and NGO, BRCS
and CPP and women’s representatives. Likewise, below the district level, there are the
upazila, union and village tiers of the disaster management committees. These local-level
committees include representatives from almost all relevant interest groups in society (Figure
1). An examination of how these committees function appears in succeeding sections.
3.2. Increasing roles and responsibilities of NGOs
The Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) has been assigned the role of coordinating the ac‐
tivities of NGOs. The NGOs constitute a vibrant sector in Bangladesh, and have been ac‐
claimed worldwide. NGOs and CBOs are actively involved, among others, in disaster
management, micro-credits, family planning, and human rights protection. As a matter of
fact, the advent of NGO activities in Bangladesh owes its origin to the rehabilitation works
immediately after the devastating war of independence in 1971. Currently, about a quarter
of foreign assistance to Bangladesh is channeled through the NGOs. Therefore, their contri‐
butions, particularly to the social service sector and the mobilization of the poor, are quite
prominent. This has been acclaimed by the international community. NGOs like the
Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) have extended
their development and disaster management programs at the international level as well.
NGOs such as CARE-Bangladesh, OXFAM-Bangladesh, Action Aid, Intermediate Technolo‐
gy Development Group-Bangladesh, Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Center (BDPC) and
Disaster Forum are particularly involved in various pre-, during and post-disaster activities.
Pre-disaster activities include advocacy, public education campaigns and training programs
for personnel involved in disaster management from the national down to the union or local
community level. NGOs also are active in emergency evacuation and in taking people to
shelters. The post-disaster activities include offering new micro-credits or rescheduling their
loan payment programs for rehabilitation.
3.3. Developments in the Institutional Framework: Introduction to the Comprehensive
Disaster Management Plan (CDMP)
Besides the Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) and the standing orders, the government
of Bangladesh adopted a Corporate Plan (2005-2009) called “Comprehensive Disaster Man‐
agement: A Framework for Action.” The US $15 million Comprehensive Disaster Manage‐
ment Plan (CDMP, Table 1) was funded by DFID and UNDP. It aimed “to reduce the level
of community vulnerability to natural and human-induced hazards and risks to manageable
and humanitarian levels.” This program was supposed to be implemented through a “pro‐
gram-based approach” that encompassed all aspects of risk management. The approach
comprehended a transition from a single agency response and relief system to a holistic
strategy involving the entire development planning process of the government. CDMP
Phase II was launched in 2010 to institutionalize the adoption of risk reduction approaches,
and to channel support through government and velopment partners, civil society and
NGOs into a people-oriented disaster management and risk reduction partnership. The
project period will be 2010-20114.
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At the field level (Figure 1), disaster management and related mechanisms start with the
district administrations covering all 64 districts of Bangladesh. The District Disaster Manage‐
ment Committee (DDMC) is chaired by the deputy commissioner, the chief civil administrator
of the district. The members of the committee include departmental officers and NGO, BRCS
and CPP and women’s representatives. Likewise, below the district level, there are the
upazila, union and village tiers of the disaster management committees. These local-level
committees include representatives from almost all relevant interest groups in society (Figure
1). An examination of how these committees function appears in succeeding sections.
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The Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) has been assigned the role of coordinating the ac‐
tivities of NGOs. The NGOs constitute a vibrant sector in Bangladesh, and have been ac‐
claimed worldwide. NGOs and CBOs are actively involved, among others, in disaster
management, micro-credits, family planning, and human rights protection. As a matter of
fact, the advent of NGO activities in Bangladesh owes its origin to the rehabilitation works
immediately after the devastating war of independence in 1971. Currently, about a quarter
of foreign assistance to Bangladesh is channeled through the NGOs. Therefore, their contri‐
butions, particularly to the social service sector and the mobilization of the poor, are quite
prominent. This has been acclaimed by the international community. NGOs like the
Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) have extended
their development and disaster management programs at the international level as well.
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Disaster Forum are particularly involved in various pre-, during and post-disaster activities.
Pre-disaster activities include advocacy, public education campaigns and training programs
for personnel involved in disaster management from the national down to the union or local
community level. NGOs also are active in emergency evacuation and in taking people to
shelters. The post-disaster activities include offering new micro-credits or rescheduling their
loan payment programs for rehabilitation.
3.3. Developments in the Institutional Framework: Introduction to the Comprehensive
Disaster Management Plan (CDMP)
Besides the Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) and the standing orders, the government
of Bangladesh adopted a Corporate Plan (2005-2009) called “Comprehensive Disaster Man‐
agement: A Framework for Action.” The US $15 million Comprehensive Disaster Manage‐
ment Plan (CDMP, Table 1) was funded by DFID and UNDP. It aimed “to reduce the level
of community vulnerability to natural and human-induced hazards and risks to manageable
and humanitarian levels.” This program was supposed to be implemented through a “pro‐
gram-based approach” that encompassed all aspects of risk management. The approach
comprehended a transition from a single agency response and relief system to a holistic
strategy involving the entire development planning process of the government. CDMP
Phase II was launched in 2010 to institutionalize the adoption of risk reduction approaches,
and to channel support through government and velopment partners, civil society and
NGOs into a people-oriented disaster management and risk reduction partnership. The
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Table 1. Sub-programs, outputs, target area/group and implementing agencies of CDMP. Adapted from [19].
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The Corporate Plan (2005-09; 2010-14) acknowledged the need for pre-disaster mitigation
and preparedness of the people as opposed to the earlier concepts of responding after a
disaster  had taken place.  Priority  was  accorded to  focus  on  community-level  prepared‐
ness,  response,  recovery  and rehabilitation.  Programs to  train  people  living  in  disaster-
prone areas were emphasized to improve their capability to cope with natural disasters.
The Corporate Plan emphasized a series of broad-based strategies: First, disaster manage‐
ment involved the management of  both risks  and consequences  of  disasters,  which included
prevention,  emergency  response  and  post-disaster  recovery.  Second,  community  involve‐
ment  was a  major  focus for  preparedness  programs to protect  lives  and properties.  The
involvement  of  local  government  bodies  was  an  essential  part  of  the  strategy.  Self-reli‐
ance  was  the  key  for  preparedness,  response  and recovery.  Third,  non-structural  mitiga‐
tion  measures,  such  as  community  disaster  preparedness,  training,  advocacy  and  public
awareness,  were given a high priority;  this required the integration of structural mitiga‐
tion with non-structural measures.
The strategic focus of the CDMP was to lay the foundation for the shift in principle from a
post-disaster relief and response strategy towards a comprehensive risk minimization culture
that encouraged disaster-resilience initiatives. This approach was to be realized through a
series of interconnected strategic directives:
1. Raising the level of expertise of the disaster management systems,
2. Mainstreaming disaster risk management programming,
3. Strengthening community institutional mechanisms,
4. Expanding preparedness programs across a broad range of hazards, and
5. Putting the response systems into operation.
Based  on  these  directives,  the  major  sub-programs  of  CDMP  included:  (1)  Capacity-
building,  (2)  Partnership Development,  (3)  Community Empowerment,  (4)  Research and
Information  Management,  and  (5)  Response  Management.  Under  the  sub-program  of
Partnership  Development,  the  government  actively  sought  to  achieve  a  multi-agency  ap‐
proach that encompassed the institutions of the government, NGOs and private sector in
a collaborative strategy for the alleviation of disaster-induced poverty. This enhanced co‐
ordination and information-sharing among the various actors and thus maximized the ef‐
ficacy  of  resource  use  for  effective  risk  reduction.  Under  the  Community  Empowerment
sub-program,  the  government  planned to  further  consolidate  the  empowerment  process
by  expanding  the  program  and  by  realizing  community  capacity-building  through
awareness and skill development and by expanding disaster management studies within
the school system and staff training academies.
Besides these, disaster risk reduction was incorporated as a component into the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Bangladesh as Annex-9 of Disaster Vulnerability and Risk
Management [14]. The preparation of the PRSP, funded by the World Bank, acknowledged a
holistic approach to disaster management.
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a collaborative strategy for the alleviation of disaster-induced poverty. This enhanced co‐
ordination and information-sharing among the various actors and thus maximized the ef‐
ficacy  of  resource  use  for  effective  risk  reduction.  Under  the  Community  Empowerment
sub-program,  the  government  planned to  further  consolidate  the  empowerment  process
by  expanding  the  program  and  by  realizing  community  capacity-building  through
awareness and skill development and by expanding disaster management studies within
the school system and staff training academies.
Besides these, disaster risk reduction was incorporated as a component into the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Bangladesh as Annex-9 of Disaster Vulnerability and Risk
Management [14]. The preparation of the PRSP, funded by the World Bank, acknowledged a
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4. Shift from relief and response to disaster risk management
In the last few decades, disasters have typically been viewed by the public institutions as
numerous individual extreme events, and the responses included top-down-oriented gov‐
ernment  policies  and efforts  by  local  and international  relief  agencies  that  did  not  take
into  simultaneous  account  the  social  and  economic  implications  and  causes  of  these
events.  With  the  significant  advancement  in  the  understanding of  the  natural  processes
that  underlie  the  hazardous  events,  a  more  technocratic  paradigm  came  into  existence
which conceded that the only way to deal with disasters was by the public policy appli‐
cation of geophysical and engineering knowledge and the associated interventions. These
approaches treated disasters as exceptional  or “abnormal” events,  not related to the on‐
going  social  and  developmental  processes.  Gradually,  with  recognition  of  the  fact  that
these are not “natural events” per se, but directly linked with social structures and their
dynamics [20],  this  structural  engineering,  technocratic  approach shifted to an emphasis
on preparedness measures, such as stockpiling of relief goods, preparedness plans and a
growing role  for  relief  agencies  such as  the  Red Crescent  [21].  This  evolution of  public
policy  approach  from  “relief  and  response”  to  “risk  management”  has  begun  to  influ‐
ence the way disaster management programs are planned and financed. Initiatives have
been aimed more and more at reducing social  and economic vulnerability and at inves‐
ting in long-term mitigation activities.
Community-Based Disaster Management (CBDM)
Recognizing the need for vulnerability reduction for effective disaster management, the
failures of a top-down management approach have become evident. This approach has been
unsuccessful in addressing the needs of vulnerable communities. A better understanding of
disasters and losses also brings to light the fact that the increased occurrence of disasters and
disaster-related loss has been due to the exponential increase in the occurrence of small- and
medium-scale disasters. As a result, numerous scholars and stakeholders feel that it is
important to adopt a new strategy that directly involves vulnerable people in the planning and
implementation of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery measures. This bottom-
up approach has received wide acceptance because it considers communities as the best judges
of their own vulnerability and capable of making the best decisions regarding their well-being.
The search for the newer approach led to the formulation of the Community-Based Disaster
Management (CBDM) strategy.
The aim of CBDM is to reduce vulnerabilities and to strengthen people’s capacity to deal with
hazards and cope with disasters. A thorough assessment of a community’s exposure to hazards
and an analysis of their specific vulnerabilities and capacities is the basis for activities, projects
and programs that can reduce disaster risks. Because a community is involved in the whole
process, their real and felt needs, as well as their inherent resources, are considered. Therefore,
there is a greater likelihood that problems will be addressed with appropriate interventions.
People’s participation is not only focused on processes but also on the contents. It is anticipated
that the local community should be able to gain directly from improved disaster risk manage‐
ment. This in turn will contribute to a progression toward safer conditions and to the improved
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security of livelihoods and sustainable development. This underlines the point that the local
community is not only the primary actor but also the beneficiary of the risk reduction and
development process [21].
The implementation of CBDM requires consideration of many essential features. Following
Yodmani (2001), [21], the primary ones could be identified as:
a. The local community has a central role in long-term and short-term disaster manage‐
ment and therefore the focus of attention in disaster management must be on the lo‐
cal community.
b. Disaster risk or vulnerability reduction is the foundation of CBDM; the primary content
of disaster management activities revolves around reducing vulnerable conditions and
the root causes of vulnerability. The primary strategy for vulnerability reduction is by
increasing a community’s capacities and their resources, and by improving and strength‐
ening coping strategies.
c. Disaster management must also establish linkages to the development process as disasters
are viewed as unmanaged development risks and unresolved problems of the develop‐
ment process. CBDM should lead to a general improvement of the quality of life of the
vast majority of the poor people and of the natural environment.
d. CBDM contributes to people’s empowerment – to possess physical safety; to have more
access to, and control of, resources; to participate in decision-making which affects their
lives; to enjoy the benefits of a healthy environment.
e. As community is a key resource in disaster risk reduction, their role and interests must
be recognized. The community is the key actor as well as the primary beneficiary of
disaster risk reduction. Within the community, priority attention is given to the conditions
of the most vulnerable, as well as to their mobilization in the disaster risk reduction. The
community must directly participate in the whole process of disaster risk management --
from situational analysis to planning and to implementation.
f. A multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary approach must be applied.
CBDM brings together the multitude of community stakeholders for disaster risk
reduction, as well as to expand their resource base. The local community-level institutions
link up with the intermediate and national levels and even up to the international level to
address the complexity of vulnerability issues. A wide range of approaches to disaster
risk reduction is employed.
g. The CBDM is an involving and dynamic framework, and therefore its implementation
must be monitored, evaluated and adapted to incorporate newer elements. Lessons
learned from practice continue to build into the theory of CBDM. The sharing of experi‐
ences, methodologies and tools by communities and CBDM practitioners continues to
enrich practice.
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community must directly participate in the whole process of disaster risk management --
from situational analysis to planning and to implementation.
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address the complexity of vulnerability issues. A wide range of approaches to disaster
risk reduction is employed.
g. The CBDM is an involving and dynamic framework, and therefore its implementation
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ences, methodologies and tools by communities and CBDM practitioners continues to
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5. Is the present framework based on a partnership approach?
As is evident from the institutional structure explained above, Bangladesh has developed quite
an elaborate framework and disaster preparedness and response mechanism. Moreover, some
policy and plan pronouncements in the recent past indicate that the government has begun to
adopt an approach to disaster management that includes both risks and consequences. Some
progress has been made in enhancing the disaster management capacities during the last
decades. After the experiences of the devastating 1988 floods and 1991 cyclone, the concept of
disaster management was introduced in place of disaster control. The ministry was renamed the
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) in 1993 and then again renamed the
Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) in 2002. After the formation a new
government in 2008, this name of this ministry went back to its previous title as the Ministry
of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR).
The primary function associated with disaster management is outlined in the government’s
Rules of Business which are undertaken by the DMB and the DRR. The Rules of Business have
been revised to reflect the current MoDMR approach of comprehensive, community-based
vulnerability reduction and risk management. The result is that though there has been a
declining trend in loss of lives and property, particularly from cyclone disasters, flood damage
has tended to rise because of the large spatial extent of floods, their increased frequency and
the expanding economy.
Government documents and the NGO literature indicate that there is a wide recognition that
effective disaster response at the local level is not possible by government agencies alone and
that the cost of management needs to be shared by all stakeholders. Still, the major lacuna in
the institutional framework continues to be a lack of functioning partnerships among the
stakeholders. The massive flood of July 2004 showed that there were no partnerships func‐
tioning and there was little coordination. The Local Consultative Group (LCG) concluded that
massive shortcomings existed in the forecasting, preparedness and coordinated response to
the crisis [22]. As a result, the NGOs conducted relief and rehabilitation efforts largely without
government directives and coordination. Initially, the government appeared confident to deal
with the post-disaster recovery singlehandedly. When things were getting worse, it made a
flash appeal on 17 August 2004 through the UNDP, Dhaka, for international assistance.
Another report argues about the handling of 1998 floods, indicating that “limited evidence of
government coordination was found in the recovery phase” [23]. Save the Children (USA) also
proclaimed that “there was a general lack of coordination among actors” [24]. In the wake of
the latest cyclone, Sidr in 2007, BBC reported, “Plenty of agencies, but not enough aid - too
little, too late,” and further quoted a professional working in an affected area, “The reason why
these people are not receiving enough help is because there is no coordination between the
government and aid agencies” [25].
A striking example of poor management and coordination is the following case. Southkhali
village in Shoronkhola upazila of Bagerhat district was one the worst hit areas in Sidr. During
a visit immediately after the event to the area, the Indian foreign minister pledged his country’s
intention to build all the houses in this and the surrounding villages. From then onwards,
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nominal government initiative was taken to give shelters to the affected people in this area,
and a virtual official ban was put into effect on others, including NGOs and aid agencies, to
build houses for the affected people. The pledged Indian support did not come in due time
and even 100 days after the event people in this area were forced to live under the sky [26].
Perhaps this unfortunate decision arose from the lack of international/bilateral coordination,
bureaucracy on both sides in Bangladesh and India, a lack of understanding of the gravity of
not giving shelter to victims in time, or from the unnecessary exercise of power on the
administration’s part, even when in distress.
5.1. Empirical Investigation of Cyclone Sidr Victims at the Local Level: Vulnerability of the
Poor
It is worth noting that the recent initiatives on community-based disaster risk management
became subject to stern criticisms because of their general inadequacy in addressing the
vulnerability of the poor to natural hazards and socioeconomic shocks. CBDM programs that
aim at prevention and mitigation are few in low- and middle-income countries like Bangladesh
and they are poorly funded and insignificant when compared to the financial capital spent by
donors and development banks on humanitarian assistance, relief and post-disaster recon‐
struction. Another weakness of such initiatives was that they were often taken up in the formal
sector of the economy, and therein bypassed the poor and the most vulnerable sections of
society. As Maskrey (p. 86) points out, “in the year or so between the occurrence of a disaster
and approved national reconstruction plans, many vulnerable communities revert to coping
with risk, often in the same or worse conditions than before the disaster actually struck” [27].
Therefore, in the current paradigm of risk management approaches, there is more room than
ever before for addressing the issues of risk reduction for the poor. This is also consonant with
the paradigm shift in mainstream development practice, which is now characterized by a focus
on good governance, accountability and greater emphasis on bottom-up approaches [21]. In
light of the above perspective, the case of Cyclone Sidr can be examined.
Bangladesh has experienced several catastrophic environmental disasters during the last two
decades; among these events, the April 1991 [28] and November 2007 major cyclones were the
most catastrophic in terms of both physical and human dimensions [29]. Cyclone Sidr struck
the coast of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007 and was the most powerful mega-cyclone to
impact Bangladesh since 1991. However, the death toll (officially, 3,406 lives were lost) caused
by Cyclone Sidr was significantly lower than comparable cyclones in previous years due to
the improved warning system and evacuation. Nonetheless, the damage to crops and infra‐
structure was considerable across 30 districts, 200 upazilas and 1,950 unions. In total, more than
55,000 people were injured by the Cyclone Sidr event. The Joint Damage, Loss, and Needs
Assessment (JDNLA) committee estimated that the total damage and losses caused by the
cyclone were more than US $1.7 billion [30].
Our investigation along the coastal plains of Bangladesh revealed that the geographical loca‐
tion and patterns of settlement associated with low income populations were the most impor‐
tant determinants of vulnerability to tropical cyclones and related storm surges. Coastal and
island people observed that the new, isolated, single-unit settlements were the most severely
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the latest cyclone, Sidr in 2007, BBC reported, “Plenty of agencies, but not enough aid - too
little, too late,” and further quoted a professional working in an affected area, “The reason why
these people are not receiving enough help is because there is no coordination between the
government and aid agencies” [25].
A striking example of poor management and coordination is the following case. Southkhali
village in Shoronkhola upazila of Bagerhat district was one the worst hit areas in Sidr. During
a visit immediately after the event to the area, the Indian foreign minister pledged his country’s
intention to build all the houses in this and the surrounding villages. From then onwards,
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struction. Another weakness of such initiatives was that they were often taken up in the formal
sector of the economy, and therein bypassed the poor and the most vulnerable sections of
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and approved national reconstruction plans, many vulnerable communities revert to coping
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Therefore, in the current paradigm of risk management approaches, there is more room than
ever before for addressing the issues of risk reduction for the poor. This is also consonant with
the paradigm shift in mainstream development practice, which is now characterized by a focus
on good governance, accountability and greater emphasis on bottom-up approaches [21]. In
light of the above perspective, the case of Cyclone Sidr can be examined.
Bangladesh has experienced several catastrophic environmental disasters during the last two
decades; among these events, the April 1991 [28] and November 2007 major cyclones were the
most catastrophic in terms of both physical and human dimensions [29]. Cyclone Sidr struck
the coast of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007 and was the most powerful mega-cyclone to
impact Bangladesh since 1991. However, the death toll (officially, 3,406 lives were lost) caused
by Cyclone Sidr was significantly lower than comparable cyclones in previous years due to
the improved warning system and evacuation. Nonetheless, the damage to crops and infra‐
structure was considerable across 30 districts, 200 upazilas and 1,950 unions. In total, more than
55,000 people were injured by the Cyclone Sidr event. The Joint Damage, Loss, and Needs
Assessment (JDNLA) committee estimated that the total damage and losses caused by the
cyclone were more than US $1.7 billion [30].
Our investigation along the coastal plains of Bangladesh revealed that the geographical loca‐
tion and patterns of settlement associated with low income populations were the most impor‐
tant determinants of vulnerability to tropical cyclones and related storm surges. Coastal and
island people observed that the new, isolated, single-unit settlements were the most severely
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impacted by the cyclone and storm surge forces. The settlements near the coast and those which
were in linear patterns along the coastal embankment suffered the most. This type of settle‐
ment, which was more susceptible to cyclonic storm surges, was inhabited primarily by the
poor of the coastal zones. The fragmentation of families and the building of new settlements al‐
so contributed to high cyclone disaster loss. The soil of the new settlements was less cohesive,
and in most cases, the properties had few or only very small trees. The houses of the linear settle‐
ments along the coastal and island embankment were made of straw, bamboo and other locally
sourced materials. Apart from high winds and storm surges, these houses were also vulnerable
to breaches of the embankment that occur in major cyclonic storms. In our survey, we registered
that most of the houses constructed using straw, bamboo, jute stalk, and corrugated iron sheets
alongside of the coastal embankment had faced the sea. Such positioning of the housing struc‐
tures also made them more susceptible to severe damage by the cyclones. In contrast, houses lo‐
cated in the interior mainland were usually clustered in groups of six or seven houses called
Baris in dense tropical forest. Several closely located Baris comprise a Samaj. This type of settle‐
ment is less susceptible to severe cyclonic wind and storm surges.
Landless families tend to occupy coastal embankments illegally, as there are no public housing
or welfare programs in Bangladesh for the landless. The respondents of our survey asserted
that because of easy access to both land areas and the sea, they preferred to live on the






















Figure 2. Consideration of villagers living close to the sea
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5.2. Cyclone preparedness at the local level
Cyclone preparedness programs that have been implemented in recent years in the coastal
zones of Bangladesh have involved both non-structural and structural measures. Appropriate
cyclone preparedness training and enhancement of awareness by campaigns and public
education have been major tools for building a well-prepared and cyclone-resilient commun‐
ity. Our field investigation revealed that only 31% of the local community members have
received cyclone preparedness training during non-cyclone periods. Such training was chiefly
provided by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were locally active (30% of the
local community members received training from them); national and local government
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calm (non-cyclone) period
Figure 3. Training on cyclone preparedness
Among the structural engineering measures, the construction of cyclone shelters and raised
mounds (locally known as killa) to provide refuge during the onset of cyclones were the
principal ones. The expansion of coastal embankments and reforestation programs to pro‐
tect settlements and properties from cyclone gusts and storm surges along the coast and es‐
tuary channels were among other significant structural measures. The majority (59%) of the
community members took refuge in the designated cyclone shelters or in the masonry build‐
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sourced materials. Apart from high winds and storm surges, these houses were also vulnerable
to breaches of the embankment that occur in major cyclonic storms. In our survey, we registered
that most of the houses constructed using straw, bamboo, jute stalk, and corrugated iron sheets
alongside of the coastal embankment had faced the sea. Such positioning of the housing struc‐
tures also made them more susceptible to severe damage by the cyclones. In contrast, houses lo‐
cated in the interior mainland were usually clustered in groups of six or seven houses called
Baris in dense tropical forest. Several closely located Baris comprise a Samaj. This type of settle‐
ment is less susceptible to severe cyclonic wind and storm surges.
Landless families tend to occupy coastal embankments illegally, as there are no public housing
or welfare programs in Bangladesh for the landless. The respondents of our survey asserted
that because of easy access to both land areas and the sea, they preferred to live on the
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5.2. Cyclone preparedness at the local level
Cyclone preparedness programs that have been implemented in recent years in the coastal
zones of Bangladesh have involved both non-structural and structural measures. Appropriate
cyclone preparedness training and enhancement of awareness by campaigns and public
education have been major tools for building a well-prepared and cyclone-resilient commun‐
ity. Our field investigation revealed that only 31% of the local community members have
received cyclone preparedness training during non-cyclone periods. Such training was chiefly
provided by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were locally active (30% of the
local community members received training from them); national and local government
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Among the structural engineering measures, the construction of cyclone shelters and raised
mounds (locally known as killa) to provide refuge during the onset of cyclones were the
principal ones. The expansion of coastal embankments and reforestation programs to pro‐
tect settlements and properties from cyclone gusts and storm surges along the coast and es‐
tuary channels were among other significant structural measures. The majority (59%) of the
community members took refuge in the designated cyclone shelters or in the masonry build‐
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ings of neighbors, friends, and relatives during the onset of Cyclone Sidr. About 41% stayed
in their homes and opted not to go the cyclone shelters. Such behavior was attributed either
to a strong belief that their lives were in the hands of Allah (i.e., strong presence of fatalism),
a desire to save property from potential looting, the considerable distance of the shelters
from their houses, or the unavailability of cyclone shelters in their locality.
The degree of variation in the number of people who took refuge per cyclone shelter among
the localities was significant. Our field research calculated that there were 34 cyclone shelters
for 631,138 people (according to the 2001 population census) in the Burguna Sadar upazila,
under Burguna district, implying that each cyclone shelter would need to provide refuge to
18,563 people. In Kalapara upazila, under Patuakhali district, there were 113 cyclone shelters
for 202,078 people, implying that each shelter would need to accommodate 1,788 people during
the onset of a cyclone. Our exploration into why a considerable population did not use cyclone
shelters during Cyclone Sidr provided a number of explanations. All cyclone shelters were
being used as civic facilities (such as primary schools or community centers) during the non-
cyclonic periods but lacked adequate drinking water supply infrastructure and toilets. A total
of 87% of the cyclone shelter users identified low sanitation and inadequate drinking water
facilities as major constraints to using these shelters. They also opined that low physical
capacity (79%) and difficulty in maintaining privacy (47%) were other major problems in using
the shelters (Table 2). The poor dispersion of cyclone shelters and the lack of road access were
other major concerns about the cyclone shelters. The degree of satisfaction about the cyclone
shelters was very low among the local community members (only 6% were satisfied). The
examination of the use pattern of cyclone shelters at the local level revealed that although
cyclone shelters saved many lives during Cyclone Sidr, many local people opted not to use
them or they were simply unavailable in some localities. Clearly, these cyclone preparedness
and mitigation measures are testimony of institutional partnerships at various levels of
governance and public services.
Factors Respondents (%) (n= 162)
Inadequate sanitation and drinking water facilities 87
Inadequate physical capacity 79
Hard to maintain privacy 47
Fragile structure 43
Unhygienic conditions 24
Absence of access road 14
Situated in a distant place 12
Do not know 5
Table 2. Problems in using cyclone shelters. Source: Field survey
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Figure 4. People’s response on cyclone shelters and facilities
Over the last four decades, the Water Development Board, in collaboration with other
ministries, has constructed about 5,333 km of embankments in the coastal districts to support
agriculture and protect the lives and property of coastal residents during cyclones and storm
surges. Reducing vulnerability via these structural measures has been quite effective in coastal
Bangladesh. There is clear evidence that these embankments along the coastal areas provided
an effective buffer during the storm surge associated with Cyclone Sidr. Lives were saved, and
damages and property losses were much lower where embankment structures had been
properly maintained. Some embankments did not fail even when the storm surge overtopped
them. More than 90% of our survey respondents observed that coastal embankments had saved
their lives and property from Cyclone Sidr. They also registered that coastal plantations were
another major living structural feature that reduced the velocity of the wind and the speed of
tidal surges along with the cyclone and, in turn, saved their lives and properties.
6. Conclusions
The findings of our study reveal that, officially and legislatively, the government of Bangladesh
in recent years has taken a comprehensive and integrated approach to disaster management.
Both preparedness and response capacity have increased as a result. However, in the absence
of stable and transparent institutions, this strong institutional partnership approach remains
largely on paper. Individual stakeholders continue to make significant contributions, but
synergy and multiplier effects are still missing. Our analysis shows that no, or only a very
limited, culture of partnership in disaster management has yet been established. Divisive
partisan politics and the lack of good governance prevent partnerships among stakeholders.
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ings of neighbors, friends, and relatives during the onset of Cyclone Sidr. About 41% stayed
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a desire to save property from potential looting, the considerable distance of the shelters
from their houses, or the unavailability of cyclone shelters in their locality.
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for 202,078 people, implying that each shelter would need to accommodate 1,788 people during
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the shelters (Table 2). The poor dispersion of cyclone shelters and the lack of road access were
other major concerns about the cyclone shelters. The degree of satisfaction about the cyclone
shelters was very low among the local community members (only 6% were satisfied). The
examination of the use pattern of cyclone shelters at the local level revealed that although
cyclone shelters saved many lives during Cyclone Sidr, many local people opted not to use
them or they were simply unavailable in some localities. Clearly, these cyclone preparedness
and mitigation measures are testimony of institutional partnerships at various levels of
governance and public services.
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agriculture and protect the lives and property of coastal residents during cyclones and storm
surges. Reducing vulnerability via these structural measures has been quite effective in coastal
Bangladesh. There is clear evidence that these embankments along the coastal areas provided
an effective buffer during the storm surge associated with Cyclone Sidr. Lives were saved, and
damages and property losses were much lower where embankment structures had been
properly maintained. Some embankments did not fail even when the storm surge overtopped
them. More than 90% of our survey respondents observed that coastal embankments had saved
their lives and property from Cyclone Sidr. They also registered that coastal plantations were
another major living structural feature that reduced the velocity of the wind and the speed of
tidal surges along with the cyclone and, in turn, saved their lives and properties.
6. Conclusions
The findings of our study reveal that, officially and legislatively, the government of Bangladesh
in recent years has taken a comprehensive and integrated approach to disaster management.
Both preparedness and response capacity have increased as a result. However, in the absence
of stable and transparent institutions, this strong institutional partnership approach remains
largely on paper. Individual stakeholders continue to make significant contributions, but
synergy and multiplier effects are still missing. Our analysis shows that no, or only a very
limited, culture of partnership in disaster management has yet been established. Divisive
partisan politics and the lack of good governance prevent partnerships among stakeholders.
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Therefore, in the following section we propose a partnership framework that outlines new
roles and responsibilities for major players. Implementation of the framework could lead to
partnership in disaster management in Bangladesh. Government agencies, NGOs and
policymakers need to understand the perspectives of local communities, the impacts of floods,
and the levels of vulnerability to improve information, knowledge, resource support and
services. For this, there is a need for more “action research” involving communities and
scientists from different disciplines and greater awareness about the integration of floods,
cyclones and other natural disasters and climatic events into the development process among
key actors, particularly, government agencies.
Disaster management is a nationwide affair, involving each and every organization and citizen
of the country. The government of any country cannot do it alone because of the resource
constraints as well as the wide scope of the tasks involved. Therefore, a broad-based partner‐
ship involving all the stakeholders is a desirable and realistic approach to realizing the full
potential at all stages of disaster management, namely, prevention, preparedness, response
and recovery [31]. Experience that demonstrates the value of partnership in managing disasters
is grounded in the mutual recognition of many different ideas and interests. The constituencies
or interests associated with this partnership include the stakeholders, such as government
ministries/agencies, National Parliament and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Disaster Management, NGOs/CBOs, the private sector, the media, academia, donors and
regional countries (Figure 5). The approach, involving multi-modal communication and
interaction, proposes to integrate the activities of different stakeholders into a functional
partnership framework. This outline describes how each stakeholder can be a loop in an
integrated chain.
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR)
This organization, directly supported by DMB and DRR, remains the pivot and is destined to
channel and coordinate all communications and activities between and among all the partners
in the loop. This coordinated process, particularly during non-crisis periods, is expected to
result in the shift of focus from post-disaster to pre-disaster risk management. However, the
MoDMR must ensure the transparency of its own and all other agencies involved in developing
the partnership for disaster management. Public disclosure and documentation should be
mandatory for all the stakeholders and must be published by this pivotal agency on a regular
basis. The ultimate goal of the partnership is to enhance the investment and social capital for
community empowerment against disaster risks.
From a partnership point of view, the following measures need to be initiated by the MoDMR:
1. Adoption of a comprehensive national disaster management policy, with clear guidelines
for an effective partnership of all stakeholders.
2. Coordination of the functions of disaster management and climate change communities;
this is likely to help integrate prevention with preparedness, response and recovery
efforts, in both short-term and long-term perspectives; CDMP appears to be beginning in
the right direction.
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3. Strengthening the capacity of the MoFDM and other disaster management-related
agencies and committees at all levels, with particular emphasis on the district-level
disaster management committees (DDMC). Each of the DDMC in the risk-prone areas can
be equipped with a Geographic Information System (GIS) Cell as a planning tool for
managing development and disaster reduction activities.
4. Large-scale training of staff at all levels, including the stakeholders, particularly from the
media, NGOs and private sector, in team and motivational works and in how to prevent
disasters; for the purpose, a Disaster Management Training Cell can be established at the
DMB.
5. Activating the Disaster Management Committees (DMC) at all levels, including the
national ones, through organizing meetings at regular intervals.
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Therefore, in the following section we propose a partnership framework that outlines new
roles and responsibilities for major players. Implementation of the framework could lead to
partnership in disaster management in Bangladesh. Government agencies, NGOs and
policymakers need to understand the perspectives of local communities, the impacts of floods,
and the levels of vulnerability to improve information, knowledge, resource support and
services. For this, there is a need for more “action research” involving communities and
scientists from different disciplines and greater awareness about the integration of floods,
cyclones and other natural disasters and climatic events into the development process among
key actors, particularly, government agencies.
Disaster management is a nationwide affair, involving each and every organization and citizen
of the country. The government of any country cannot do it alone because of the resource
constraints as well as the wide scope of the tasks involved. Therefore, a broad-based partner‐
ship involving all the stakeholders is a desirable and realistic approach to realizing the full
potential at all stages of disaster management, namely, prevention, preparedness, response
and recovery [31]. Experience that demonstrates the value of partnership in managing disasters
is grounded in the mutual recognition of many different ideas and interests. The constituencies
or interests associated with this partnership include the stakeholders, such as government
ministries/agencies, National Parliament and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Disaster Management, NGOs/CBOs, the private sector, the media, academia, donors and
regional countries (Figure 5). The approach, involving multi-modal communication and
interaction, proposes to integrate the activities of different stakeholders into a functional
partnership framework. This outline describes how each stakeholder can be a loop in an
integrated chain.
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR)
This organization, directly supported by DMB and DRR, remains the pivot and is destined to
channel and coordinate all communications and activities between and among all the partners
in the loop. This coordinated process, particularly during non-crisis periods, is expected to
result in the shift of focus from post-disaster to pre-disaster risk management. However, the
MoDMR must ensure the transparency of its own and all other agencies involved in developing
the partnership for disaster management. Public disclosure and documentation should be
mandatory for all the stakeholders and must be published by this pivotal agency on a regular
basis. The ultimate goal of the partnership is to enhance the investment and social capital for
community empowerment against disaster risks.
From a partnership point of view, the following measures need to be initiated by the MoDMR:
1. Adoption of a comprehensive national disaster management policy, with clear guidelines
for an effective partnership of all stakeholders.
2. Coordination of the functions of disaster management and climate change communities;
this is likely to help integrate prevention with preparedness, response and recovery
efforts, in both short-term and long-term perspectives; CDMP appears to be beginning in
the right direction.
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3. Strengthening the capacity of the MoFDM and other disaster management-related
agencies and committees at all levels, with particular emphasis on the district-level
disaster management committees (DDMC). Each of the DDMC in the risk-prone areas can
be equipped with a Geographic Information System (GIS) Cell as a planning tool for
managing development and disaster reduction activities.
4. Large-scale training of staff at all levels, including the stakeholders, particularly from the
media, NGOs and private sector, in team and motivational works and in how to prevent
disasters; for the purpose, a Disaster Management Training Cell can be established at the
DMB.
5. Activating the Disaster Management Committees (DMC) at all levels, including the
national ones, through organizing meetings at regular intervals.
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1. Introduction
Planning for disasters at the federal, state, and local level is a relatively recent area of focus
within the practice of emergency management in the United States. Historically, emergency
management as a practice was focused on response to a disaster, with little attention paid to
preparation, recovery, or overall and ongoing activities to reduce the effects of disasters. The
theoretical framework and literature demonstrates the importance of planning as an activity
which impacts the success of many other emergency management activities, yet practice has
shown that planning is not always a valued or highly prioritized practice at the local level.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 marked the first legislative emphasis on planning and
mitigation and recent studies by the authors have shown mixed results for the implementa‐
tion of planning laws. This chapter reviews in detail the historical developments in the theo‐
ry and practice of planning with special emphasis on hazard mitigation planning; provides a
theoretical framework based on the literature for understanding the importance of local lev‐
el planning within the national system of emergency management, and the complexity that
arises within that system; and discusses ongoing challenges in the successful completion of
planning activities in the 21st century due to ongoing administrative and cultural challenges.
2. Hazard mitigation before and during the cold war
Understanding hazard mitigation in the United States first requires an understanding of
how emergency management activities evolved historically. E. L. Quarantelli, one of the
leaders in disaster sociology, described the beginnings of disaster research as “almost exclu‐
© 2013 Jackman and Beruvides; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2013 Jackman and Beruvides; licensee InTech. This is a paper distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
[23] Beck, T. Learning Lessons from Disaster Recovery: The Case of Bangladesh. Disaster
Management Working paper Series Washington, DC: World Bank; (2005). (11)
[24] Haque, C. E, Khan, M. R, Uddin, M. S, & Chowdhury, S. R. Disaster Management
and Public Policies in Bangladesh: Institutional Partnerships in Cyclone Hazards
Mitigation and Response. In: Haque CE, Etkin D. (eds.) Disaster Risk and Vulnerabil‐
ity: Mitigation through Mobilizing Communities and Partnerships. Montreal and
Kingston, Canada: McGill and Queen’s University Press; (2012). , 154-182.
[25] BBCPlenty of agencies, but not enough aid. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
stm, 19 November; (2007).
[26] BBCOne hundred days after SIDR-very little progress in rehabilitation and housing
(an audio report in Bangla). http://www.bbc.co.uk/bengali/indepth/story/
2008/02/080222_mbsidr_100days.shtml,February; (2008).
[27] Maskrey, A. Reducing Global Disasters. In: Ingleton J. (ed.) Natural Disaster Man‐
agement. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose; (1999).
[28] Haque, C. E. Atmospheric Hazards Preparedness in Bangladesh: A Study of Warn‐
ing, Adjustments and Recovery from the April 1991 Cyclone. Natural Hazards
(1997). , 16, 181-202.
[29] Paul, B. K. Why Relatively Fewer People Died? The Case of Bangladesh’s Cyclone
Sidr. Natural Hazards (2009). , 50, 289-304.
[30] GoB (Government of Bangladesh)Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh: Damage, Loss and
Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction. Dhaka: Government of
Bangladesh; (2008).
[31] Quarantelli, E. L. Assessment of Development Potential and Capacity Based on Vul‐
nerability. In: Integrated Approach to Disaster Management and Regional Develop‐
ment Planning with Peoples’ Participation. UN Center for Regional Development;
(1990).
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters54
Chapter 3
Hazard Mitigation Planning in the United States:
Historical Perspectives, Cultural Influences, and Current
Challenges
Andrea M. Jackman and Mario G. Beruvides
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/54209
1. Introduction
Planning for disasters at the federal, state, and local level is a relatively recent area of focus
within the practice of emergency management in the United States. Historically, emergency
management as a practice was focused on response to a disaster, with little attention paid to
preparation, recovery, or overall and ongoing activities to reduce the effects of disasters. The
theoretical framework and literature demonstrates the importance of planning as an activity
which impacts the success of many other emergency management activities, yet practice has
shown that planning is not always a valued or highly prioritized practice at the local level.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 marked the first legislative emphasis on planning and
mitigation and recent studies by the authors have shown mixed results for the implementa‐
tion of planning laws. This chapter reviews in detail the historical developments in the theo‐
ry and practice of planning with special emphasis on hazard mitigation planning; provides a
theoretical framework based on the literature for understanding the importance of local lev‐
el planning within the national system of emergency management, and the complexity that
arises within that system; and discusses ongoing challenges in the successful completion of
planning activities in the 21st century due to ongoing administrative and cultural challenges.
2. Hazard mitigation before and during the cold war
Understanding hazard mitigation in the United States first requires an understanding of
how emergency management activities evolved historically. E. L. Quarantelli, one of the
leaders in disaster sociology, described the beginnings of disaster research as “almost exclu‐
© 2013 Jackman and Beruvides; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2013 Jackman and Beruvides; licensee InTech. This is a paper distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
sively supported by the U.S.A. military organizations with very practical concerns about
wartime situations” [1]. He notes that these “organized research activities [occurred] from
about 1950 to 1965” and their primary goals were civil organization in wartime situations,
under the assumption that “morale is the key to disaster control,” and “effective disaster
control includes the securing of conformity to emergency regulations” and “the reduction
and control of panic reactions” [1]. The federal government took further action during the
1950s by undergoing several reorganizations within the Department of Defense (see [2]). Pri‐
or to, and during that time, the federal government was mainly concerned with civil de‐
fense, so that “private, voluntary agencies such as the American National Red Cross, the
Salvation Army, and many others bore the primary responsibility for disaster relief; and
state and local governments coped as best they could” [2]. Federal assistance was available
as an absolute last resort by way of “special assistance acts passed by Congress” [2]. Howev‐
er this system had been operating essentially without change since 1803, and due to its reac‐
tive nature, there were “frequent delays before federal assistance reached impacted areas,
and the nature of the assistance was designated only for selected purposes” [2].
Two interesting notes about the observations in [1] and [2]: first, the basis of government ac‐
tivity in emergency management emerged from a military and national defense perspective.
The first “emergencies” in this regard were wars, or attacks from outside invaders. This mil‐
itaristic approach – managing a disaster as enemy attack – would shape emergency manage‐
ment significantly in later years. Second, governmental activities in early years were largely
reactive. Planning, particularly with an emphasis on mitigation, is not mentioned. A reactive
war approach may seem antiquated outside of the Cold War context, but it is essential to
understanding the development and decisions of current sentiments toward planning with‐
in local governments. As will be discussed in later sections, the defense mentality is still the
dominant approach to loss prevention at the local level, and helps explain actions at all lev‐
els of government, in all modern aspects of emergency management.
3. The four phases of emergency management
In 1979, a report by the National Governor’s Association was published on the topic of
emergency management, and defined the general practice as:
A state’s responsibility and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters
by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies. The comprehensive aspect of [emergency
management] includes all four phases of disaster or emergency activity: mitigation, prepar‐
edness, response, and recovery. It applies to all risks: attack, man-made, and natural, in a
federal-state-local partnership (see Table 1).
The four phases listed- mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery- serve as the cur‐
rent model of emergency management, are widely used among practitioners, and are con‐
sidered the starting point for all policy and program design for all types of hazards at all
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levels of government. The NGA Report included only suggested actions for each phase,
which were not operationally defined until 1985:
1. Mitigation- assessing the risk posed by a hazard or potential disaster and attempting to
reduce the risk;
2. Preparedness- developing a response plan based upon the risk assessment, training re‐
sponse personnel, arranging for necessary resources, making arrangements with other
jurisdictions for sharing of resources, clarifying jurisdictional responsibilities, and so on;
3. Response- implementing the plan, reducing the potential for secondary damage, and
preparing for the recovery phase; and
4. Recovery- reestablishing life support systems, such as repairing electrical power net‐
works, and providing temporary housing, food, and clothing. Recovery is assumed to
stop short of reconstruction. [3]
In the years following the development of the NGA model, a number of scientific studies
(summarized in Table 1) sought to define each phase in more detail. These definitions are
still widely used today.
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sively supported by the U.S.A. military organizations with very practical concerns about
wartime situations” [1]. He notes that these “organized research activities [occurred] from
about 1950 to 1965” and their primary goals were civil organization in wartime situations,
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1950s by undergoing several reorganizations within the Department of Defense (see [2]). Pri‐
or to, and during that time, the federal government was mainly concerned with civil de‐
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Salvation Army, and many others bore the primary responsibility for disaster relief; and
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The four phases listed- mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery- serve as the cur‐
rent model of emergency management, are widely used among practitioners, and are con‐
sidered the starting point for all policy and program design for all types of hazards at all
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levels of government. The NGA Report included only suggested actions for each phase,
which were not operationally defined until 1985:
1. Mitigation- assessing the risk posed by a hazard or potential disaster and attempting to
reduce the risk;
2. Preparedness- developing a response plan based upon the risk assessment, training re‐
sponse personnel, arranging for necessary resources, making arrangements with other
jurisdictions for sharing of resources, clarifying jurisdictional responsibilities, and so on;
3. Response- implementing the plan, reducing the potential for secondary damage, and
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In the years following the development of the NGA model, a number of scientific studies
(summarized in Table 1) sought to define each phase in more detail. These definitions are
still widely used today.
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and property from natural
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cle of disaster damage, re‐
construction, and repeated
damage. These activities or
actions… will have a long-
term sustained effect.
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters58
Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation





*Drills & Exercises (D&E)
*Writing a plan (Plan)
*Activation of Emergency
Protocol (AEP)
*Medical assistance and first
aid (EMS)
*Shelter & Evacuation (S&E)














nerability & risk assess‐
ments (VRA)
Table 1. Four Phase Model Definitions
The four phases are widely considered to be overlapping and cyclical (Figure 1). Mitigation
activities occur in all phases of a disaster, and frequently are most evident during recon‐
struction, which has since been informally added by practitioners as a part of the long-term
recovery phase. The ongoing, ubiquitous nature of mitigation activities makes this the hard‐
est phase to clearly define with a beginning and end point. As reconstruction and recovery
near completion, lessons learned from these phases are incorporated into preparedness ac‐
tivities with additional mitigation in mind, which in turn are set aside when a response be‐
comes necessary. Hazard Mitigation Plans are easiest to study within the context of the
Planning phase, instead of Mitigation. According to the federal policy described later, miti‐
gation, recovery and even some response activities are directed by state and local Hazard
Mitigation Plans. Although risk assessment, defined here to be part of the mitigation, is a
critical step in authoring a HMP, the entire process will be grouped into the Preparedness
phase for simplicity. This is also due to the complex nature of risk assessment as a separate
activity, and a tolerance for imprecision in the HMP approval process. Within the context of
the Four Phase model, Preparedness, and specifically plan creation, at each level of govern‐
ment is described in the next section.
3.1. Planning for disaster in federal, state, and local government
The role of local-level emergency planning within the national emergency management
framework is one of great importance. Federal government provides direction and goals for
local planners, but primarily serves as a financial supporter when governments are unable
to meet these goals. Likewise, the state acts as a regional conduit between federal and local
government, providing aid to its local jurisdictions as needed. This concept, known as
shared governance, is a reflection of American attitudes about self-governance. In their book
exploring policy implementation issues within the federal government, May and Williams
[8] cited, as an example of this mindset, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, which marked the first time in U.S. history that the federal government assumed a di‐
rect funding role in public education. Although American government was deliberately de‐
signed in this fashion, it can cause a dilemma:
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The four phases are widely considered to be overlapping and cyclical (Figure 1). Mitigation
activities occur in all phases of a disaster, and frequently are most evident during recon‐
struction, which has since been informally added by practitioners as a part of the long-term
recovery phase. The ongoing, ubiquitous nature of mitigation activities makes this the hard‐
est phase to clearly define with a beginning and end point. As reconstruction and recovery
near completion, lessons learned from these phases are incorporated into preparedness ac‐
tivities with additional mitigation in mind, which in turn are set aside when a response be‐
comes necessary. Hazard Mitigation Plans are easiest to study within the context of the
Planning phase, instead of Mitigation. According to the federal policy described later, miti‐
gation, recovery and even some response activities are directed by state and local Hazard
Mitigation Plans. Although risk assessment, defined here to be part of the mitigation, is a
critical step in authoring a HMP, the entire process will be grouped into the Preparedness
phase for simplicity. This is also due to the complex nature of risk assessment as a separate
activity, and a tolerance for imprecision in the HMP approval process. Within the context of
the Four Phase model, Preparedness, and specifically plan creation, at each level of govern‐
ment is described in the next section.
3.1. Planning for disaster in federal, state, and local government
The role of local-level emergency planning within the national emergency management
framework is one of great importance. Federal government provides direction and goals for
local planners, but primarily serves as a financial supporter when governments are unable
to meet these goals. Likewise, the state acts as a regional conduit between federal and local
government, providing aid to its local jurisdictions as needed. This concept, known as
shared governance, is a reflection of American attitudes about self-governance. In their book
exploring policy implementation issues within the federal government, May and Williams
[8] cited, as an example of this mindset, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, which marked the first time in U.S. history that the federal government assumed a di‐
rect funding role in public education. Although American government was deliberately de‐
signed in this fashion, it can cause a dilemma:
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On the one hand, federal officials have a strong stake in promoting hazard mitigation and
preparedness but little direct control over the effectiveness of such efforts. On the other
hand, in the aggregate, sub-national governments and individuals owning property in haz‐
ardous areas directly control the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness policies, but
for the most part actions consistent with such policies are low on their list of priorities. [8]
Figure 1. The cyclic nature of the Four Phase Model
In the following sections, emergency planning at each phase of government will be dis‐
cussed, with particular emphasis on local response to the recent federal demands for Hazard
Mitigation Plans.
3.2. What is a hazard mitigation plan?
Before discussing how Hazard Mitigation Plans are completed within the government, it is
worth briefly considering: what exactly is a Hazard Mitigation Plan? The Disaster Mitiga‐
tion Act of 2000 [9] only lists two requirements for local mitigation plans, stating that the
plans “shall (1) describe actions to mitigate hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities identified un‐
der the plan; and (2) establish a strategy to implement those actions” [P.L. 106-390 § 322(b)].
FEMA’s Interim Final Rule (The Rule) provides much more specific requirements based on
these guidelines. In summary, a Hazard Mitigation Plan must include:
1. Documentation of the planning process;
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2. A risk assessment, including: (i) a description of the type, location, and extent of all nat‐
ural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction, including previous occurrences and (ii) a
description of the jurisdictions vulnerability to the hazards. Vulnerability should be de‐
scribed in terms of: (A) types and numbers of existing infrastructure, (B) an estimate of
potential dollar losses to vulnerable structures, and (C) a description of land uses and
development trends. (iii) “For multi-jurisdictional plans, the risk assessment section
must assess each jurisdiction’s risks where they vary from the risks facing the entire
planning area.”
3. A mitigation strategy, including: (i) long-term mitigation goals, (ii) a description of spe‐
cific actions for new and existing structures, and (iii) an action plan for how the above
will be implemented, prioritized by cost-benefit analysis.
4. A plan maintenance process, including: (i) a description of maintenance for the plan on
a five-year cycle, (ii) a process, if possible, to incorporate mitigation efforts into other
aspects of local planning, and (iii) a discussion on continuing public maintenance of the
plan.
5. Documentation that the plan has been formally adopted by all participating jurisdic‐
tions [44 CFR 201.6(c)].
Because the legal style of The Rule can be tedious and lacking examples, FEMA published a
series of how-to guides for state and local mitigation planning [10]. The first four guides list‐
ed are considered the “Core Four” of HMPs, with the remaining guides available for those
jurisdictions as applicable:
1. Getting started with the mitigation planning process, including important considera‐
tions for how you can organize your efforts to develop an effective mitigation plan (FE‐
MA 386-1);
2. Identifying hazards and assessing losses to your community, State, or Tribe (FEMA
386-2);
3. Setting mitigation priorities and goals for your community, State, or Tribe and writing
the plan (FEMA 386-3);
4. Implementing the mitigation plan, including project funding and maintaining a dynam‐
ic plan that changes to meet new developments (FEMA 386-4);
5. Evaluating potential mitigation actions through the use of benefit-cost review (FEMA
386-5);
6. Incorporating special considerations into hazard mitigation planning for historic prop‐
erties and cultural resources, the topic of this how-to guide (FEMA 386-6);
7. Incorporating mitigation considerations for manmade hazards into hazard mitigation
planning (FEMA 386-7);
8. Multi-Jurisdictional Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-8); and
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9. Finding and securing technical and financial resources for mitigation planning (FEMA
386-9).
All of the guides have a similar format of listing the specific subsection of The Rule, and
then provide an explanation, a list of required activities, recommended activities, and exam‐
ples for how to implement the specific part of The Rule in a clear, non-legal style.
The eighth volume of the How-To Guide, published in 2006 (386-8), is titled “Multi-Jurisdic‐
tional Mitigation Planning” and provides guidelines for this specific type of local plan au‐
thorship. Although there are many ways to organize a multi-jurisdictional plan, the guide
recommends a specific structure to follow; the common portion of the plan may include the
“process, common hazards, general mitigation goals, collaborative actions, and [plan] main‐
tenance [schedule].” The items unique to each participating jurisdiction that may be includ‐
ed are: “geographically specific hazards, risks, specific [mitigation] goals, actions,
participation, and adoption” [10]. In other words, the number of activities for which the
costs would fall exclusively to a single jurisdiction has already been reduced.
If a plan is to be submitted as a multi-jurisdictional HMP, 386-8 provides specific require‐
ments that must be met at each stage of the process. FEMA 386-8 makes recommendations
for how to implement the requirements, and tips and examples for following the recommen‐
dations. Since the recommendations are not mandatory, and each jurisdiction is unique, the
recommendations are not included in summary table. One critical component for multi-ju‐
risdictional plans however, is “documentation” or “proof or adoption” is required from par‐
ticipating single jurisdictions. This refers to city or county resolutions that were passed in
the individual jurisdictions to adopt the regional or multi-jurisdictional mitigation plan.
With regard to plan participation, the organization of multiple jurisdictions generally fol‐
lows three models: Direct Representation, Authorized Representation, and a combination of
the two. The first involves sending “direct representatives” to the plan author, who coordi‐
nates the creation of the plan. For the second, the individual jurisdictions will authorize the
plan author to act on their behalf, usually through city or county resolution [10]. A combina‐
tion of the two can also be created. Any or all of the models are acceptable, but may lead to
different cost situations.
3.2.1. Planning at the federal and state level
As the U.S. exited the Cold War, emergency management at all levels of government contin‐
ued to evolve and in 1974 with The Disaster Relief Act was enacted. The primary goal of the
Disaster Relief Act was to update the federal response and relief system described earlier,
and to grant more power to the federal government to provide aid in the immediate after‐
math of a disaster. In 1979, following the Disaster Relief Act, the Federal Emergency Man‐
agement Agency (FEMA) was formed. While FEMA remains the national organization for
emergency management, past structuring of the federal bureaucracy has shown that these
institutions are frequently replaced. Predecessors to FEMA include: The Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization (1958), the Office of Emergency Preparedness (1961), The Civil De‐
fense Preparedness Agency (1972), and finally the Federal Emergency Management Agency
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in 1979 (see [2]). Each of these contained multiple sub-organizations concerned with differ‐
ent areas of emergency management, and operated within a wide range of government
groups, from the Department of Defense (DOD) to Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) [2]. As a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, FEMA was brought un‐
der the auspices of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and after a
controversial response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 CNN reported that a congressional
committee was calling for the abolition of FEMA [11].
After  the  changes  made  at  the  federal  level  during  1970s,  policy  continued  to  evolve
through amendments to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 with the Robert T. Stafford Disas‐
ter  Relief  and Emergency Assistance Act  (1988),  and the Disaster  Mitigation Act  (2000).
Each amendment encourages localities to “focus on individual and community infrastruc‐
tures,” unless the disaster is beyond their ability to manage [12]. Further, “if the disaster
exceeds the state’s  capacity to respond … the state governor [is  allowed] to request aid
from the national government.  FEMA evaluates the request,  prepares material  for presi‐
dential approval, and coordinates the federal response” [12]. Local and state governments
now officially bore the responsibility for emergency planning, although federal response
capacity had been expanded.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 was significant because by its own title was the first law
to emphasize the mitigation and preparedness phases of the Four Phase model, rather than
“relief” or “assistance” as before; this was achieved by expanding Section 404 of the Stafford
Act, which authorized the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) as a means by which
jurisdictions that had received presidential declarations of disaster could apply for and receive
federal assistance for mitigation projects. An additional program, for Pre-Disaster Mitigation
grants (PDMs), was instituted so that a presidential declaration was not a requirement to ap‐
ply for funding directed at mitigation activity; however the application process is separate,
nationally competitive, and less familiar than that of the HMGP; and often the amount of
money made available for funding applications through presidential declarations is substan‐
tially higher. In amending Section 404 of the Stafford Act, Section 322(a) of the Disaster Miti‐
gation Act required state and local mitigation plans to be in place before any applications
were made to the HMGP:
a condition of receipt of an increased Federal share for hazard mitigation measures…a State,
local, or tribal government shall develop and submit for approval to the President a mitiga‐
tion plan that outlines the processes for identifying the natural hazards, risks, and vulnera‐
bilities of the area under the jurisdiction of the government.
The Disaster Mitigation Act provided a legal foundation for FEMA to author an Interim Fi‐
nal Rule under the Federal Register (44 CFR Parts 201 and 206). As discussed in the previous
section, the Rule provides specific clarification, based on the Disaster Mitigation Act, for re‐
ceiving funding through FEMA under the HMGP. Beginning at the state level, a state can
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9. Finding and securing technical and financial resources for mitigation planning (FEMA
386-9).
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in 1979 (see [2]). Each of these contained multiple sub-organizations concerned with differ‐
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either have a Standard or Enhanced Mitigation Plan that will result in a 15% or 20% increase
in HMGP funding, respectively. The state is also allowed to use up to 7% of the HMGP
funding to cover the expenses of writing state, local, or tribal plans. As of November 2007,
48 states had approved Standard Plans, and two states were waiting for approval on submit‐
ted plans. Seven of the 48 states with approved plans had also elevated their status to hav‐
ing approved Enhanced Plans, showing the state-level implementation of plans was highly
successful. The Rule explicitly states that “[t]o be eligible to receive HMGP project grants,
local governments must develop Local Mitigation Plans that include a risk assessment and
mitigation strategy to reduce potential losses and target resources. Plans must be reviewed,
revised, and submitted to us for approval every 5 years” (p. 8847). Local Mitigation Plans
are also referred to as Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMPs), or Mitigation Action Plans, by FE‐
MA and local planners alike. An important note for later discussions on the cultural influen‐
ces in local planning, The Rule further specifies that “[m]ulti-jurisdictional plans may be
accepted, as appropriate, as long as each jurisdiction has participated in the process and has
officially adopted the plan. State-wide plans will not be accepted as multi-jurisdictional
plans” [44 CFR § 201.6(3)].
To encourage a fast response to the new local-level planning requirements, The Rule origi‐
nally set a deadline of November 1, 2003. Prior to that date, writing plans and applying for
funding through the HMGP could be done simultaneously. In October 2003 the deadline
was changed to November 1, 2004 with an amendment in the Federal Register, stating that
“local governments must have an approved mitigation plan in order to receive project
grants under any Notice of Funding Opportunity [including PDMs] issued after November
1, 2003 [fiscal year 2004 and later]” (p. 61368). Interestingly, this legislation used a limitation
of access to federal grants to motivate local governments to create HMPs.
From this sequence of bureaucratic re-organization and policy implementation, it is clear
that planning for disasters at the federal level has involved maintaining a reliable response
and relief capacity, and passing the planning responsibilities to state and local government.
This is not counterintuitive however, as local residents have a better understanding of their
areas, and would be the first to respond during a disaster.
3.2.2. Planning at the local level
While federal and state governments are easily recognizable, it is worth considering the def‐
initions of local government when considering the planning that occurs there. The U.S. Cen‐
sus Bureau provides rigorous definitions for city governments, and a certain set of criteria
that must be met for a local government to be considered legitimate. FEMA accepts plans
from a wide variety of local governments, including tribal governments and individual
school districts. When conducting any analysis on HMPs, a distinction should be made for
which types of governments are under consideration. Councils of governments are not de‐
fined by the census bureau, and may take a variety of forms depending on the needs of lo‐
calities within a region. According to the National Association of Regional Councils
(NARC), a regional council, or council of governments, is defined as:
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…a multi-service entity with state and locally-defined boundaries that delivers a variety of
federal, state and local programs while continuing its function as a planning organization,
technical assistance provider and “visionary” to its member local governments. As such,
they are accountable to local units of government and effective partners for state and federal
governments [13].
In support of the notion within emergency management that inter-organizational coopera‐
tion is crucial, [13] believes “the role of the regional council has been shaped by the chang‐
ing dynamics in federal, state and local government relations, and the growing recognition
that the region is the arena in which local governments must work together to resolve social
and environmental challenges.”
As emergency management evolves and becomes more advanced, the earlier quotation from
[8] becomes more relevant. Recall that:
On the one hand, federal officials have a strong stake in promoting hazard mitigation and
preparedness but little direct control over the effectiveness of such efforts. On the other
hand, in the aggregate, sub-national governments and individuals owning property in haz‐
ardous areas directly control the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness policies, but
for the most part actions consistent with such policies are low on their list of priorities [8].
Because of increased globalization, a community that was once relatively isolated might
now house critical facilities for a distant parent company. Sociologist Arjen Boin notes how
deeply systemic and interlinked society as become, allowing the effects of disaster to spread
and multiply more rapidly than in the past, and stressing the need for improved local disas‐
ter planning:
First, Western societies become increasingly dependent on complex systems to deliver most
basic tasks ranging from garbage collection to national defense. Second, the various subsys‐
tems become increasingly tightly coupled, which means that a disturbance in one system
rapidly propagates toward another [14].
All levels of government participate in some way in all levels of emergency management,
creating a complex system of interlinked activities. Ultimately though, the entire structure of
emergency management in the United States, and within the Four Phase model, depends on
preparedness at the local level. This concept is aptly publicized by the planning require‐
ments within the Disaster Mitigation Act and FEMA’s Interim Final Rule. Despite general
consensus that local preparedness is essential, its execution has traditionally been of mini‐
mal quality, low priority, and host to a multitude of administrative problems. These are dis‐
cussed in the following sections.
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3.2.2.1. What constitutes preparedness?
Returning to the Four Phase model of emergency management proposed in 1979 by the
NGA, the report failed to provide definitions for the phases; instead, suggested activities
were included. For the preparedness phase, the NGA recommended:
Developing a response plan and training first responders to save lives and reduce disaster
damage, including the identification of critical resources and the development of necessary
agreements among responding agencies, both within the jurisdiction and with other juris‐
dictions [6].
Six years later, the NGA was better able to define each phase (see Table 1). Preparedness
was defined as:
Developing a response plan based upon the risk assessment, training response personnel,
arranging for necessary resources, making arrangements with other jurisdictions for sharing
of resources, clarifying jurisdictional responsibilities, and so on. [14]
An interesting similarity between both definitions is that they encourage cooperation with
other jurisdictions. Although this cooperation has appeared low on the list of priorities of
local planners for reasons discussed later, recent research has shown multi-jurisdictional co‐
operation to be almost exclusively responsible for the creation of HMPs [15].
As the understanding of emergency planning and hazards progressed, a number of re‐
searchers would recommend activities that led to an increased state of preparedness for lo‐
cal emergency managers (see [16]). After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, [16]
revisited these activities, summarized and combined the work that had been done previous‐
ly, and suggested ten guidelines for increased preparedness within the newfound context of
terrorism as a viable threat. In summary, the ten steps are:
1. Base planning activities “upon accurate knowledge of the threat and of likely human
responses;”
2. encourage an appropriate, rather than quick or impulsive, response;
3. emphasize “response flexibility so that those involved in operations can adjust to
changing disaster demands;”
4. address inter-organizational coordination;
5. “integrate plans for each individual community hazard managed into a comprehensive
approach for multi-hazard management;”
6. include a training program so that all involved parties are familiar with the plan, in‐
cluding elected officials and the general public;
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7. test the plan with drills and exercises;
8. recognize that “planning is a continuing process;”
9. recognize that due to the nature of local government culture [see Section 2.2.3.2.3],
“emergency planning… is almost always conducted in the face of conflict and resist‐
ance;” and
10. 1recognize that a plan is only ever truly tested and improved upon “with its implemen‐
tation in an emergency” (adapted from [16]).
The authors note that “often, there is a tendency to equate emergency planning with the
presence of a written plan and similarly believe that a written plan is evidence of jurisdic‐
tional preparedness” [16]. In fact, as demonstrated in the ten guidelines, planning is a dy‐
namic process. Emphasizing a written plan may not be a bad idea, given the requirements of
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program; however a possible future task for policy might be to
highlight the process rather than the written document.
Combining the definitions of the NGA Four Phase model with [4] and [16], preparedness
within the context of emergency management is best thought of as a cyclic process, much
like the Four Phase model, which consists of threat assessment, resource assessment and ac‐
quisition, inter- and intra-jurisdictional cooperation, drills and exercises, and finally writing
a plan (see Figure 1). As previously discussed, a preliminary examination of FEMA data on
Hazard Mitigation Plan completion has shown that over 90% of the “plan writing” phase of
preparedness has occurred at the multi-jurisdictional level, especially within counties and
COGs [15]. It would appear that these five activities within preparedness can occur with
varying success at different levels of local government. The history of multi-government
bodies in emergency management is discussed in the next section.
3.2.2.2. The role of counties and councils of governments
With rare exception, emergency management literature has followed the governmental de‐
sign of the NGA model to the letter; the four phases are to be carried out at the federal, state,
and local level. However, in the NGA report and subsequent literature, local government is
seldom defined and assumed to mean primarily city, or occasionally, county government.
Very little literature exists on the role of councils of governments in the preparedness phase.
An important note from the literature in emergency management is that “inter-organization‐
al” or “multi-jurisdictional” coordination is considered essential among disaster researchers;
even if the terms are broad, encompass many types of coordination, and refer almost exclu‐
sively to the response phase of emergency management. Like [14], Louise Comfort argues
that due to the increasing complexity of society, not only are effective local responses criti‐
cal, but are also “necessarily inter-organizational and interdisciplinary” [17]. Comfort had
previously proposed specific roles for county emergency management within the prepared‐
ness phase. In summary, Comfort lists the county’s responsibilities as:
1. Review individual city emergency plans and enter their data into a resource database;
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2. Summarize database into county-wide profile of responsibilities and capabilities, and
return this report to city governments for review;
3. Conduct drills and exercises that bring multiple organizations together; 4) evaluate the
performance of the cities in these drills;
4. improve preparedness at the county level and “seek assistance…from inter-jurisdiction‐
al sources;”
5. schedule, monitor and evaluate preparedness activities; and
6. submit an annual report of these activities to the state (adapted from [17]).
Two important factors in Comfort’s guidelines are that first, she recognizes the importance
of a coordinating government to act between the city and state levels, but she also relies on
the assumption that individual cities will author their own plans.
In 1994, William Waugh expanded on Comfort’s role for county government. Waugh ar‐
gued that counties should be the exclusive home of local emergency management, because
county offices generally:
1. are geographically close to environmental problems,
2. have larger resource bases than municipalities,
3. have ambiguous administrative structures that encourage inter- and intra-organization‐
al cooperation,
4. are local agents of state administration,
5. have close administrative ties to state agencies,
6. provide forums for local-local cooperation, and
7. serve as general-purpose governments representing local interests and have strong lo‐
cal identification (adapted from [3]).
Waugh’s reasoning may provide some insight into why the success rates for Hazard Mitiga‐
tion Plan authorship are so high for counties and COGs. Yet in many rural areas, counties
only encompass a small number of sparsely populated municipalities, which raises the ques‐
tion of when county governments or COGs are more appropriate in the planning process.
Only one example of a successful COG exists in the literature, and it receives a brief mention
in a report by Thomas Drabek [18]. In 1990, Drabek published the results of a study of
twelve highly successful local emergency managers. From what he learned through person‐
al visits and interviews, Drabek extracted fifteen qualities that all of the managers shared;
one of which was the formation of “mergers.” While this generally meant the cooperation
between public and private organizations, or inter-departmental cooperation, Drabek found
that Donald Herrick of Davidson County, South Dakota founded the James Valley Emergen‐
cy and Disaster Service District- “a four county emergency services unit” [18].
Undoubtedly the academic aspect of emergency management recognizes the usefulness of
regionalized government, especially counties and within the response phase of a disaster. In
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practice at the local level however, both the preparedness phase of emergency management
and the concept of shared governance even at a regional level is resisted and viewed with
suspicion and disdain. Despite its apparent benefits, the difficulty in implementing multi-
jurisdictional cooperation is discussed next.
3.2.2.3. Cultural issues in local government
Planning for disaster in local government has traditionally been a neglected and misunder‐
stood part of emergency management. The reasons, summarized and listed in [19], include:
…diversity of hazards, low issue salience, resistance to regulatory efforts, resistance to plan‐
ning efforts, lack of a strong political constituency, lack of a strong administrative constitu‐
ency, problems with measuring the effectiveness of programs, the technical complexity of
many emergency management efforts, vertical fragmentation of federal systems, horizontal
fragmentation of governments and communities, current political and economic milieu, and
state and local capacity [19].
In other words, emergency management is not a simple matter. The complex and infrequent
nature of disasters compared with more familiar problems places them low on the list of pri‐
orities for many planners. This lack of enthusiasm is compounded by local politics, turf pro‐
tection, and ambiguity caused by shared governance. These reasons for resistance to
planning efforts can cause both vertical and horizontal fragmentation of government.
Documenting this type of cultural phenomenon poses a challenge of a sociological nature.
Presented below are the results of preliminary studies that have begun quantifying these
barriers to success. The results indicate that an aversion to planning is frequently present
among local government officials. The reason is twofold: the process itself is ongoing, ex‐
pensive, and time-consuming, and the background of many professionals in emergency
management is one of trained rapid response. By asking city planners to rate their own suc‐
cesses in the formation of mandated local toxic chemical emergency planning committees
(LEPCs) under SARA Title III, five years after the policy went into effect in the state of Mich‐
igan, M. Lindell [20] found that:
On average, LEPCs had completed 31% of the task of conducting hazard analyses, 26% of
the task of developing site-specific emergency plans, and 15% of the task of training emer‐
gency responders. Moreover, they rated the quality of their LEPCs work (on a scale of 1-5, 5
is very high quality) at 2.88 for organizing and administering the LEPC, 2.46 for conducting
hazard analyses, 2.55 for developing site specific plans, 1.71 for training emergency res‐
ponders, 2.02 for conducting drills and exercises, and 2.64 for filing hazard data [20].
Lindell’s results indicate that not only are planners reluctant to take action, but willingly
rank themselves as such. In a follow-up study [21], Lindell found that the largest contribu‐
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2. Summarize database into county-wide profile of responsibilities and capabilities, and
return this report to city governments for review;
3. Conduct drills and exercises that bring multiple organizations together; 4) evaluate the
performance of the cities in these drills;
4. improve preparedness at the county level and “seek assistance…from inter-jurisdiction‐
al sources;”
5. schedule, monitor and evaluate preparedness activities; and
6. submit an annual report of these activities to the state (adapted from [17]).
Two important factors in Comfort’s guidelines are that first, she recognizes the importance
of a coordinating government to act between the city and state levels, but she also relies on
the assumption that individual cities will author their own plans.
In 1994, William Waugh expanded on Comfort’s role for county government. Waugh ar‐
gued that counties should be the exclusive home of local emergency management, because
county offices generally:
1. are geographically close to environmental problems,
2. have larger resource bases than municipalities,
3. have ambiguous administrative structures that encourage inter- and intra-organization‐
al cooperation,
4. are local agents of state administration,
5. have close administrative ties to state agencies,
6. provide forums for local-local cooperation, and
7. serve as general-purpose governments representing local interests and have strong lo‐
cal identification (adapted from [3]).
Waugh’s reasoning may provide some insight into why the success rates for Hazard Mitiga‐
tion Plan authorship are so high for counties and COGs. Yet in many rural areas, counties
only encompass a small number of sparsely populated municipalities, which raises the ques‐
tion of when county governments or COGs are more appropriate in the planning process.
Only one example of a successful COG exists in the literature, and it receives a brief mention
in a report by Thomas Drabek [18]. In 1990, Drabek published the results of a study of
twelve highly successful local emergency managers. From what he learned through person‐
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cy and Disaster Service District- “a four county emergency services unit” [18].
Undoubtedly the academic aspect of emergency management recognizes the usefulness of
regionalized government, especially counties and within the response phase of a disaster. In
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters68
practice at the local level however, both the preparedness phase of emergency management
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tors to the time commitments needed for plan completion were: committee member input,
available planning resources, and community support. Staffing and structure within the
government and the city’s vulnerability to hazards were not found to be significant (see
[21]).
Lindell’s findings [20, 21] were supported by two recent papers (see Buckle et al. [22]; and
Stuart-Black et al. [23]). Buckle et al. found that the unfamiliar nature of hazards made them
less appealing for planners, and that good communication between local government and
community led to better planning [22]. The second study [23] surveyed local emergency
managers to determine the composition of the field with regard to education, background,
age, sex, and previous job experience. The results demonstrated a lack of value placed on
education or academic training, with preferences given to practical experience in defense or
response-oriented jobs. One of the motivations for the study was what the authors described
as an informal “notion…that those doing the job were older men from a military or emer‐
gency services background, who having retired from their service were embarking on a sec‐
ond career in order to boost their pensions” [23]. In the United Kingdom, the study found
that 76% of local planners looking to hire a new emergency manager were not even consid‐
ering recent graduates or degree holders [23]. The planners estimated they would fill their
positions using employees with significant experience or those looking for a transition into
retirement. When asked where they expected to find potential candidates, the planners re‐
sponded that they “expected to recruit from the local government sector (63%), first re‐
sponse (37%), and/or retired military (34%),” with percentages including responses where
multiple sectors were chosen as potential hiring pools. The surveys also asked why these
sectors where chosen, and “the overwhelming answer was that age and experience were
paramount to the job, and younger applicants were not always able to bring the necessary
authority that was needed in dealing with senior officers and elected council members.” In
regard to this “overwhelming” response, the authors commented that “clearly the emergen‐
cy planners are by their own actions and beliefs perpetuating the myth.” Though the “no‐
tion” that prompted surveys in [23] was informal and not fully documented, it certainly is
supported by the data collected.
Local emergency managers appear to subscribe to the war-oriented approach described by
[1] above. Often police and fire departments closely resemble the military in structure, train‐
ing, and operation, with all groups placing high emphasis on the ability to act rationally and
maintain order in emergency situations. As indicated by [23], this leads directly to hiring
preferences that value the experienced responder above all other candidates. It also leads to
a second inhibitor to local planning: the difficulties of implementing inter-jurisdictional co‐
operation.
Policy research has shown that because of differing priorities of various agencies, such as
police and fire, “bureaucrats tend to avoid communication with their counterparts in other
agencies, even when their responsibilities clearly overlap or interface… In general, the more
coordination required to implement a policy, the less chances of its success” (Edwards, 1978,
as quoted in [24]). Kartez and Kelley [25] supported this finding with their own survey of
local emergency planners. The planners were asked to rank seven strategies for implement‐
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ing preparedness policy, based on perceived likelihood of adoption, perceived benefits of
strategy, and perceived effort of adoption. Among other strategies, such as citizen education
and creating a media information center, inter-jurisdictional forums ranked third and sec‐
ond respectively in benefit and effort, but dropped to fourth for the likelihood of adoption
[25]. The authors surmised that the planners recognized the benefit of inter-jurisdictional
collaboration, but deemed it too difficult to execute.
Drabek’s study [18] of successful emergency managers also supported these conclusions,
highlighting the political reasons for avoiding working with other jurisdictions and even de‐
partments within their single jurisdiction. Drabek sited “turf defense” as a major barricade
to what he called the “sensitive ground” of “coalition building” [18]. Drabek specifically cit‐
ed an emergency manager that had tried to start a smoke detector and fire extinguisher cam‐
paign in his jurisdiction, much to the irritation of the fire department, who felt such a
campaign was their responsibility and resented the emergency manager for making them
look unconcerned about prevention.
3.2.3. Summary of planning for disaster in federal, state, and local government
The previous sections provided a history of the planning subsection of the preparedness
phase of emergency management. Planning at the federal level is limited; federal govern‐
ment is primarily a financier and supporting partner of response, recovery, and mitigation
efforts. The most recent federal policy, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and FEMA’s sub‐
sequent Interim Final Rule (44 CFR Parts 201 and 206) have required that all local jurisdic‐
tions have an approved Hazard Mitigation Plan in order to be eligible for any federal
funding opportunities.
The states play intermediate roles in transferring information between local and federal gov‐
ernments, and the local governments are responsible for their own planning. Using the five
aspects of preparedness [4, 16], Table 2 shows how some roles within the Preparedness
phase can be checked off by definition, while others remain poorly understood. To carry out
any of the activities listed at the regional level, without the knowledge or cooperation of the
city level, would be extremely poor planning. Similarly, inter- and intra-jurisdictional coop‐
eration requires the participation of multiple jurisdictions by definition. The remaining roles
however, are poorly understood within the literature. For instance, what is the role of a
council of governments in drills and exercises? Are they activities that require maximum co‐
operation, or are counties better suited to perform this task so as to avoid over-complica‐
tion? This chapter focused on planning at the city, county, and COG level (Table 2) but
certainly more research is needed in the other areas of the Preparedness phase.
COG ? ? ? + ?
County ? ? ? + ?
City + + + + +
Plan TA RAA IJC D&E
Table 2. The Roles of Local Government within the Preparedness Phase
Hazard Mitigation Planning in the United States: Historical Perspectives, Cultural Influences, and Current Challenges
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/54209
71
tors to the time commitments needed for plan completion were: committee member input,
available planning resources, and community support. Staffing and structure within the
government and the city’s vulnerability to hazards were not found to be significant (see
[21]).
Lindell’s findings [20, 21] were supported by two recent papers (see Buckle et al. [22]; and
Stuart-Black et al. [23]). Buckle et al. found that the unfamiliar nature of hazards made them
less appealing for planners, and that good communication between local government and
community led to better planning [22]. The second study [23] surveyed local emergency
managers to determine the composition of the field with regard to education, background,
age, sex, and previous job experience. The results demonstrated a lack of value placed on
education or academic training, with preferences given to practical experience in defense or
response-oriented jobs. One of the motivations for the study was what the authors described
as an informal “notion…that those doing the job were older men from a military or emer‐
gency services background, who having retired from their service were embarking on a sec‐
ond career in order to boost their pensions” [23]. In the United Kingdom, the study found
that 76% of local planners looking to hire a new emergency manager were not even consid‐
ering recent graduates or degree holders [23]. The planners estimated they would fill their
positions using employees with significant experience or those looking for a transition into
retirement. When asked where they expected to find potential candidates, the planners re‐
sponded that they “expected to recruit from the local government sector (63%), first re‐
sponse (37%), and/or retired military (34%),” with percentages including responses where
multiple sectors were chosen as potential hiring pools. The surveys also asked why these
sectors where chosen, and “the overwhelming answer was that age and experience were
paramount to the job, and younger applicants were not always able to bring the necessary
authority that was needed in dealing with senior officers and elected council members.” In
regard to this “overwhelming” response, the authors commented that “clearly the emergen‐
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Local emergency managers appear to subscribe to the war-oriented approach described by
[1] above. Often police and fire departments closely resemble the military in structure, train‐
ing, and operation, with all groups placing high emphasis on the ability to act rationally and
maintain order in emergency situations. As indicated by [23], this leads directly to hiring
preferences that value the experienced responder above all other candidates. It also leads to
a second inhibitor to local planning: the difficulties of implementing inter-jurisdictional co‐
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Policy research has shown that because of differing priorities of various agencies, such as
police and fire, “bureaucrats tend to avoid communication with their counterparts in other
agencies, even when their responsibilities clearly overlap or interface… In general, the more
coordination required to implement a policy, the less chances of its success” (Edwards, 1978,
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sequent Interim Final Rule (44 CFR Parts 201 and 206) have required that all local jurisdic‐
tions have an approved Hazard Mitigation Plan in order to be eligible for any federal
funding opportunities.
The states play intermediate roles in transferring information between local and federal gov‐
ernments, and the local governments are responsible for their own planning. Using the five
aspects of preparedness [4, 16], Table 2 shows how some roles within the Preparedness
phase can be checked off by definition, while others remain poorly understood. To carry out
any of the activities listed at the regional level, without the knowledge or cooperation of the
city level, would be extremely poor planning. Similarly, inter- and intra-jurisdictional coop‐
eration requires the participation of multiple jurisdictions by definition. The remaining roles
however, are poorly understood within the literature. For instance, what is the role of a
council of governments in drills and exercises? Are they activities that require maximum co‐
operation, or are counties better suited to perform this task so as to avoid over-complica‐
tion? This chapter focused on planning at the city, county, and COG level (Table 2) but
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Although placing responsibility for planning at the local level is logical, considering locals
know their areas the best and are the first to respond to a disaster, literature shows that in
practice there are many more factors at play. First, writing a plan on paper is only a small
portion of preparedness as a whole. Second, the individual government success rate for
Hazard Mitigation Plans is minute compared to that for multi-jurisdictional bodies; even
though the latter is not well understood in the literature. Finally, a political, response-based
culture at the local level has consistently made multi-jurisdictional cooperation difficult.
Returning to planning and preparedness within the context of a national emergency manage‐
ment system, recall that emergency management follows a four-phase model developed in 1979
by the National Governor’s Association. The four phases are: preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation. They are accepted as standard among practitioners of emergency management,
and are widely considered to be overlapping and cyclical (Figure 1). All four phases contain
component activities as demonstrated in the literature (Table 1). Due to the complexity of actual
disasters, it is likely that even more activities and sub-categories exist within these divisions, but
they have yet to be formally established by the literature.
As defined by the NGA model, the four phases of emergency management can be extended
to all levels of government (Figure 2). A typical assumption in emergency management liter‐
ature is that government in the United States is divided into local, state, and federal levels.
However local government can be further subdivided into municipality/town, county, and
COG. The activities that comprise the four phases of emergency management may be car‐
ried out at all levels of government.
Figure 2. Four phases of emergency management at all levels of government
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However a third dimension may be added to the model to show what aspects of emergency
management can influence the activities within certain areas of government. Three factors
were found to have a significant effect on organizing emergency management activities
within a government by [21] as discussed earlier: available resources, committee input, and
community support. It is likely that there are many more factors that influence preparedness
and cooperation in local emergency planning, but these have yet to be documented in the
literature. In addition to influencing emergency management activities, these three factors
also provide frameworks for measuring the activities. A pictorial representation (Figure 3)
provides a visual summary of the Four Phase Model, extended to all levels of government,
and within the contexts for action identified by [21], and clearly shows the complexity faced
by local planners.
Figure 3. A Conceptual Model of the National Emergency Management System. Copyright © 2008 Andrea M. Jack‐
man & Mario G. Beruvides
3.3. Hazard mitigation planning as part of a national emergency management system
Most of the emergency management literature in this chapter is presented within the context
of planning, specifically for hazard mitigation in a local community. However based on Ta‐
ble 1, the findings of [21], and the established structure of American government, it is not
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unreasonable to begin imagining the complexity of our national emergency management
system as illustrated in Figure 3. Certainly there is more research to be done; more activities
may be added to the subdivisions of the Four Phase Model as our national approach to
emergency management grows and evolves, and further motivating factors for each activity
will likely be discovered beyond those in [21] that were found to influence planning.
However one aspect of Figure 3 cannot be disputed: the complexity of our national emer‐
gency management system will not get any simpler. Even the introductory overview of liter‐
ature provided in this chapter is able to justify an 18 x 5 x 3 conceptual diagram – equaling a
minimum of 270 individual components that make up the national system of emergency
management. Recalling the words of sociologist Arjen Boin from earlier:
First, Western societies become increasingly dependent on complex systems to deliver most
basic tasks ranging from garbage collection to national defense. Second, the various subsys‐
tems become increasingly tightly coupled, which means that a disturbance in one system
rapidly propagates toward another [14].
Hazard mitigation planning is  a  small  component  of  emergency management.  Even ex‐
panded to  all  possible  levels  of  government,  it  is  only  one  type  of  plan  among many,
and planning is  only one type of  activity  in  overall  preparedness.  Yet  one might  ques‐
tion,  how  “tightly  coupled”  is  it  with  other  aspects  of  emergency  management?  How
rapidly will  one action within a HMP propagate to other subsystems within emergency
management as a whole? A simple HMP may be comprised of a community risk assess‐
ment and one or two mitigative actions to reduce those risks. But the risk assessment is
likely based on past disasters in the community. The lessons learned and recommended
actions from those disasters in turn influence future responses, which influence future re‐
covery efforts,  which will  drive mitigation planning and risk assessments in later years.
Through  Figure  3  we  see  how  one  activity  affects  many  others  within  the  system.  At
first  glance, local hazard mitigation planning seems distant and unrelated to decontami‐
nation efforts managed by the federal government. However an effective mitigation strat‐
egy put  in  to  place  today through the  HMP process  may significantly  reduce the  need
for decontamination or any federal involvement at all.  As another example, the after-ac‐
tion  report  of  a  state-level  search  and  rescue  team  could  directly  impact  risk  assess‐
ments, planning, and mitigation strategy following a major disaster.
Hazard mitigation planning at  the local  and COG level,  studied from all  possible  plan‐
ning contexts, only comprises (at most) 9 out of 270 subsections of Figure 3, or 3%. This
estimate does not include the further breakdown of different kinds of  plans in addition
to HMPs, yet was shown to influence many other subsections of Figure 3. This illustrates
not only the importance of understanding hazard mitigation plans, but the impact of any
legislative  action  taken  in  emergency  management.  The  true  impact  of  a  single  act  can
have vast,  sometimes  unpredictable  consequences,  especially  in  a  system such as  emer‐
gency  management  where  current  practices  and  scientific  research  are  still  relatively
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new. An understanding of the implementation of the HMGP policy is critical for this rea‐
son, and is discussed in the next section.
4. Hazard mitigation planning in the 21st century
The HMGP policy that led to HMPs as a requirement was put into place in November, 2004.
Based on the material covered in the previous sections, two questions naturally arise: first,
how many local jurisdictions have completed HMPs since the original deadline? Second, for
those localities with an approved HMP, how did they manage given all the documented cul‐
tural aversions to planning at the local level?
These questions were answered in part by a recent series of studies [15, 26]. An initial study
[15] found that in 2008, 67% of the country’s active local governments were without an ap‐
proved Hazard Mitigation Plan (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Map of Hazard Mitigation Plan Completion Percentage for the Continental United States in 2008 [15]
A follow up examination in 2009 [15] of the eight states with the lowest completion percen‐
tages did not indicate significant improvement following the initial study, and revealed in‐
consistencies in plan completion data over time. The completion percentage varied greatly
by state, and did not appear to follow any expected pattern such as wealth or hazard vulner‐
ability that might encourage prompt completion of a plan. Further, the results indicated that
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to HMPs, yet was shown to influence many other subsections of Figure 3. This illustrates
not only the importance of understanding hazard mitigation plans, but the impact of any
legislative  action  taken  in  emergency  management.  The  true  impact  of  a  single  act  can
have vast,  sometimes  unpredictable  consequences,  especially  in  a  system such as  emer‐
gency  management  where  current  practices  and  scientific  research  are  still  relatively
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new. An understanding of the implementation of the HMGP policy is critical for this rea‐
son, and is discussed in the next section.
4. Hazard mitigation planning in the 21st century
The HMGP policy that led to HMPs as a requirement was put into place in November, 2004.
Based on the material covered in the previous sections, two questions naturally arise: first,
how many local jurisdictions have completed HMPs since the original deadline? Second, for
those localities with an approved HMP, how did they manage given all the documented cul‐
tural aversions to planning at the local level?
These questions were answered in part by a recent series of studies [15, 26]. An initial study
[15] found that in 2008, 67% of the country’s active local governments were without an ap‐
proved Hazard Mitigation Plan (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Map of Hazard Mitigation Plan Completion Percentage for the Continental United States in 2008 [15]
A follow up examination in 2009 [15] of the eight states with the lowest completion percen‐
tages did not indicate significant improvement following the initial study, and revealed in‐
consistencies in plan completion data over time. The completion percentage varied greatly
by state, and did not appear to follow any expected pattern such as wealth or hazard vulner‐
ability that might encourage prompt completion of a plan. Further, the results indicated that
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approximately 92% of the approved plans were completed by multi-jurisdictional entities,
which suggests single governments seldom complete and gain approval for plans. This is di‐
rectly opposed to expectations set by literature documenting cultural barriers to multi-juris‐
dictional collaboration, and presents a number of opportunities for further research.
The  study  was  conducted  for  the  initial  three  year  period  of  the  HMGP  from  2004  to
2007,  and given the results,  it  is  important to note that federal  policy such as the HMP
requirements can change quickly and often. Strategic directions, policy, and guidance can
change regularly,  and is  always expected at  the federal  level  following a change in ad‐
ministration. The completion percentages demonstrated in this study represent an impor‐
tant step in understanding how long it  takes for jurisdictions to react  to policy changes
and take necessary steps to become compliant,  especially given the systemic complexity
demonstrated in Figure 3.
A second study [26] examined HMP completion within the context of “available resources”
from Figure 3; namely, cost. It was found that the cost of a HMP varied significantly based
on the frequency of natural hazards experienced by the authoring jurisdiction, the number
of participating jurisdictions in the plan, population, and population density. Similarly, mul‐
ti-jurisdictional plans were found to be significantly cheaper unless a jurisdiction experi‐
enced, on average, more than 6.5 events requiring some kind of emergency response per
year (see [26]). This would provide a financial incentive for jurisdictions to override some of
the cultural barriers mentioned earlier, and proceed with a multi-jurisdictional plan. In view
of the realities presented thus far and the sheer complexity of the US emergency manage‐
ment system, future research might benefit from a systems analysis and systems dynamic
modeling to assist in shaping our national emergency management policy.
Where will hazard mitigation planning go from here? The importance of having at least
some level of understanding of the possible impacts of any new emergency management
policy were illustrated by Figure 3, and this section demonstrates that for the example of
hazard mitigation planning,  relatively  little  is  known about  its  implementation,  success,
and longevity.  Planning in general  was shown by the literature to be valued by policy‐
makers and theorists, but difficult to execute in practice for a variety of reasons. Due to
the far-reaching consequences of good mitigation and mitigation planning, continued re‐
search in this area is  critical  to a better understanding of our entire national emergency
management system.
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1. Introduction
Decision makers must have timely and actionable information to guide their response to
emergency situations. For environmental problems, this information is often produced using
decision support systems (DSS), which is usually a computer-based, environmental simulation
and prediction model that emphasizes access and manipulation of data and algorithms. Using
historical time series data, current conditions, and physically-based algorithms the DSS can
predict the potential outcomes for various decision scenarios, and may also provide the
decision maker with uncertainty and risk estimates. In this way, the DSS can improve decision
making efficiency and accuracy, facilitate decision maker exploration and discovery, commu‐
nication and information organization, and outreach and education.
An important component of advanced decision support tools is data assimilation. Data
assimilation is the application of recursive Bayesian estimation to combine current and past
data in an explicit dynamical model, using the model’s prognostic equations to provide time
continuity and dynamic coupling amongst the fields. Data assimilation aims to utilize both
our knowledge of physical processes as embodied in a numerical process model, and infor‐
mation that can be gained from observations, to produce an improved, continuous system state
estimate in space and time. When implemented in near-real time, data assimilation can
objectively provide decision makers with the timeliest information, as well as provide superior
initializations for short term scenario predictions. Data assimilation can also act as a parameter
estimation method to help reduce DSS bias and uncertainty.
This chapter will provide an overview of data assimilation theory and its application to
decision support tools, and then provide a review of current data assimilation applications in
disaster management.
© 2013 Houser; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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2. Background
Information about environmental conditions is of critical importance to real-world applica‐
tions such as agricultural production, water resource management, flood prediction, water
supply, weather and climate forecasting, and environmental preservation. Improved estimates
about current environmental conditions useful for agriculture, ecology, civil engineering,
water resources management, rainfall-runoff prediction, atmospheric process studies, climate
and weather/climate prediction, and radiation management [1,2].
This information is usually provided to decision makers through Decision Support Systems
(DSS).  DSS’s  are  generally  defined  as  interactive  software-based  systems  that  help  to
assemble useful information from raw data, documents, knowledge, and models to identify
and resolve problems and make decisions. A model-driven DSS emphasizes access to and
operation  of  a  statistical,  financial,  optimization  or  physical  simulation  model.  A  data-
driven DSS emphasizes access to and manipulation of a time-series of data and informa‐
tion.  Data-driven DSS’s  combined with analytical  model  processing provide the  highest
level of functionality and decision support that is linked to analysis of large collections of
historical data.
Physically-based environmental models are often at the heart of powerful DSSs. They rely on
a set of well-established physical principles to make current condition assessments and future
projections. Physical model simulations are performed on powerful computer platforms,
dividing the area of interest into elements in which fluxes and storages are calculated.
Environmental parameters are provided by connected databases of observational and
calibration data.
Observations are important components of DSSs, providing critical information that mitigates
the risk of loss of life and damage to property. Environmental observations are sourced from
the numerous disconnected observational networks and systems that have a wide variety of
characteristics (Figure 1). Basic monthly, seasonal and annual summaries of temperature,
rainfall and other climate elements provide an essential resource for planning endeavors in
areas such as agriculture, water resources, emergency management, urban design, insurance,
energy supply and demand management and construction.
While  ground-based  observational  networks  are  improving,  the  only  practical  way  to
observe the environment on continental  to global scales is  via satellites.  Remote sensing
can make spatially comprehensive measurements of various components of the environ‐
ment,  but  it  cannot  provide  information  on  the  entire  system,  and  the  observations
represent only an instant in time. Environmental process models may be used to predict
the temporal and spatial state variations, but these predictions are often poor, due to model
initialization, parameter and forcing, and physics errors. Therefore, an attractive prospect
is to combine the strengths of environmental models contained within DSSs and observa‐
tions  and minimize  the  weaknesses  to  provide a  superior  environmental  state  estimate.
This is the goal of data assimilation.
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Figure 1. Illustration of an integrated environmental observation network. The network illustrated is the National Sci‐
ence Foundation (NSF) National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON).
Data assimilation combines observations into a dynamical model, using the model’s equations
to provide time continuity and coupling between the estimated fields. Data assimilation aims
to utilize both our environmental process knowledge, as embodied in a numerical computer
model, and information that can be gained from observations. Both model predictions and
observations are imperfect and we wish to use both synergistically to obtain a more accurate
result. Moreover, both contain different kinds of information, that when used together, provide
an accuracy level that cannot be obtained individually.
Figure 2. Numerical models contain errors that increase with time due to model imperfections and uncertainties in
initial and boundary conditions. Data assimilation minimizes these errors by correcting the model stats using new ob‐
servations (from http://www.hzg.de/institute/coastal_research/cosyna).
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The data assimilation challenge is to merge the spatially comprehensive observations with the
dynamically complete but typically poor predictions of an environmental model to yield the
best possible system state estimation (Figure 2). In this illustration, the model represents any
environmental model that simulates system states. Model biases can be mitigated using a
complementary calibration and parameterization process. However, model imperfections will
always remain and will be exasperated by uncertain initial and boundary (forcing) conditions.
Data assimilation techniques can be used to continuously partially reinitialize the model with
information provided by observations. This reinitialization can be constrained by the model
physics to assure that it is physically and dynamically realistic. Limited point measurements
are often used to calibrate the model(s) and validate the assimilation results [3].
3. Data assimilation
Charney et al. (1969) first suggested combining current and past data in an explicit dynamical
model, using the model’s prognostic equations to provide time continuity and dynamic
coupling amongst the fields [4]. This concept has evolved into a family of techniques known
as data assimilation. In essence, data assimilation aims to utilize both our physical process
knowledge as embodied in an environmental model, and information that can be gained from
observations. Both model predictions and observations are imperfect and we wish to use both
synergistically to obtain a more accurate result. Moreover, both contain different kinds of
information, that when used together, provide an accuracy level that cannot be obtained when
used separately.
Data assimilation techniques were established by meteorologists [5] and have been used very
successfully to improve operational weather forecasts. Data assimilation has also been
successfully used in oceanography[6] for improving ocean dynamics prediction. Houser et al.,
(2010) gave an overview of hydrological data assimilation, discussing different data assimila‐
tion methods and several case studies in hydrology [7].
Data assimilation was meant for state estimation, but in the broadest sense, data assimilation
refers to any use of observational information to improve a model [8]. Basically, there are four
methods for “model updating”, as follows:
• Input: corrects model input forcing errors or replaces model-based forcing with observa‐
tions, thereby improving the model’s predictions;
• State: corrects the state or storages of the model so that it comes closer to the observations
(state estimation, data assimilation in the narrow sense);
• Parameter: corrects or replaces model parameters with observational information (parameter
estimation, calibration);
• Error correction: correct the model predictions or state variables by an observed time-
integrated error term in order to reduce systematic model bias (e.g. bias correction).
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State updating can be justified by lack of knowledge about the model’s initial conditions, but
with unconstrained state updating, the model logic is foregone, while this is exactly the main
strength of dynamic assimilation and modelling. If an intensive update of the state is needed
for good results, the model may simply not be able to produce correct state or flux values. In
such cases, assimilation for parameter estimation is better advised. The static parameters
obtained through off-line calibration, prior to the actual forecast simulations, may not always
result in a proper model definition, because of the state and time dependency of parameters
or problems in the model structure or input. Often the model validation residuals show the
presence of bias, variation in error and a correlation structure.
The data assimilation challenge is: given a (noisy) model of the system dynamics, find the best
estimates of system states x̂ from (noisy) observations y. Most current approaches to this
problem are derived from either the direct observer (i.e., sequential filter) or dynamic observer
(i.e., variational through time) techniques (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Schematic of the (a) direct observer and (b) dynamic observer assimilation approaches [7].
3.1. Direct observer assimilation
Direct observer techniques sequentially update the model forecast x̂k
b (a priori simulation
result), using the difference between observation yk  and model predicted observation ŷk ,
known as the “innovation”, whenever observations are available. The predicted observation
is calculated from the model predicted or “background” states, indicated by the superscript
b. The correction, or analysis increment, added to the background state vector is the innovation
multiplied by a weighting factor or gain K. The resulting estimate of the state vector is known
as the “analysis”, as indicated by the superscript a.
( )ˆ ˆ ˆa bk k k k k= + -x x K y y (1)
The subscript k refers to the time of the update. For particular assimilation techniques, like the
Kalman filter, the gain represents the relative uncertainty in the observation and model
variances, and is a number between 0 and 1 in the scalar case. If the uncertainty of the predicted
observation (as calculated from the background states and their uncertainty) is large relative
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State updating can be justified by lack of knowledge about the model’s initial conditions, but
with unconstrained state updating, the model logic is foregone, while this is exactly the main
strength of dynamic assimilation and modelling. If an intensive update of the state is needed
for good results, the model may simply not be able to produce correct state or flux values. In
such cases, assimilation for parameter estimation is better advised. The static parameters
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result in a proper model definition, because of the state and time dependency of parameters
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known as the “innovation”, whenever observations are available. The predicted observation
is calculated from the model predicted or “background” states, indicated by the superscript
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multiplied by a weighting factor or gain K. The resulting estimate of the state vector is known
as the “analysis”, as indicated by the superscript a.
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The subscript k refers to the time of the update. For particular assimilation techniques, like the
Kalman filter, the gain represents the relative uncertainty in the observation and model
variances, and is a number between 0 and 1 in the scalar case. If the uncertainty of the predicted
observation (as calculated from the background states and their uncertainty) is large relative
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to the uncertainty of the actual observation, then the analysis state vector takes on values that
will closely yield the actual observation. Conversely, if the uncertainty of the predicted
observation is small relative to the uncertainty of the actual observation, then the analysis state
vector is unchanged from the original background value. The commonly used direct observer
methods are: (i) direct insertion; (ii) statistical correction; (iii) successive correction; (iv) analysis
correction; (v) nudging; (vi) optimal interpolation/statistical interpolation; (vii) 3-D variation‐
al, 3D-Var; and (viii) Kalman filter and variants [7].
While approaches like direct insertion, nudging and optimal interpolation are computationally
efficient and easy to implement, the updates do not account for observation uncertainty or
utilize system dynamics in estimating model background state uncertainty, and information
on estimation uncertainty is limited. The Kalman filter, while computationally demanding in
its pure form, can be adapted for near-real-time application and provides information on
estimation uncertainty. However, it has only limited capability to deal with different types of
model errors, and necessary linearization approximations can lead to unstable solutions. The
Ensemble Kalman filter (EnKF), while it can be computationally demanding (depending on
the size of the ensemble) is well suited for near-real-time applications without any need for
linearization, is robust, very flexible and easy to use, and is able to accommodate a wide range
of model error descriptions.
Direct insertion. One of the earliest and most simplistic approaches to data assimilation is direct
insertion. As the name suggests,  the forecast model states are directly replaced with the
observations by assuming that K  = I,  the unity matrix. This approach makes the explicit
assumption that the model is wrong (has no useful information) and that the observations are
right, which both disregards important information provided by the model and preserves
observational errors. The risk of this approach is that unbalanced state estimates may result,
which causes model shocks: the model will attempt to restore the dynamic balance that would
have existed without insertion. A further key disadvantage of this approach is that model physics
are solely relied upon to propagate the information to unobserved parts of the system [9,10].
Statistical correction. A derivative of the direct insertion approach is the statistical correction
approach, which adjusts the mean and variance of the model states to match those of the
observations. This approach assumes the model pattern is correct but contains a non-uniform
bias. First, the predicted observations are scaled by the ratio of observational field standard
deviation to predicted field standard deviation. Second, the scaled predicted observational
field is given a block shift by the difference between the means of the predicted observational
field and the observational field [9]. This approach also relies upon the model physics to
propagate the information to unobserved parts of the system.
Successive correction. The successive corrections method (SCM) [5,11-13] is also known as
observation nudging. The scheme begins with an a priori state estimate (background field) for
an individual (scalar) variable, which is successively adjusted by nearby observations in a
series of scans (iterations, n) through the data. The advantage of this method lies in its
simplicity. However, in case of observational error or different sources (and accuracies) of
observations, this scheme is not a good option for assimilation, since information on the
observational accuracy is not accounted for. Mostly, this approach assumes that the observa‐
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tions are more accurate than model forecasts, with the observations fitted as closely as is
consistent. Furthermore, the radii of influence are user-defined and should be determined by
trial and error or more sophisticated methods that reduce the advantage of its simplicity. The
weighting functions are empirically chosen and are not derived based on physical or statistical
properties. Obviously, this method is not effective in data sparse regions.
Analysis correction. This is a modification to the successive correction approach that is applied
consecutively to each observation [14]. In practice, the observation update is mostly neglected
and further assumptions make the update equation equivalent to that for optimal interpola‐
tion [15].
Nudging. Nudging or Newtonian relaxation consists of adding a term to the prognostic model
equations that causes the solution to be gradually relaxed towards the observations. Nudging
is very similar to the successive corrections technique and only differs in the fact that through
the numerical model the time dimension is included. Two distinct approaches have been
developed [16]. In analysis nudging, the nudging term for a given variable is proportional to
the difference between the model simulation at a given grid point and an “analysis” of
observations (i.e., processed observations) calculated at the corresponding grid point. For
observation nudging, the difference between the model simulation and the observed state is
calculated at the observation locations.
Optimal interpolation The optimal interpolation (OI) approach, sometimes referred to as
statistical interpolation, is a minimum variance method that is closely related to kriging. OI
approximates the “optimal” solution often with a “fixed” structure for all time steps, given by
prescribed variances and a correlation function determined only by distance [17]. Sometimes,
the variances are allowed to evolve in time, while keeping the correlation structure time-
invariant.
3-D variational. This approach directly solves the iterative minimization problem given [18].
The same approximation for the background covariance matrix as in the optimal interpolation
approach is typically used.
Kalman filter. The optimal analysis state estimate for linear or linearized systems (Kalman or
Extended Kalman filter, EKF) can be found through a linear update equation with a Kalman
gain that aims at minimizing the analysis error (co)variance of the analysis state estimate [19].
The essential feature which distinguishes the family of Kalman filter approaches from more
static techniques, like optimal interpolation, is the dynamic updating of the forecast (back‐
ground) error covariance through time. In the traditional Kalman filter (KF) approach this is
achieved by application of standard error propagation theory, using a (tangent) linear model.
(The only difference between the Kalman filter and the Extended Kalman filter is that the
forecast model is linearized using a Taylor series expansion in the latter; the same forecast and
update equations are used for each approach.)
A further approach to estimating the state covariance matrix is the Ensemble Kalman filter
(EnKF). As the name suggests, the covariances are calculated from an ensemble of state forecasts
using the Monte Carlo approach rather than a single discrete forecast of covariances [20].
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insertion. As the name suggests,  the forecast model states are directly replaced with the
observations by assuming that K  = I,  the unity matrix. This approach makes the explicit
assumption that the model is wrong (has no useful information) and that the observations are
right, which both disregards important information provided by the model and preserves
observational errors. The risk of this approach is that unbalanced state estimates may result,
which causes model shocks: the model will attempt to restore the dynamic balance that would
have existed without insertion. A further key disadvantage of this approach is that model physics
are solely relied upon to propagate the information to unobserved parts of the system [9,10].
Statistical correction. A derivative of the direct insertion approach is the statistical correction
approach, which adjusts the mean and variance of the model states to match those of the
observations. This approach assumes the model pattern is correct but contains a non-uniform
bias. First, the predicted observations are scaled by the ratio of observational field standard
deviation to predicted field standard deviation. Second, the scaled predicted observational
field is given a block shift by the difference between the means of the predicted observational
field and the observational field [9]. This approach also relies upon the model physics to
propagate the information to unobserved parts of the system.
Successive correction. The successive corrections method (SCM) [5,11-13] is also known as
observation nudging. The scheme begins with an a priori state estimate (background field) for
an individual (scalar) variable, which is successively adjusted by nearby observations in a
series of scans (iterations, n) through the data. The advantage of this method lies in its
simplicity. However, in case of observational error or different sources (and accuracies) of
observations, this scheme is not a good option for assimilation, since information on the
observational accuracy is not accounted for. Mostly, this approach assumes that the observa‐
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weighting functions are empirically chosen and are not derived based on physical or statistical
properties. Obviously, this method is not effective in data sparse regions.
Analysis correction. This is a modification to the successive correction approach that is applied
consecutively to each observation [14]. In practice, the observation update is mostly neglected
and further assumptions make the update equation equivalent to that for optimal interpola‐
tion [15].
Nudging. Nudging or Newtonian relaxation consists of adding a term to the prognostic model
equations that causes the solution to be gradually relaxed towards the observations. Nudging
is very similar to the successive corrections technique and only differs in the fact that through
the numerical model the time dimension is included. Two distinct approaches have been
developed [16]. In analysis nudging, the nudging term for a given variable is proportional to
the difference between the model simulation at a given grid point and an “analysis” of
observations (i.e., processed observations) calculated at the corresponding grid point. For
observation nudging, the difference between the model simulation and the observed state is
calculated at the observation locations.
Optimal interpolation The optimal interpolation (OI) approach, sometimes referred to as
statistical interpolation, is a minimum variance method that is closely related to kriging. OI
approximates the “optimal” solution often with a “fixed” structure for all time steps, given by
prescribed variances and a correlation function determined only by distance [17]. Sometimes,
the variances are allowed to evolve in time, while keeping the correlation structure time-
invariant.
3-D variational. This approach directly solves the iterative minimization problem given [18].
The same approximation for the background covariance matrix as in the optimal interpolation
approach is typically used.
Kalman filter. The optimal analysis state estimate for linear or linearized systems (Kalman or
Extended Kalman filter, EKF) can be found through a linear update equation with a Kalman
gain that aims at minimizing the analysis error (co)variance of the analysis state estimate [19].
The essential feature which distinguishes the family of Kalman filter approaches from more
static techniques, like optimal interpolation, is the dynamic updating of the forecast (back‐
ground) error covariance through time. In the traditional Kalman filter (KF) approach this is
achieved by application of standard error propagation theory, using a (tangent) linear model.
(The only difference between the Kalman filter and the Extended Kalman filter is that the
forecast model is linearized using a Taylor series expansion in the latter; the same forecast and
update equations are used for each approach.)
A further approach to estimating the state covariance matrix is the Ensemble Kalman filter
(EnKF). As the name suggests, the covariances are calculated from an ensemble of state forecasts
using the Monte Carlo approach rather than a single discrete forecast of covariances [20].
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3.2. Dynamic observer assimilation
The dynamic observer techniques find the best fit between the forecast model state and the
observations, subject to the initial state vector uncertainty and observation uncertainty, by
minimizing over space and time an objective or penalty function, including a background and
observation penalty term. To minimize the objective function over time, an assimilation time
“window” is defined and an “adjoint” model is typically used to find the derivatives of the
objective function with respect to the initial model state vector. The adjoint is a mathematical
operator that allows one to determine the sensitivity of the objective function to changes in the
solution of the state equations by a single forward and backward pass over the assimilation
window. While an adjoint is not strictly required (i.e., a number of forward passes can be used
to numerically approximate the objective function derivatives with respect to each state), it makes
the problem computationally tractable. The dynamic observer techniques can be considered
simply as an optimization or calibration problem, where the state vector – not the model
parameters – at the beginning of each assimilation window is “calibrated” to the observations
over that time period. The dynamic observer techniques can be formulated with: (i) strong
constraint (variational); (ii) weak constraint (dual variational or representer methods).
Dynamic observer methods are well suited for smoothing problems, but provide information
on estimation accuracy only at considerable computational cost. Moreover, adjoints are not
available for many existing environmental models, and the development of robust adjoint
models is difficult due to the non-linear nature of environmental processes.
4D-Var. In its pure form, the 4-D (3-D in space, 1-D in time) “variational” (otherwise known
as Gauss-Markov) dynamic observer assimilation methods use an adjoint to efficiently
compute the derivatives of the objective function with respect to each of the initial state vector
values. Solution to the variational problem is then achieved by minimization and iteration. In
practical applications the number of iterations is usually constrained to a small number.
Given a model integration with finite time interval, and assuming a perfect model, 4D-Var and
the Kalman filter yield the same result at the end of the assimilation time interval. Inside the
time interval, 4D-Var is more optimal, because it uses all observations at once (before and after
the time step of analysis), i.e., it is a smoother. A disadvantage of sequential methods is the
discontinuity in the corrections, which causes model shocks. Through variational methods,
there is a larger potential for dynamically based balanced analyses, which will always be
situated within the model climatology. Operational 4D-Var assumes a perfect model: no model
error can be included. With the inclusion of model error, coupled equations are to be solved
for minimization. Through Kalman filtering it is in general simpler to account for model error.
Both the Kalman filter and 3D/4D-Var rely on the validity of the linearity assumption. Adjoints
depend on this assumption and incremental 4D-Var is even more sensitive to linearity.
Uncertainty estimates via the Hessian are critically dependent on a valid linearization.
Furthermore, with variational assimilation it is more difficult to obtain an estimate of the
quality of the analysis or of the state’s uncertainty after updating. In the framework of
estimation theory, the goal of variational assimilation is the estimation of the conditional mode
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(maximum a posteriori probability) estimate, while for the Kalman filter the conditional mean
(minimum variance) estimate is sought.
Hybrid assimilation methods have been explored in which a sequential method is used to
produce the a priori state error or background error covariance for variational assimilation [7].
4. Review of current data assimilation applications in disaster management
4.1. Weather forecasting
During the last three decades, data assimilation has gradually reached a mature center stage
position at operational numerical weather prediction centers, and are largely responsible for
the significant advances in weather forecast accuracy [21]. Improved weather forecasts are
critical for better informing the public and decision makers about impending severe weather
events such as tropical storms, tornados, frozen precipitation events, wind hazards, droughts,
and flooding.
The basis for improved weather prediction using data assimilation is to improve the initial
state, which results in an improved forecast. Initial work was based on hand interpolations
that combined present and past observations with model results [22-24]. This tedious proce‐
dure was replaced by automatic objective analysis [12, 25-27].
Currently, data assimilation is available and implemented worldwide at operational numerical
weather prediction centers. The impact of adopting data assimilation in numerical weather
prediction was qualified as a substantial, resulting in an improvement in NWP quality and
accuracy [28]. Combined with improvement in error specifications and with a large increase
in a variety of observations has led to improvements in NWP accuracy [29].
The development of the global positioning system (GPS) satellites has facilitated the use of
radio occultation (RO) techniques for sounding the earth’s atmosphere. RO is a remote sensing
technique that relies on the detection of a change or refraction in a radio signal as it passes
through the atmosphere. The degree of refraction depends on the gradients of density and the
water vapor. These global measurements are actually commensurable with radiosonde
soundings in accuracy [30]. Assimilations of the RO retrieved data have exhibited promising
impact on regional as well as global weather predictions [31,32].
The impact of GPS radio occultation data assimilation on severe weather predictions was
demonstrated in East Asia [33]. These observations were assimilated in the Weather Research
and Forecasting (WRF) model’s using a three-dimensional variational (3DVAR) data assimi‐
lation system to improve the initial analysis of the model. The GPS RO data assimilation may
improve prediction of severe weather such as typhoons. These positive impacts are seen not
only in typhoon track prediction but also in prediction of local heavy rainfall associated with
severe weather over Taiwan. From a successive evaluation of skill scores for real-time forecasts
on frontal systems operationally conducted over a longer period and predictions of six
typhoons in 2008, assimilation of GPS RO data appears to have some positive impact on
regional weather predictions, on top of existent assimilation with all other observations.
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technique that relies on the detection of a change or refraction in a radio signal as it passes
through the atmosphere. The degree of refraction depends on the gradients of density and the
water vapor. These global measurements are actually commensurable with radiosonde
soundings in accuracy [30]. Assimilations of the RO retrieved data have exhibited promising
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demonstrated in East Asia [33]. These observations were assimilated in the Weather Research
and Forecasting (WRF) model’s using a three-dimensional variational (3DVAR) data assimi‐
lation system to improve the initial analysis of the model. The GPS RO data assimilation may
improve prediction of severe weather such as typhoons. These positive impacts are seen not
only in typhoon track prediction but also in prediction of local heavy rainfall associated with
severe weather over Taiwan. From a successive evaluation of skill scores for real-time forecasts
on frontal systems operationally conducted over a longer period and predictions of six
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The impact of GPS RO assimilation on Tropical Cyclone Gonu (2007) was studied over the western
Indian Ocean [33]. Gonu was one of the most intense in regional history and had asevere impact.
The positive impact of GPS RO data on track prediction is clearly seen in Figure 4. It is surprising‐
ly found that assimilations with all other data (including SSM/I, GTS and their combinations)
do not outperform the run with GTS+GPS or even the run with GPS RO data only.
4.2. Flood management: early warning, monitoring, and damage assessments
Flood forecasting using numerical models and data assimilation techniques provides extend‐
ed lead-time and improved accuracy for flood information useful for residents, local authori‐
ties and emergency services. The use of data assimilation in operational hydrologic forecasting
predates its use in weather forecasting and oceanography. Examples include updating of snow
model states and the use of observed streamflow to make short-term adjustments to the simulated
streamflow. However, despite its early adoption, more advanced methods of data assimila‐
tion (i.e. Kalman filtering) has yet to take firm root in operational hydrologic forecasting.
Operational hydrologic data assimilation typically uses telemetered, near real-time measure‐
ments of river levels and flows, and raingauge or Doppler radar precipitation estimates as
inputs to a computer-based flood forecasting system. Model outputs include minute to several
Figure 4. The best track from JTWC (black line) for Cyclone Gonu (2007) and simulated tracks for experiments CTL and
GPS without and with the RO data assimilated, respectively, and other experiments with different data, GTS (radio‐
sondes), SSMI (SSM/I retrieved oceanic near-surface wind speed OWS and integrated precipitable water PW, denoted
as OWSA an IWVA, respectively), bogus vortex 1 (large vortex) and bogus vortex2 (small vortex) [33].
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day forecasts for river levels, river flows, and reservoir and lake levels. Forecasts can be
extended further using weather forecasts, and can include snowmelt processes and river
control operations.
Hydrologic rainfall-runoff models are used to estimate river flows from rainfall observations
and forecasts. These models may take into account local catchment topography, soils, vegeta‐
tion, temperature, river flow hydrodynamics, and structure operations and backwater effects.
These models are enhanced using data assimilation methods such as error prediction, state
updating, and parameter updating techniques. Forecast uncertainties can arise and propagate
through the modeling network from errors in model parameters, initial conditions, boundary
conditions, data inputs and model physics.
As part of the European Union near real time flood forecasting, warning and management
“FloodMan” project data-assimilation techniques were developed, demonstrated and validat‐
ed for integrated hydrological and hydraulic models in a pilot study of the Rhine River [34].
The model combines a hydraulic model (SOBEK) representing the Rhine River between
Andernach and Düsseldorf with a hydrological model (HBV) for the Sieg tributary. To increase
the accuracy of flood forecasts, data assimilation is applied, using measured water levels at
Bonn and Cologne to adapt bed roughness and lateral discharges until the calculated water
levels agree with the measured water levels.
The data-assimilation technique computes model corrections based on the assumption that the
uncertainties in model output and observations are known and are normally distributed. The
data-assimilation algorithm compares the observed value with the calculated value, and makes
corrections to the parameters. The changes are made taking into consideration the uncertainty
of the parameters and measured data. For example, a mean water level measurement is
accurate compared to calculated water levels. Therefore the water level calculated with data-
assimilation will be closer to the measured water level than the calculated without data-
assimilation.
The data-assimilation algorithm is applied to the flood of December 1993 (Figure 5). The data-
assimilation improves the water level forecast. The small differences between forecast and
measured data are due to the perfect forecast for the input at Andernach. The adaptations by
the data-assimilation on the model parameters were small indication a well calibrated
hydraulic model for 1993 flood and that robust data assimilation procedure.
4.3. Drought management
Droughts are environmental disasters that occur in virtually all climates, and are generally
related to reduced precipitation for an extended period of time. High temperature, high wind,
low humidity; rainfall timing, intensity and duration, also play a significant role in droughts
[35]. Aridity is a permanent feature of climate related to low rainfall areas [36], while drought
is a temporary anomaly, lasting from months to several years. Population growth, agricultural
and industrial expansion, energy demands for water, climate change, and water contamination
further amplify the effects of drought and water scarcity.
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day forecasts for river levels, river flows, and reservoir and lake levels. Forecasts can be
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The data-assimilation technique computes model corrections based on the assumption that the
uncertainties in model output and observations are known and are normally distributed. The
data-assimilation algorithm compares the observed value with the calculated value, and makes
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of the parameters and measured data. For example, a mean water level measurement is
accurate compared to calculated water levels. Therefore the water level calculated with data-
assimilation will be closer to the measured water level than the calculated without data-
assimilation.
The data-assimilation algorithm is applied to the flood of December 1993 (Figure 5). The data-
assimilation improves the water level forecast. The small differences between forecast and
measured data are due to the perfect forecast for the input at Andernach. The adaptations by
the data-assimilation on the model parameters were small indication a well calibrated
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4.3. Drought management
Droughts are environmental disasters that occur in virtually all climates, and are generally
related to reduced precipitation for an extended period of time. High temperature, high wind,
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[35]. Aridity is a permanent feature of climate related to low rainfall areas [36], while drought
is a temporary anomaly, lasting from months to several years. Population growth, agricultural
and industrial expansion, energy demands for water, climate change, and water contamination
further amplify the effects of drought and water scarcity.
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Droughts impact both surface and groundwater, leading to reduced water supply and quality,
crop failure, reduced livestock range, reduced power supply, disturbed riparian habitat, and
deferred recreation [37]. Therefore, droughts are of great importance in the planning and
management of water resources.
Droughts rank first among all natural hazards when measured in terms of the number of
people affected [38]. Hazard events were ranked based on the degree of severity, the length of
event, total areal extent, total loss of life, total economic loss, social effect, long-term impact,
suddenness, and occurrence of associated hazards [39]. It was found that drought stood first
based on most of the hazard characteristics. Other natural hazards, which followed droughts
in terms of their rank, are tropical cyclones, regional floods, earthquakes, and volcanoes.
The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellite mission, launched in 2002
measures monthly changes in total water storage over large areas, which can help to assess
change in water supply on and beneath the land surface. However, the coarse spatial and
temporal resolutions of GRACE, and its lack of information on the vertical distribution of the
observed mass changes limits its utility unless it is combined with other sources of information.
In order to increase the resolution, eliminate the time lag, and isolate groundwater and other
components from total terrestrial water storage, the GRACE data was integrated with other
ground- and space-based meteorological observations (precipitation, solar radiation, etc.)
within the Catchment Land Surface Model, using Ensemble Kalman smoother type data
assimilation [40]. The resulting fields of soil moisture and groundwater storage variations are
then used to generate drought indicators based on the cumulative distribution function of
wetness conditions during 1948-2009 simulated by the Catchment model [41] (Figure 6).
Figure 5. Streamflow forecasts using data assimilation. The blue line depicts the difference between forecast and
measured water levels without data-assimilation, the red line the differences with data-assimilation [34].
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Figure 6. GRACE data assimilation based drought indicators for surface (top) and root zone (middle) soil moisture and
groundwater (bottom) for 26 December 2011, expressed as percentiles relative to conditions during the 1948-2011
simulated record [41].
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There are several aquifers in the U.S. that have been depleted in that way over the past century,
such as the southern half of the High Plains aquifer in the central U.S. If the groundwater
drought indicator map accounted for human-induced depletion, such regions would be red
all the time, which would not be useful for evaluating current wetness conditions relative to
previous conditions. On time scales of weeks to ten years, we expect that these maps will be
reasonably well correlated with measured water table variations over spatial scales of 25 km
(16 miles) or more. However, users should not assume a direct correspondence between these
groundwater percentiles and measured groundwater levels over multiple decades. The color-
coded maps show how much water is stored now as a probability of occurrence in the record
from 1948 to the present.
4.4. Radiation guidance and monitoring
Decision makers must have the information needed to react in a rapid and appropriate manner
before, during and immediately after an accidental or intentional contamination of the
environment. Decision support systems are needed to estimate the likely evolution of the
environmental contamination. The primary goal is to determine the area likely to be affected
by a possible release and to obtain an estimate of the potential maximum environmental
consequences. In the early phases of an accident the main goal is to provide a forecast of the
magnitude and geographical coverage of the potential environmental consequences. It is
important to know the prevailing and forecasted meteorological conditions in the local area.
Also the status of the source should be known in detail. Depending on the meteorological
situation and the model used, trajectories may be calculated first to give a rough estimation of
the plume transport.
Dispersion models driven with weather data and best-estimate source information can be used.
When results of radiological measurements are available they can be used to improve model
calculations by data assimilation. Atmospheric dispersion modeling of radioactive material in
radiological risk assessment and emergency response has evolved significantly over the past
50 years. The three types of dispersion models are the Gaussian plume, Lagrangian-puff and
particle random walk, and computational fluid dynamic models. When data from radiological
measurements are available, they should be taken into account in the consequence assessment
and used to correct and update model calculation results (data assimilation). Because obser‐
vations are often sparse in emergency situations, data assimilation procedures should be
designed to handle cases with only a few measurements. Even simple dispersion models
would benefit from data assimilation, and may also run faster to provide critical time-sensitive
information to decision makers [42].
Rojas-Palma et al., (2005) describe an in-depth effort to integrate a suite of computer codes,
with different degrees of complexity, into a European real-time, on-line decision support
system for off-site management of nuclear emergencies (the RODOS system) [42]. The resulting
modeling system describes the transport and dispersion of radionuclides in both atmospheric
and aquatic systems, as well as their impact on the food chain.
RODOS predicts the values of many quantities that are likely to be of interest to decision
makers after an accident (e.g. activity concentration in air, deposition, concentration in foods,
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external dose rates, concentrations in water bodies). The predictions will not exactly reflect the
situation after an accident, as the models use a number of assumptions that are appropriate to
the average situation across large areas of Europe, rather than to the particular conditions of
the area affected by the accident. In the period immediately after the accident there will be a
limited amount of information available from monitoring programs. To make the best use of
this information, it is necessary to correct the RODOS predictions in light of the available
measurements.
A 2 km RODOS test case was generated with a release point at Risø, Denmark, and 23 detector
points surrounding Risø (Figure 7,8). The meteorological situation was a 7m/s westerly wind
at 60 m above ground with neutral stability, and no rain.
Figure 7. Gamma dose field from puffs in measurement generating run. The 15 detector points 10 to 50 km east of
the release point are seen as black squares, the 8 points surrounding the release point are not marked. The back‐
ground picture is the land use map [42].
In general, in off-site emergency management, data assimilation will prove useful throughout
the different stages of the accident. In the assessment of the consequences during the early
phase, in the improvement of prior assumptions based solely on expert judgement, and when
there is a clear need for longer-term predictions to assess the radiological impact on the food
chain.
4.5. Tsunami warnings and forecasts
A tsunami is a series of waves that can move on shore rapidly, but last for several hours and
flood coastal communities with little warning. Tsunamis can be triggered by a variety of
geological processes such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, or meteorite impacts.
Throughout history, Tsunami’s have taken many lives in coastal regions around the world. In
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phase, in the improvement of prior assumptions based solely on expert judgement, and when
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chain.
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A tsunami is a series of waves that can move on shore rapidly, but last for several hours and
flood coastal communities with little warning. Tsunamis can be triggered by a variety of
geological processes such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, or meteorite impacts.
Throughout history, Tsunami’s have taken many lives in coastal regions around the world. In
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the wake of the catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which caused over 200,000 deaths
and widespread destruction, many governmental organizations have increased their efforts
to diminish the potential impacts of a tsunami by strengthening tsunami detection, warning,
education and preparedness efforts [43].
In contrast to forecasting other natural hazards such as hurricanes or floods, near-real-time
tsunami forecast models must produce predictions after a seismic event has been detected, but
before the event arrive at the coast. These forecasts provide emergency managers near-realtime
information about the time of first impact as well as the sizes and duration of the tsunami
waves, and give an estimate of the area of inundation. The entire forecasting process has to be
completed very quickly, to allow time for evacuation efforts. The entire forecast, including
data acquisition, data assimilation and inundation projections, must take place within a few
hours [44].
Titov et al., (2003) presented a method for tsunami forecasting that combining real-time data
from tsunameters with numerical model estimates to provide site- and event-specific fore‐
casts for tsunamis in real time [45]. Observational networks will never be sufficiently dense
because the ocean is vast. Establishing and maintaining monitoring stations is costly and difficult,
Figure 8. Gamma dose rates 50 km from the release point, right below the plume. Kalman filtering applied in runs
with the release doubled and halved relative to that having generated the "measurements", and with different release
rate uncertainties "a" [42].
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especially in deep water. Numerical model accuracy is inherently limited by errors in bathyme‐
try and topography and uncertainties in the generating mechanism. But combined, these
techniques  can  provide  reliable  tsunami  forecasts,  as  is  demonstrated  in  the  Short-term
Inundation Forecasting (SIFT) system. The Method of Splitting Tsunamis (MOST) numerical
model is run in two steps or modes. In the data assimilation mode, the model is adjusted “on-
the-fly” by a real-time data stream to provide the best fit to the data. In the forecast mode, the
model uses the simulation scenario obtained in the first step and extends the simulation to
locations where measured data is not available, providing the forecast. An effective implemen‐
tation of the inversion is achieved by using a discrete set of Green’s functions to form a model
source. The algorithm chooses the best fit to a given tsunameter data among a limited number
of unit solution combinations by direct sorting, using a choice of misfit functions (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Results of MOST data assimilation for 1996 Anderanov Island tsunami [45]. Top frame shows the source in‐
ferred by the data assimilation (black rectangles show unit sources’ fault plains), maximum computed amplitudes of
tsunami from this source (filled colored contours), travel time contours in hours after earthquake (solid lines), and lo‐
cations of the bottom pressure recorders. Bottom frame shows a reference map (left) and comparison of the model
(blue) and bottom pressure recorder data (magenta).
5. Conclusions
This chapter provided an overview of data assimilation theory and its application to decision
support tools, and provided 5 examples of operational data assimilation applications in
Improved Disaster Management Using Data Assimilation
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55840
99
the wake of the catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which caused over 200,000 deaths
and widespread destruction, many governmental organizations have increased their efforts
to diminish the potential impacts of a tsunami by strengthening tsunami detection, warning,
education and preparedness efforts [43].
In contrast to forecasting other natural hazards such as hurricanes or floods, near-real-time
tsunami forecast models must produce predictions after a seismic event has been detected, but
before the event arrive at the coast. These forecasts provide emergency managers near-realtime
information about the time of first impact as well as the sizes and duration of the tsunami
waves, and give an estimate of the area of inundation. The entire forecasting process has to be
completed very quickly, to allow time for evacuation efforts. The entire forecast, including
data acquisition, data assimilation and inundation projections, must take place within a few
hours [44].
Titov et al., (2003) presented a method for tsunami forecasting that combining real-time data
from tsunameters with numerical model estimates to provide site- and event-specific fore‐
casts for tsunamis in real time [45]. Observational networks will never be sufficiently dense
because the ocean is vast. Establishing and maintaining monitoring stations is costly and difficult,
Figure 8. Gamma dose rates 50 km from the release point, right below the plume. Kalman filtering applied in runs
with the release doubled and halved relative to that having generated the "measurements", and with different release
rate uncertainties "a" [42].
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters98
especially in deep water. Numerical model accuracy is inherently limited by errors in bathyme‐
try and topography and uncertainties in the generating mechanism. But combined, these
techniques  can  provide  reliable  tsunami  forecasts,  as  is  demonstrated  in  the  Short-term
Inundation Forecasting (SIFT) system. The Method of Splitting Tsunamis (MOST) numerical
model is run in two steps or modes. In the data assimilation mode, the model is adjusted “on-
the-fly” by a real-time data stream to provide the best fit to the data. In the forecast mode, the
model uses the simulation scenario obtained in the first step and extends the simulation to
locations where measured data is not available, providing the forecast. An effective implemen‐
tation of the inversion is achieved by using a discrete set of Green’s functions to form a model
source. The algorithm chooses the best fit to a given tsunameter data among a limited number
of unit solution combinations by direct sorting, using a choice of misfit functions (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Results of MOST data assimilation for 1996 Anderanov Island tsunami [45]. Top frame shows the source in‐
ferred by the data assimilation (black rectangles show unit sources’ fault plains), maximum computed amplitudes of
tsunami from this source (filled colored contours), travel time contours in hours after earthquake (solid lines), and lo‐
cations of the bottom pressure recorders. Bottom frame shows a reference map (left) and comparison of the model
(blue) and bottom pressure recorder data (magenta).
5. Conclusions
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support tools, and provided 5 examples of operational data assimilation applications in
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disaster management. These included tsunami warning, radiation guidance and monitoring,
flood and drought management, and weather forecasting.
Information about environmental conditions is of critical importance to real-world applica‐
tions disaster management in areas such as agricultural production, water resource manage‐
ment, flood prediction, water supply, weather and climate forecasting, and environmental
preservation. This information is usually provided to decision makers through Decision
Support Systems (DSS). Observations are important components of DSSs, providing critical
information that mitigate the risk of loss of life and damage to property. Environmental process
models are used in DSSs to predict the temporal and spatial state variations, but these
predictions are often poor, due to model initialization, parameter and forcing, and physics
errors. Therefore, we must combine the strengths of environmental models contained within
DSSs and observations and minimize the weaknesses to provide a superior environmental
state estimate – data assimilation.
Data assimilation merges the spatially comprehensive observations with the dynamically
complete but typically poor predictions of an environmental model to yield the best possible
system state estimation. Data assimilation aims to utilize both our knowledge of physical
processes as embodied in a numerical process model, and information that can be gained from
observations, to produce an improved, continuous system state estimate in space and time.
When implemented in near-real time, data assimilation can objectively provide decision
makers with the timeliest information, as well as provide superior initializations for short term
scenario predictions. Data assimilation can also act as a parameter estimation method to help
reduce DSS bias and uncertainty.
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disaster management. These included tsunami warning, radiation guidance and monitoring,
flood and drought management, and weather forecasting.
Information about environmental conditions is of critical importance to real-world applica‐
tions disaster management in areas such as agricultural production, water resource manage‐
ment, flood prediction, water supply, weather and climate forecasting, and environmental
preservation. This information is usually provided to decision makers through Decision
Support Systems (DSS). Observations are important components of DSSs, providing critical
information that mitigate the risk of loss of life and damage to property. Environmental process
models are used in DSSs to predict the temporal and spatial state variations, but these
predictions are often poor, due to model initialization, parameter and forcing, and physics
errors. Therefore, we must combine the strengths of environmental models contained within
DSSs and observations and minimize the weaknesses to provide a superior environmental
state estimate – data assimilation.
Data assimilation merges the spatially comprehensive observations with the dynamically
complete but typically poor predictions of an environmental model to yield the best possible
system state estimation. Data assimilation aims to utilize both our knowledge of physical
processes as embodied in a numerical process model, and information that can be gained from
observations, to produce an improved, continuous system state estimate in space and time.
When implemented in near-real time, data assimilation can objectively provide decision
makers with the timeliest information, as well as provide superior initializations for short term
scenario predictions. Data assimilation can also act as a parameter estimation method to help
reduce DSS bias and uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The impetus for hurricane storm surge visualization
Visualizations of storm surge forecasts offer opportunities to improve risk awareness and
communication of impending disaster in emergency situations such as a hurricane evacua‐
tion. A continuum of potential visualizations ranges from static maps, animated model out‐
put, to 3-D, immersive, and multimedia. In addition to risk communication for the public
high-quality photorealistic geovisualizations might allow managers to investigate and ex‐
plore forecasted surges and could reveal vulnerabilities and improve preparedness and re‐
sponse. Visualization can reveal three-dimensional space-time dynamics and provide
insights for practical applications [1,2]. Scientific and visual analytic applications, for exam‐
ple, might include representations of model uncertainty or instability, such as “quality
flags” symbolized on the model mesh or grid. With a focus on spatial and specifically
“place-based” site and situation, geovisualization encourages analysis for multiple purposes
and users, for interpreting spatial patterns, and using new multimedia and communications
in a broader, informed way among academics, government managers, and stakeholders [3].
Hence, the challenge is to develop accessible technology that will provide proven and robust
improvements to risk awareness and communication.
This chapter aims to evaluate existing storm surge models such as Sea, Lake, and Overland
Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) and ADvanced CIRCulation (ADCIRC) models (described
below) in order to identify constraints to their application for risk communication and to ex‐
plore their potential for diverse forms of geovisualization. This chapter reviews some of the
physical and computational limitations of surge models, the factors inhibiting spatial repre‐
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sentation and visualization, and the applications of and hurdles for GIS post-processing and
cartographic analysis and communication. A subset of computational techniques and geovi‐
sualizations are demonstrated that could improve upon the limitations inherent in the status
quo approaches to representing surge and inundation model output. Applications and case
studies that employ enhanced spatial resolution (down-scaled) grid output, enforcement of
hydrologic connectivity in spatial models of inundation, and web-based, interactive cartog‐
raphy (2-D and 3-D) and 3-D, animated, and interactive-immersive geovisualization are de‐
scribed. Enhanced visualizations that provide better “on the ground” resolution of potential
flooding events play an increasingly critical role in surge management and response, partic‐
ularly in urban centers with dense population and infrastructure. While storm tracks, inten‐
sity forecasts, and tabular metrics have become ubiquitous, they do little to convey the
highly localized effects of potential flooding at municipal or facility scales. The chapter con‐
cludes with a case study, reflects upon the constraints and limitations, and makes sugges‐
tions for avenues of future research.
1.2. General approaches to modeling water surfaces
Users of storm surge model output should realize that the surface of the storm tide is not
flat. It has relief. In addition, local short-term variation in sea surface height results mostly
from tidal forces and atmospheric conditions and is less influenced by large-scale ocean and
estuarine circulation, or even gravitational anomalies. NOAA has defined three broad cate‐
gories within which most storm surge models may be classified: modeled water surfaces, in‐
terpolated water surfaces, and single-value water surfaces [4].
Modeled water surfaces typically comprise inundation grids that are based on output from
either a single hydrodynamic model, or a combination of hydrodynamic and wave models.
Both the SLOSH and ADCIRC models provide modeled water-surface outputs. Water sur‐
face models may consider variables such as winds, atmospheric pressure, tides, storm dura‐
tion, basin circulation, terrestrial obstructions, and other factors. Increased output accuracy
of modeled water surfaces is the primary benefit that results from accounting for this diver‐
sity of variables. However, the models used to produce these surfaces require significant
amounts of a priori information and often require expert-level knowledge of one or more
modeling applications.
Interpolated water surfaces may be preferred when only a few water level observations exist
for an area of interest. In such cases, the modeler must interpolate water level values be‐
tween actual water level measurements within the study area. This method is often used
and best employed for post-event analysis when modelers employ observed high-water da‐
ta (e.g., high water marks or tide gauges) to reconstruct flood levels for a storm. This ap‐
proach for predictive surge modeling may have limited value due to the need for
observational input. Input of a relatively small set of observational data may also result in a
coarse resolution representation of the water surface height that does not adequately reflect
variations due to terrestrial topography and other factors. However, the variety and com‐
plexity of interpolation methods benefits greatly from analyst experience in spatial statistical
techniques.
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Single-value water surface models create water surfaces representations based on a single
numerical water level value that is draped over a study area. These models are often known
as “bathtub” models as they simply raise the water surface evenly and consistently over an
entire region. Single-value water surface models may be the best alternative where only one
water level observation is available and other modeling techniques are impractical [4]. Static
models such as these are also frequently developed as second-tier models that use the out‐
put from modeled water surfaces (SLOSH, ADCIRC) as input parameters. The case study
explored later in this chapter makes use of this technique. Single-value models require mini‐
mal modeling expertise and for this reason are often employed by small organizations with
limited resources. NOAA suggests that modeled and interpolated surfaces are generally
preferred to the single-value method for better accuracy and more realistic depictions [4].
2. Spatial modeling of hurricane surge inundation
Storm surge models are often developed by coastal modelers who only give secondary con‐
sideration to visualization or the potential for integration into GIS and other decision-sup‐
port systems. There are many advantages to incorporation of such model output into
decision-support systems. Other data layers, such as evacuation routes, critical infrastruc‐
ture, and vulnerable populations, can be analyzed in conjunction with the model results.
The SLOSH model is the model that most emergency managers use for evacuation decision-
making as well as for post-landfall guidance regarding the areas of likely inundation im‐
pacts and for disaster-response planning [5]. The model output is spatially coarse and
provides limited assistance to site-specific operational preparedness, but rather produces a
first-order estimate of storm surge potential.
A GIS model has been created to downscale the resolution of the SLOSH output, and to
provide a more representative estimation of inundation. The downscaling of the SLOSH
output  uses  a  variety  of  elevation layers  to  illustrate  the  model’s  flexibility.  The down‐
scaled  SLOSH  outputs,  shown  in  experimental  form  throughout  this  chapter,  are  com‐
pared  to  the  other  currently  available  SLOSH  data  products  available  in  the  State  of
North Carolina’s  geospatial  clearinghouse,  NC OneMap [6],  to  determine the best  map‐
ping, interpolation, and visualization techniques to represent a slow-moving Saffir-Simp‐
son category 3 storm. Other comparisons that will  be discussed include the areal  extent
of inundation produced by each model,  the discrepancies of impacted critical infrastruc‐
ture in the output and the measures of size and vulnerabilities of affected at-risk popula‐
tions based on coarse- and fine-scale data.
2.1. Slosh
The SLOSH model was originally developed by the Techniques Development Laboratory
of  the  National  Weather  Service  (NWS)  as  a  real-time  operational  surge  forecast  that
could be run once the appropriate tropical cyclone track and pressure data became avail‐
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sentation and visualization, and the applications of and hurdles for GIS post-processing and
cartographic analysis and communication. A subset of computational techniques and geovi‐
sualizations are demonstrated that could improve upon the limitations inherent in the status
quo approaches to representing surge and inundation model output. Applications and case
studies that employ enhanced spatial resolution (down-scaled) grid output, enforcement of
hydrologic connectivity in spatial models of inundation, and web-based, interactive cartog‐
raphy (2-D and 3-D) and 3-D, animated, and interactive-immersive geovisualization are de‐
scribed. Enhanced visualizations that provide better “on the ground” resolution of potential
flooding events play an increasingly critical role in surge management and response, partic‐
ularly in urban centers with dense population and infrastructure. While storm tracks, inten‐
sity forecasts, and tabular metrics have become ubiquitous, they do little to convey the
highly localized effects of potential flooding at municipal or facility scales. The chapter con‐
cludes with a case study, reflects upon the constraints and limitations, and makes sugges‐
tions for avenues of future research.
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Users of storm surge model output should realize that the surface of the storm tide is not
flat. It has relief. In addition, local short-term variation in sea surface height results mostly
from tidal forces and atmospheric conditions and is less influenced by large-scale ocean and
estuarine circulation, or even gravitational anomalies. NOAA has defined three broad cate‐
gories within which most storm surge models may be classified: modeled water surfaces, in‐
terpolated water surfaces, and single-value water surfaces [4].
Modeled water surfaces typically comprise inundation grids that are based on output from
either a single hydrodynamic model, or a combination of hydrodynamic and wave models.
Both the SLOSH and ADCIRC models provide modeled water-surface outputs. Water sur‐
face models may consider variables such as winds, atmospheric pressure, tides, storm dura‐
tion, basin circulation, terrestrial obstructions, and other factors. Increased output accuracy
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modeling applications.
Interpolated water surfaces may be preferred when only a few water level observations exist
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tween actual water level measurements within the study area. This method is often used
and best employed for post-event analysis when modelers employ observed high-water da‐
ta (e.g., high water marks or tide gauges) to reconstruct flood levels for a storm. This ap‐
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observational input. Input of a relatively small set of observational data may also result in a
coarse resolution representation of the water surface height that does not adequately reflect
variations due to terrestrial topography and other factors. However, the variety and com‐
plexity of interpolation methods benefits greatly from analyst experience in spatial statistical
techniques.
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Single-value water surface models create water surfaces representations based on a single
numerical water level value that is draped over a study area. These models are often known
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water level observation is available and other modeling techniques are impractical [4]. Static
models such as these are also frequently developed as second-tier models that use the out‐
put from modeled water surfaces (SLOSH, ADCIRC) as input parameters. The case study
explored later in this chapter makes use of this technique. Single-value models require mini‐
mal modeling expertise and for this reason are often employed by small organizations with
limited resources. NOAA suggests that modeled and interpolated surfaces are generally
preferred to the single-value method for better accuracy and more realistic depictions [4].
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making as well as for post-landfall guidance regarding the areas of likely inundation im‐
pacts and for disaster-response planning [5]. The model output is spatially coarse and
provides limited assistance to site-specific operational preparedness, but rather produces a
first-order estimate of storm surge potential.
A GIS model has been created to downscale the resolution of the SLOSH output, and to
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pared  to  the  other  currently  available  SLOSH  data  products  available  in  the  State  of
North Carolina’s  geospatial  clearinghouse,  NC OneMap [6],  to  determine the best  map‐
ping, interpolation, and visualization techniques to represent a slow-moving Saffir-Simp‐
son category 3 storm. Other comparisons that will  be discussed include the areal  extent
of inundation produced by each model,  the discrepancies of impacted critical infrastruc‐
ture in the output and the measures of size and vulnerabilities of affected at-risk popula‐
tions based on coarse- and fine-scale data.
2.1. Slosh
The SLOSH model was originally developed by the Techniques Development Laboratory
of  the  National  Weather  Service  (NWS)  as  a  real-time  operational  surge  forecast  that
could be run once the appropriate tropical cyclone track and pressure data became avail‐
able.  The networks of  grid points  comprising model  domains  are  called SLOSH basins,
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and have been created for the Atlantic coast, Gulf Coast, Bahamas, Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico, as well as for parts of China and India. Each grid cell in a SLOSH basin has either
topographic  or  bathymetric  data  associated with  it.  Updates  are  released as  new eleva‐
tion and bathymetry data for particular basins are provided by the U.S.  Geological  Sur‐
vey  (USGS)  and  the  National  Geophysical  Data  Center  (NGDC).  SLOSH  basins  are
individually  designed for  the  geography of  a  given coastal  segment.  Depending on the
size and location of the particular area of interest, one might choose from an assortment
of  telescoping  grids.  The  telescoping  grid  allows  for  higher  resolution  in  coastal  areas
and less detail  of  open ocean.  This reduces computing requirements compared to struc‐
tured grids with uniform cells across a model’s domain.
To obtain the surge levels, the SLOSH model requires several fairly simple meteorological
parameters, at specified time intervals. The calculations use the latitude and longitude of the
storm’s eye, central atmospheric pressure, the radius of the maximum winds (RMW), storm
track and speed [7]. Surface wind speed is not an input parameter in the SLOSH model [8],
but rather “water levels are forced by an idealized wind field that depends upon the pres‐
sure deficit (Δp) and the radius of maximum wind (RMW) from the storm center” [5]. Hous‐
ton and Powell [5] note that the calculations consider topography and bathymetry, but not
astronomical tides, waves or rainfall flooding.
Every model,  whether forecast  model or numerical  model,  requires assumptions.  Differ‐
ent  models  are  designed  to  operate  and  handle  these  inaccuracies  and  assumptions  in
different ways depending on the end-product and the end-user. SLOSH has its own ser‐
ies of issues and limitations. One issue relevant to local application stems from the grid
structure  and  basin  formation.  While  the  telescoping  grids  are  efficient  with  regard  to
computational  resources,  they  can  fall  short  of  local  managers’  desires  when  used  to
model inundation and surge to inform decision-making. For example, if the area of inter‐
est is a section of hurricane-prone Dare County, North Carolina, USA, the size of the cell
is  often too coarse to distinguish either surge on sound-side or back-barrier sites versus
open-ocean shorelines, or the direction and interaction of both source area surges. Coarse
resolution in this region occurs as a result of distance from the central arc of the SLOSH
grid origin. Figure 1 illustrates how the cell size increases with the distance along an ax‐
is of the telescoping grid for an area of the Pamlico Sound SLOSH basin, and shows am‐
biguities of source-cell inundation (shown in hachures of selected grid cells overlaid on a
greyscale  of  Light  Detection  and  Ranging  (LiDAR)  elevation  grids  for  the  peninsular
mainland and Outer  Banks barrier  islands).  One solution for  disambiguating the poten‐
tial  surge  for  finer-scale,  local  hurricane  emergency  management  is  to  downscale  the
SLOSH  surge  forecast  and  incorporate  finer  elevation  data  and  hydrologic  modeling
techniques  in  a  GIS.  To do so  opens  up a  new set  of  issues  and subject  matter  for  re‐
search and geovisualization,  but  also new concerns for  miscommunication and the mis‐
taken assumption of precision as opposed to model forecast accuracy.
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Figure 1. SLOSH surge model grid for Pamlico Sound Basin, North Carolina (inset) and a subset of the northern Outer
Banks, illustrating telescoping grid scale, overlapping sound and ocean cells. Background shading of elevation corre‐
sponds to high resolution airborne LiDAR elevation values. Grid cells symbolize SLOSH forecast surge heights (meters)
for a Category 2 slow-moving storm (Maximum-of-Maximums scenario) with hachured grid cells denoting ambiguities
of source inundation (ocean vs. estuarine grid cells).
2.2. Surge visualization for emergency management
Coastal  emergency managers  have  begun using visualizations  in  graphical  programs to
portray potential changes of ground-level inundation from floods and surges with photo‐
realism and  software  applications  such  as  CanVis  [9,10].  Technologies  such  as  webmap
services and GIS portals  are  now ubiquitous and able  to  distribute storm surge models
such  as  ADCIRC  output  and  related  maps  and  animations  produced  using  real-time
forecasting  [11].  The  Louisiana  Geographic  Information  Center’s  2009  Hurricane  Re‐
sponse  Mapping  is  one  example  that  has  linked  the  National  Hurricane  Center  (NHC)
products  with  custom-developed Internet  map servers  [12],  while  the  NC Coastal  Haz‐
ards  Portal  (NC  COHAZ)  is  an  experimental  platform  that  integrates  multiple  hazard
layers  in  separate  thematic  map  interfaces  (e.g.,  coastal  erosion,  surges,  and  real-time
hazards)  [13].  In addition,  local  emergency managers have GIS resources and personnel
who can employ the GIS products like SLOSH from the NHC. Some may already be us‐
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sure deficit (Δp) and the radius of maximum wind (RMW) from the storm center” [5]. Hous‐
ton and Powell [5] note that the calculations consider topography and bathymetry, but not
astronomical tides, waves or rainfall flooding.
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ent  models  are  designed  to  operate  and  handle  these  inaccuracies  and  assumptions  in
different ways depending on the end-product and the end-user. SLOSH has its own ser‐
ies of issues and limitations. One issue relevant to local application stems from the grid
structure  and  basin  formation.  While  the  telescoping  grids  are  efficient  with  regard  to
computational  resources,  they  can  fall  short  of  local  managers’  desires  when  used  to
model inundation and surge to inform decision-making. For example, if the area of inter‐
est is a section of hurricane-prone Dare County, North Carolina, USA, the size of the cell
is  often too coarse to distinguish either surge on sound-side or back-barrier sites versus
open-ocean shorelines, or the direction and interaction of both source area surges. Coarse
resolution in this region occurs as a result of distance from the central arc of the SLOSH
grid origin. Figure 1 illustrates how the cell size increases with the distance along an ax‐
is of the telescoping grid for an area of the Pamlico Sound SLOSH basin, and shows am‐
biguities of source-cell inundation (shown in hachures of selected grid cells overlaid on a
greyscale  of  Light  Detection  and  Ranging  (LiDAR)  elevation  grids  for  the  peninsular
mainland and Outer  Banks barrier  islands).  One solution for  disambiguating the poten‐
tial  surge  for  finer-scale,  local  hurricane  emergency  management  is  to  downscale  the
SLOSH  surge  forecast  and  incorporate  finer  elevation  data  and  hydrologic  modeling
techniques  in  a  GIS.  To do so  opens  up a  new set  of  issues  and subject  matter  for  re‐
search and geovisualization,  but  also new concerns for  miscommunication and the mis‐
taken assumption of precision as opposed to model forecast accuracy.
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Coastal  emergency managers  have  begun using visualizations  in  graphical  programs to
portray potential changes of ground-level inundation from floods and surges with photo‐
realism and  software  applications  such  as  CanVis  [9,10].  Technologies  such  as  webmap
services and GIS portals  are  now ubiquitous and able  to  distribute storm surge models
such  as  ADCIRC  output  and  related  maps  and  animations  produced  using  real-time
forecasting  [11].  The  Louisiana  Geographic  Information  Center’s  2009  Hurricane  Re‐
sponse  Mapping  is  one  example  that  has  linked  the  National  Hurricane  Center  (NHC)
products  with  custom-developed Internet  map servers  [12],  while  the  NC Coastal  Haz‐
ards  Portal  (NC  COHAZ)  is  an  experimental  platform  that  integrates  multiple  hazard
layers  in  separate  thematic  map  interfaces  (e.g.,  coastal  erosion,  surges,  and  real-time
hazards)  [13].  In addition,  local  emergency managers have GIS resources and personnel
who can employ the GIS products like SLOSH from the NHC. Some may already be us‐
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ing  GIS  software,  such  as  FEMA  HAZUS  for  loss  estimation,  in  their  operations  [14].
Output  generated  by  HAZUS  may  include  coastal  flood  models  corresponding  to  100-
year return interval flood events, based on FEMA flood modeling. These output data can
be rendered in a desktop GIS and even draped onto high resolution LiDAR DEMs with
building footprints rendered in 3-D (Figure 2).  The outputs of generic inundation or hy‐
drologic  models  are  often  erroneously  applied  to  a  specific,  approaching  hurricane  to
meet the desire of emergency management officials for data and forecasts specific to the
potential track, intensity, and other factors of their storm. The result can be very inaccu‐
rate and grossly erroneous visuals. Therefore, anyone desiring to visualize forecast surg‐
es from hydrodynamic models must first select the most appropriate surge model output
data and cross-reference this to the spatial  context,  resolution,  and time-delimited needs
of  emergency managers.  SLOSH Maximum Envelope of  Water  (MEOW) and Maximum
of Maximum (MOM) of MEOW files are provided with the SLOSH Display System [15]
and are exportable to ESRI shapefile format for GIS analysis. The SLOSH Display System
provides  access  to  a  library of  pre-run simulations,  including a  graphical  user  interface
(GUI) to query and extract appropriate MEOW or MOM files. The system can be used as
a  stand-alone  decision  support  tool  or  in  conjunction  with  other  software  (such  as  FE‐
MA’s  HAZUS-MH  [16],  Sea  Island  Software  and  FEMA-funded  HURREVAC  [17],  PC
Weather Products’  HURRTRAK tracking software [18],  or  within a GIS).  In general,  the
MOMs provide  forecast  guidance  for  up to  5  days  of  pre-landfall  operations  and deci‐
sion-making. MEOW surge files,  depending upon the local evacuation dimensions, rout‐
ing  issues,  and  congestion  factors,  can  be  used  to  guide  decision-making  closer  to  the
actual critical decision time. A minimum clearance time of 24 to 48 hours is typically de‐
sired, and this often prompts the use of MOM and MEOW surge estimates for guidance.
Prior  to  landfall,  hurricane  track  and intensity  forecasts  are  usually  inadequate  to  judi‐
ciously postpone a  decision,  unless  tropical  storm-force winds arrive during an evacua‐
tion. Furthermore, antecedent rainfall and forecasts from the NWS’s Hydrometeorological
Prediction Center [19],  time of day, tides, and local logistical factors are also used in re‐
sponse decisions and the selection of surge guidance.
The  MEOW  output  characterizes  maximum  surge  level  associated  with  a  hypothetical
storm  at  any  time  for  every  grid  cell  in  a  SLOSH  Basin.  The  MEOW  represents  the
worst-case  flooding scenario  possible  from a  threatening hurricane  of  a  given category,
size,  and  particular  track  direction  [20].  MEOW  files  do  not  directly  incorporate  tidal
conditions, but these may be generalized and either added or subtracted in software like
the SLOSH Display System.
A MOM is the maximum of a set of MEOWs, forming a composite of the maximum water
levels at every grid cell for all hurricanes of a given category and for water from all direc‐
tions. There are only 5 MOMs for each SLOSH model basin, each representing a single storm
category. As with MEOWs, the MOM does not factor in tides. However, the SLOSH Display
System provides easy access to the library of pre-run simulations, and to a GUI to query and
extract appropriate MEOW or MOM files and to incorporate approximate tidal conditions at
landfall (low, mean, or high).
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Figure 2. Orthoperspective of SLOSH surge model for northern Outer Banks (Kitty Hawk, Southern Shores, and Duck)
illustrating digitized inundation contours for a SLOSH MOM category 2 slow-moving storm, superimposed over eleva‐
tion with building model footprints extruded in 3-D. Lighter tones on the background DEM depict high dunes (upper
right) and beach ridges for the relict Kitty Hawk Woods coastal spit (foreground.)
2.3. Surge modeling limitations
Every model, whether forecast model or numerical model, produces errors, uncertainties,
and contains assumptions. Models are designed to handle some of these factors in different
ways that depend upon the end-product and the end-user. SLOSH is no exception to this. It
has its own series of issues and limitations. The limitations of concern here are primarily as‐
sociated with grid-type, basin, and environmental parameters.
2.3.1. Grid spatial resolution
The first issue to be addressed is grid-type and basin geography. While the telescoping grids
are designed to limit computational resources needed to run the model, they can fall short
for surge inundation visualization. For example, if the area of interest is a section of Dare
County, North Carolina, a highly hurricane-prone area, the size of the native SLOSH cell is
too coarse for a site-specific visualization of surge, primarily because cell size increases with
distance from the central arc of the origin of the grid. This limits the effectiveness of inunda‐
tion forecasts for an emergency manager depending upon SLOSH output to identify prob‐
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sponse decisions and the selection of surge guidance.
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size,  and  particular  track  direction  [20].  MEOW  files  do  not  directly  incorporate  tidal
conditions, but these may be generalized and either added or subtracted in software like
the SLOSH Display System.
A MOM is the maximum of a set of MEOWs, forming a composite of the maximum water
levels at every grid cell for all hurricanes of a given category and for water from all direc‐
tions. There are only 5 MOMs for each SLOSH model basin, each representing a single storm
category. As with MEOWs, the MOM does not factor in tides. However, the SLOSH Display
System provides easy access to the library of pre-run simulations, and to a GUI to query and
extract appropriate MEOW or MOM files and to incorporate approximate tidal conditions at
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2.3. Surge modeling limitations
Every model, whether forecast model or numerical model, produces errors, uncertainties,
and contains assumptions. Models are designed to handle some of these factors in different
ways that depend upon the end-product and the end-user. SLOSH is no exception to this. It
has its own series of issues and limitations. The limitations of concern here are primarily as‐
sociated with grid-type, basin, and environmental parameters.
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The first issue to be addressed is grid-type and basin geography. While the telescoping grids
are designed to limit computational resources needed to run the model, they can fall short
for surge inundation visualization. For example, if the area of interest is a section of Dare
County, North Carolina, a highly hurricane-prone area, the size of the native SLOSH cell is
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lem areas, site vulnerabilities, relief staging areas, evacuation orders, shelters of last resort,
or rapid response, reentry, and recovery operations. Later in this chapter, a method to
down-scale and visualize some of these sensitivities is evaluated.
2.3.2. Forecast storm track uncertainty, waves, and tides
Limitations of the model remain a concern, particularly of concern is the need to simultane‐
ously account for wave heights, astronomical tides and the forcings created by river-water
levels that are not included in the model. Nonetheless, a set of MEOW grids are derived
from hundreds of storm-track scenarios (based on varying the direction of landfall), for‐
ward-speed scenarios and tides scenarios (mean and high). Forward-speed scenarios predict
surge variation according to increments of 5, 10, or 15 mph (8, 16, or 24 kph), which im‐
proves the earlier “slow” (<18mph, 29kph) and “fast” (>18mph or 29kph) scenarios. Emer‐
gency planning also benefits from the simpler derivation of MOM files, which characterize
the maximum of MEOWs and provide a consistent worst-case picture of storm surges at
specific intensities (Saffir-Simpson category 1-2, 3, and 4-5 are aggregated in traditional in‐
undation contour maps), notwithstanding the limitations of antecedent precipitation and
river-flow input, astronomical tides and waves.
Physical processes are fully represented in SLOSH. Temporal considerations dictate the use
of pre-run models for ‘worst case’ estimates or reliance on single-run deterministic track
runs (dependent and highly sensitive to track or intensity forecast errors). Thus, while
SLOSH remains the NWS’s de facto standard and operational model, it is also more often
used in conjunction with forecasts from ADCIRC based on deterministic runs within ap‐
proximately 24 hours of hurricane landfall. The model’s limitations remain a concern. None‐
theless, a set of MEOWs output grids are derived from hundreds of storm-track, forward-
speeds and tidal scenarios.
2.3.3. Currency and near-real-time utility
Real-time wind-field predictions or measurements are also lacking in SLOSH output. The
wind models used by SLOSH can vary greatly from a storm’s actual wind field in time,
space, and magnitude. This was the case for hurricane Emily in 1993 when the eye wall
crossed eastern Pamlico Sound in North Carolina causing very strong surface winds, and
the SLOSH model “…significantly underestimated the surface winds and resulting storm
surge observed on the Pamlico Sound side of Cape Hatteras” [5]. In further comparisons of
SLOSH-model wind fields with observed winds, it was concluded that the use of the NOAA
Hurricane Research Division’s real-time wind-field data could be used to improve the
SLOSH model’s estimated values.
2.3.4. Surge uncertainty and elevation
The accuracy of SLOSH is also limited by elevation data accuracy and resolution. Surge
heights are represented by a +/- 20% accuracy of predicted maximum surge height [21]. For
instance, a prediction of 15-foot surge (4.57 m) might actually produce a range of prediction
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from only 8 to 12 feet (2.44 to 3.66 m). Since SLOSH computes storm tide elevations in Na‐
tional Geodetic Vertical Datum 1929, it is at least cumbersome to recalculate values to match
extensive LiDAR DEMs in vertical meters and North American Vertical Datum 1988 (feet or
meters). By design, SLOSH does not incorporate fine-scale landform features and potential
inundation thresholds (such as the breaching of inlets in barrier islands, dunes, or engi‐
neered features such as levee). The grid resolution of SLOSH is variable and relatively
coarse scale, with most cells on the order of 1 mile x 1 mile (1.6 km x 1.6 km). Elevations for
grid cells are based on the averages of underlying DEMs, so the actual cell may really pos‐
sess a non-normal distribution of elevation. Levee areas or areas protected by natural ridges
may be overgeneralized. Furthermore, flooding in SLOSH cells is considered aspatially,
wherein each cell is flooded as if it was inundated irrespective of the direction of flooding.
To assess the impacts of errors in elevation models as they relate to downscaling of SLOSH
values to a finer grid, a Monte Carlo simulation was conducted. The primary goal of the
downscaling model is to predict the area of inundation by utilizing the SLOSH model out‐
put and a DEM. The degree of positional error is related to the uncertainty in vertical and
horizontal measurements and issues surrounding datum conversion, projections, and inter‐
polation methods. If using high resolution airborne LiDAR, the dense sampling of LiDAR
points reduces projection and interpolation errors to practically negligible for shorelines
[22]. Airborne topographic LiDAR is increasingly available with a horizontal accuracy of +/-
2.0 m and a vertical accuracy of +/-0.30 m (even as fine as +/- 5 to 10 cm). This amount of
potential error may cause the position of the inundation zone to fluctuate either landward or
seaward, but far less than any other modeling approach. Liu et al. [22] note that “the error
inflation factor is determined by the foreshore slope. For each beach with a gentle surface
slope, a slight vertical error will be amplified and translated to a larger error” [22]. Nonethe‐
less, larger spatial error could result in poor decision making in the face of an extreme coast‐
al event. The Norfolk, Virginia case study provides some insight into urban facility
managers’ concerns and the possible ramifications of error.
3. Geovisualization
The experimental demonstrations below primarily analyzed SLOSH and North Carolina Li‐
DAR elevation data. The SLOSH data were obtained from two sources, the SLOSH Display
Package [15] distributed by NOAA NHC and the NC Center for Geographic Information
and Analysis (NCCGIA) data from NC OneMap online GIS repository [6]. The SLOSH data
from NOAA are used in the downscaling model, and input as either MEOW or MOM file.
The SLOSH MOM data are a “worst case” scenario, in which multiple hurricane tracks are
used and landfall can occur from multiple directions for a given storm category and speed
[15]. Elevation data were obtained from the North Carolina Flood Plain Mapping program
in a variety of spatial resolutions (NC Floodplain Mapping Program uses 50 feet (15.24 m),
20 feet (6.1 m), and 10 feet (3.0 m) resampled elevation grids).
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lem areas, site vulnerabilities, relief staging areas, evacuation orders, shelters of last resort,
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SLOSH model’s estimated values.
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sess a non-normal distribution of elevation. Levee areas or areas protected by natural ridges
may be overgeneralized. Furthermore, flooding in SLOSH cells is considered aspatially,
wherein each cell is flooded as if it was inundated irrespective of the direction of flooding.
To assess the impacts of errors in elevation models as they relate to downscaling of SLOSH
values to a finer grid, a Monte Carlo simulation was conducted. The primary goal of the
downscaling model is to predict the area of inundation by utilizing the SLOSH model out‐
put and a DEM. The degree of positional error is related to the uncertainty in vertical and
horizontal measurements and issues surrounding datum conversion, projections, and inter‐
polation methods. If using high resolution airborne LiDAR, the dense sampling of LiDAR
points reduces projection and interpolation errors to practically negligible for shorelines
[22]. Airborne topographic LiDAR is increasingly available with a horizontal accuracy of +/-
2.0 m and a vertical accuracy of +/-0.30 m (even as fine as +/- 5 to 10 cm). This amount of
potential error may cause the position of the inundation zone to fluctuate either landward or
seaward, but far less than any other modeling approach. Liu et al. [22] note that “the error
inflation factor is determined by the foreshore slope. For each beach with a gentle surface
slope, a slight vertical error will be amplified and translated to a larger error” [22]. Nonethe‐
less, larger spatial error could result in poor decision making in the face of an extreme coast‐
al event. The Norfolk, Virginia case study provides some insight into urban facility
managers’ concerns and the possible ramifications of error.
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The experimental demonstrations below primarily analyzed SLOSH and North Carolina Li‐
DAR elevation data. The SLOSH data were obtained from two sources, the SLOSH Display
Package [15] distributed by NOAA NHC and the NC Center for Geographic Information
and Analysis (NCCGIA) data from NC OneMap online GIS repository [6]. The SLOSH data
from NOAA are used in the downscaling model, and input as either MEOW or MOM file.
The SLOSH MOM data are a “worst case” scenario, in which multiple hurricane tracks are
used and landfall can occur from multiple directions for a given storm category and speed
[15]. Elevation data were obtained from the North Carolina Flood Plain Mapping program
in a variety of spatial resolutions (NC Floodplain Mapping Program uses 50 feet (15.24 m),
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3.1. Downscaling and spatial analysis
The spatial modeling methods employed here include a combination of vector- and raster-
based analysis, as well as automation using ArcGIS Model Builder. The downscaling model
has the flexibility of incorporating a user-defined elevation grid and allows future iterations
of the model to estimate inundation as new data become available. This is a substantial im‐
provement over the traditional method of producing downscaled inundation maps, which
were created with hand- digitized USGS topographic maps. The model also allows for the
input of deterministic SLOSH model output from the NHC in the event of an actual storm,
giving emergency managers more accurate predictions of area inundation, the affected pop‐
ulations and evacuations routes.
Most inundation models allow for the flooding of interior sections of land as water levels
rise, that are, in reality, disconnected from water sources (either a bay or the ocean), an issue
known as hydro-connectivity. This is typically referred to as a “bathtub model” and pro‐
vides inaccurate representations. Hydro-connectivity is established in the model applied
here by using a cost-distance function that allows inundation only from a source raster of
water (i.e., a bay or the ocean). This generates better results than those produced using sin‐
gle-pixel or contour-based bathtub inundation.
The output from the SLOSH downscaling model is a raster grid. Once the downscaling has
been computed, map algebra calculations are used to compare differences in inundation be‐
tween the three elevation resolutions, and ultimately to a rasterized NCCGIA data. The
analysis will be conducted for Dare County, North Carolina, with a special focus on Roa‐
noke Island and the city of Nags Head. In subsequent geovisualization techniques, the Li‐
DAR-based and SLOSH-downscaled surge inundation calculations are used.
3.2. 3-D Geovisualization
In  addition  to  official  updates  from  the  NWS,  other  groups  have  worked  with  model
output to refine the resolution for  better  visualization and more accurate representation
of inundation.  The size of  the cells  to the south of  Kitty Hawk, North Carolina,  for  ex‐
ample,  is  not  always  appropriate  for  visualization.  Figure  1  shows  that  single  SLOSH
cells may cover an entire swath of barrier island and in the current example (SLOSH cat‐
egory 2,  fast-moving MOM) that  stretch of  barrier  island would be  inundated with be‐
tween 1 and 2 meters of water.
The NCCGIA inundation and SLOSH inundation polygons are aggregated using the availa‐
ble 1:24,000 USGS topographic maps (approximately 5-foot or 1.5-meter contour interval).
Areal interpolation was used to create an overlay to delimit inundation according to lumped
categories 1 and 2, category 3, and categories 4 and 5 hurricanes. The result was a polygon
file that exhibits inundation with relatively fine detail (Figure 2). These elevation data, how‐
ever, have been vastly eclipsed by LiDAR bare-earth models with 15-cm vertical accuracy
and 5- to 20-m spatial resolution.
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3.3. Monte Carlo error modeling
The procedure used in the assessment of accuracy errors in the prediction of inundation area
was similar to those used by Liu. First, the levels of error and uncertainty (bound of poten‐
tial error) of the source elevation model were determined. Then using a pseudo-random
number generator and the bound of potential error, 30 random permutations were created.
All 30 had similar means and standard deviations and were therefore determined to be
within the realm of possible error. The inundation model was run on each permutation and
their differences were recorded.
3.4. Case study: Hurricane Irene 2011 urban storm surge in Norfolk, Virginia, USA
In August 2011, Hurricane Irene drew close to the southeastern U.S. coast (Figure 3), eventu‐
ally making landfall at Cape Lookout, North Carolina at 8 a.m. EDT, August 25, 2011 as a
category one hurricane with maximum sustained winds near 85 mph. The storm moved
more slowly than expected over North Carolina, with its center crossing over Norfolk and
southeastern Virginia on August 27.
The path of Hurricane Irene was accurately predicted more than four days in advance by
NOAA’s NHC [23]. As the storm approached, the Emergency Management team at Old Do‐
minion University (ODU) in Norfolk, Virginia began creating impact scenarios and making
contingency plans. Potential flooding was of critical concern for a number of reasons. The
university’s population of 25,000 students has become more residential over the last few
years and includes a large number of international students that have no other permanent
U.S. residences to serve as temporary shelter. ODU is in a highly urbanized, mixed-use set‐
ting within Norfolk, is adjacent to several tidally influenced surge-prone water bodies
(Chesapeake Bay, the Elizabeth River, and the Lafayette River) and has restricted transporta‐
tion routes and limited evacuation corridors. A 2007 surge study in Norfolk revealed that
census blocks near the university had some of the highest vulnerability to hurricane storm
surge in the region [24].
The inherent challenges related to impending surge from an oncoming storm were exacer‐
bated by Irene’s timing as she was expected to pass over ODU during the “move-in” week‐
end for residential students. University administrators were faced with decisions such as:
Should students be allowed to move in prior to the storm? Do we evacuate residents and, if so, to
where? What critical infrastructure is likely to be exposed to flooding? Should assets be relocated to
mitigate damage? Which areas require temporary storm protection (sand bagging, etc.)? Which areas
may be isolated during the flooding? The best available information regarding potential storm
surge flooding was required to confidently answer these questions. In June 2011, the Hamp‐
ton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC) had compiled a report addressing storm-
surge vulnerability in southeastern Virginia [25]. While this report estimated that over
100,000 people may be displaced by a Category 1 storm, regional surge maps were not of
sufficient resolution to be useful at neighborhood or facility scales. To remedy this scale is‐
sue, independent GIS modeling and analysis of the surge potential associated with Irene
was performed at the university.
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more slowly than expected over North Carolina, with its center crossing over Norfolk and
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tion routes and limited evacuation corridors. A 2007 surge study in Norfolk revealed that
census blocks near the university had some of the highest vulnerability to hurricane storm
surge in the region [24].
The inherent challenges related to impending surge from an oncoming storm were exacer‐
bated by Irene’s timing as she was expected to pass over ODU during the “move-in” week‐
end for residential students. University administrators were faced with decisions such as:
Should students be allowed to move in prior to the storm? Do we evacuate residents and, if so, to
where? What critical infrastructure is likely to be exposed to flooding? Should assets be relocated to
mitigate damage? Which areas require temporary storm protection (sand bagging, etc.)? Which areas
may be isolated during the flooding? The best available information regarding potential storm
surge flooding was required to confidently answer these questions. In June 2011, the Hamp‐
ton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC) had compiled a report addressing storm-
surge vulnerability in southeastern Virginia [25]. While this report estimated that over
100,000 people may be displaced by a Category 1 storm, regional surge maps were not of
sufficient resolution to be useful at neighborhood or facility scales. To remedy this scale is‐
sue, independent GIS modeling and analysis of the surge potential associated with Irene
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Figure 3. NOAA GOES-13 satellite showing Hurricane Irene on August 25, 2011 at 10:10 a.m. EDT.
Localized surge inundation models were created for the ODU campus following three basic
steps outlined by NOAA: 1) obtain and prepare elevation data, 2) determine water levels, 3)
create MEOW inundation maps for the study area from the SLOSH display package. At the
time of Irene’s approach, ODU already possessed the best available high resolution (1-foot
or 0.3-m grid) LiDAR-derived elevation data having an accuracy of +/-.30 m, referenced to
the National Geodetic Vertical Datum 1929 (NAVD29). Horizontal and vertical datums (ref‐
erence heights) must match when creating and overlaying elevation surfaces. If they do not,
error will be introduced into the flood model elevation surface [4].
Since its inception, the SLOSH model has been used successfully by numerous emergency
management agencies and forecasters to predict storm surge and assess flood potential [26].
Given the longevity and widespread use of the SLOSH model, ODU elected to use SLOSH
model water level output and to evaluate the probabilistic SLOSH forecasts [27] for a “bath‐
tub” campus flooding model. In this hybrid approach, iterative flood surfaces were devel‐
oped from the most current storm track and intensity forecasts provided the NWS and
NHC. Immediately prior to Irene’s landfall, the most likely storm parameters were: a catego‐
ry 2 storm bearing NNE at 14 mph (22.5 kph) during mid-tide with the tide rising. Thus, this
case using SLOSH, local LiDAR and 3-D GIS data provides insight into fine-resolution, ur‐
ban applications of these modeling and geovisualization techniques.
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4. Results and discussion
4.1. Downscaling and spatial analysis
To exploit the available LiDAR DEMs, the model used accepts either raw MEOW/MOM da‐
ta or deterministic runs when available and it outputs similar results. This dataset adds the
option of including high accuracy LIDAR DEMs as they become available and using deter‐
ministic runs when they are made available by the NWS. The model inputs SLOSH, LiDAR
DEMs, and water raster data and computes a cost-distance function with enforced hydro-
connectivity to the bay or the ocean. The inundation can only originate from open-water
sources and this eliminates the non-connected inundation polygons associated with “bath‐
tub” models. Model output from three different elevation grids (2.4, 6.1, and 3.0 m resolu‐
tion) generated similar results. The inundation grids from the 20-foot resolution (6.0 m)
downscaled inundation model were overlaid with the NCCGIA interpolated contour-based
flood prediction (Figure 4). The contour-based surge model expects more inundation on the
Outer Banks relative to data indicated in LiDAR DEMs.
Figure 4. The comparison of results of inundation grids from the 20-foot resolution (6.0 m) downscaled inundation
model and the NCCGIA interpolated contour-based flood prediction model from USGS 30 m DEMs (red-only), areas of
agreement (purple), and areas of LiDAR-based potential inundation (blue-only) for a subset area of the Outer Banks
and northern tip of Roanoke Island (at bottom). Shades of light grey surrounded by surge areas are relict medaño
dunes and, in Jockey’s Ridge State Park, a star dune.
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Localized surge inundation models were created for the ODU campus following three basic
steps outlined by NOAA: 1) obtain and prepare elevation data, 2) determine water levels, 3)
create MEOW inundation maps for the study area from the SLOSH display package. At the
time of Irene’s approach, ODU already possessed the best available high resolution (1-foot
or 0.3-m grid) LiDAR-derived elevation data having an accuracy of +/-.30 m, referenced to
the National Geodetic Vertical Datum 1929 (NAVD29). Horizontal and vertical datums (ref‐
erence heights) must match when creating and overlaying elevation surfaces. If they do not,
error will be introduced into the flood model elevation surface [4].
Since its inception, the SLOSH model has been used successfully by numerous emergency
management agencies and forecasters to predict storm surge and assess flood potential [26].
Given the longevity and widespread use of the SLOSH model, ODU elected to use SLOSH
model water level output and to evaluate the probabilistic SLOSH forecasts [27] for a “bath‐
tub” campus flooding model. In this hybrid approach, iterative flood surfaces were devel‐
oped from the most current storm track and intensity forecasts provided the NWS and
NHC. Immediately prior to Irene’s landfall, the most likely storm parameters were: a catego‐
ry 2 storm bearing NNE at 14 mph (22.5 kph) during mid-tide with the tide rising. Thus, this
case using SLOSH, local LiDAR and 3-D GIS data provides insight into fine-resolution, ur‐
ban applications of these modeling and geovisualization techniques.
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters116
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Downscaling and spatial analysis
To exploit the available LiDAR DEMs, the model used accepts either raw MEOW/MOM da‐
ta or deterministic runs when available and it outputs similar results. This dataset adds the
option of including high accuracy LIDAR DEMs as they become available and using deter‐
ministic runs when they are made available by the NWS. The model inputs SLOSH, LiDAR
DEMs, and water raster data and computes a cost-distance function with enforced hydro-
connectivity to the bay or the ocean. The inundation can only originate from open-water
sources and this eliminates the non-connected inundation polygons associated with “bath‐
tub” models. Model output from three different elevation grids (2.4, 6.1, and 3.0 m resolu‐
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An experimental program to visualize and communicate storm surge risk and raise aware‐
ness to the hazard prompted the development of 3-D models and a series of photorealistic,
interactive, and animated geovisualizations. In cooperation with Dare County (North Caro‐
lina) Office of Emergency Management, the Renaissance Computing Institute (RENCI) East
Carolina Engagement Center [28] developed 3-D building models using Google Sketchup
software. Seventeen prominent landmarks were selected in consultation with the emergency
manager and community leaders. In addition, building footprints and heights were incorpo‐
rated within surrounding 1-km buffers of the landmarks from the county’s GIS database
and extruded in 3-D using ESRI ArcScene software. SLOSH MOMs were also incorporated
and matched to the elevation datum used in Google Earth. All landmarks were evaluated
for availability on the Google 3-D Community Warehouse so that users examining existing
building models would see the correct objects. For each focal landmark, a visualization was
created and included: 1) a 3-D ortho-perspective view for use as representative graphic in
presentations and briefings; 2) prerecorded video for download or playback on the Internet
(e.g., a Windows Media Player (.wmv) file or FLASH); and 3) an interactive, downloadable
master Keyhole Markup Language (.kmz) file with embedded 3-D inundation, landmark
and building objects. All data were organized into a library hosted on the RENCI SurgeViz
2010 website [29].
These products were used in diverse venues, displayed to different audiences and employed
in several activities which enabled a qualitative evaluation of their utility. Presentations and
interactive educational use was facilitated in public school presentations to elementary, mid‐
dle- and high school students on the Outer Banks to inform them of their local storm-surge
potential. The library of graphics was compiled into a set of Microsoft Office Powerpoint
slide presentations for use by emergency managers and forecasters for briefings and training
exercises. These presentation graphics are organized by SLOSH MOM category and geogra‐
phy allowing for quick selection of appropriate surge levels and for specific sites during an
emergency. Animations of short 3-D fly-throughs for each location and each MOM category
provide snapshots of potential inundation regionally and are useful for risk communication.
Finally, the interactive 3-D content of the.kmz files enabled public download and private ex‐
ploration. All of these products could also be used in hurricane exercises and drills, and in
June 2010 each product was demonstrated in a mock “tabletop” exercise for the Dare Coun‐
ty Control Board using a hypothetical Hurricane Felix, a MOM category 2, fast-moving
storm striking near the North Carolina-Virginia border. Each of these uses was deemed suc‐
cessful by their audiences (Figure 5).
Although qualitative successes of these geovisualization applications are difficult to quanti‐
fy, particularly in a real emergency, it is possible to identify several problems that occurred
in their production and delivery. First, the integration of local building data, storm surges,
Google imagery and elevation data created some asynchrony and error. For instance, a cus‐
tom building model in Sketchup was incorrectly located on the Google Imagery on a street
opposite its true location. The model was submitted to the Google 3-D Warehouse and ac‐
cepted, eventually also appearing in Google’s building database for Google Earth users.
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However, the placement error was only discovered later and took some months to correct.
Additionally, very high spatial resolution aerial imagery in the Google Earth image database
sometimes did not coincide with building footprints and surge data. In some cases, dynamic
changes (e.g., dune construction or destruction) on the barrier island actually altered poten‐
tial surge patterns. In other cases, edges and misalignments between the aerial imagery and
building data were revealed that may indicate that there was either geometric error in the
aerial data or positioning error in the mapped buildings. Nonetheless, the graphics seldom
failed to impress emergency managers and oftentimes generated requests for similar prod‐
ucts for other municipalities.
Figure 5. Screenshots of customized.kmz files with building footprint models, landmark 3-D buildings, and SLOSH
MOM output storm surge inundation layers superimposed over Google imagery for a category 2 storm affecting the
Outer Banks, North Carolina, (a) South Nags Head fire station, (b) US Coast Guard Oregon Inlet station, (c) Sam &
Omie’s Restaurant at Whalebone Junction, South Nags Head, and (d) Cape Hatteras Lighthouse, Buxton.
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The static, apparently non-destructive impact of surges evident in the geovisualizations gen‐
erated suggestions for future improvements to reinforce that these are downscaled surge
models and only approximations of potential worst-case scenarios of SLOSH MOMs. They
may not occur at all of these locations and they also carry the limitations of the SLOSH mod‐
el with respect to accuracy and accurate portrayal of wave energy impacts. To scientifically
and visually evaluate the potential error also found in the elevation data, a Monte Carlo er‐
ror model was also applied.
4.3. Monte Carlo error modeling
The initial Monte Carlo simulation of error in the DEM focused on results around the Town
of Manteo, Roanoke Island (Figure 6). Individual cells of the DEM were randomly perturbed
by error following the Gaussian error distribution for +/-15 cm vertical error. For each new
DEM, the downscaled SLOSH inundation model was run to delineate possible alternative
inundation zones. The analysis reveals that in a minority of cases in the simulation, a de‐
pression in the study area is inundated (that is not delineated in the original DEM.) This re‐
sult prompted further analysis and exploration of cartographic representation.)
Figure 6. Prototype of Monte Carlo simulation analysis of inundation sensitivity, showing original storm surge inunda‐
tion model with existing 20-foot (6-m) DEM (hachures and bold boundary line) and iterative results from the pertur‐
bed error modeling in alternate color polylines for an intensive study area of the Town of Manteo, North Carolina. This
shows 30 possible inundation zones, each is shown in a different color (and the original outline in bold with a hach‐
ured inundation zone). The dark tone area of the DEM at center illustrates a low zone, bisected by a major road, of
low-lying ground that the current DEM does not inundate but that several runs of the Monte Carlo simulation found
to be inundated.
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To further evaluate the technique for evaluating sensitivity of inundation confidence, the
analysis  applied variable  transparency and shading to more precisely identify  uncertain
areas in the DEM in a  low-lying shore area (Figure 7)  and on a barrier  island segment
(Figure 8). The cumulative confidence of inundation for 30 simulations was calculated by
tallying  the  number  of  runs  that  resulted  in  each  cell  being  inundated.  The  cells  were
shaded  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  simulations  that  produced  flooding.  Results  of
this symbolization allow more precise delineation of potential DEM error and flood vul‐
nerability.  On the island,  there seemed to be more inundation agreement,  except  in  the
boundaries around dunes and the upper beach berm zone. However, the zone of inunda‐
tion  appearing  over  water  (in  the  later  orthophoto)  also  underscores  the  potential  for
temporal asynchrony (the DEM for Figure 8 is from 2002 whereas the aerial  orthophoto
is from 2010) or error. Beach erosion at this location is not reflected in either the DEM or
in the downscaling inundation model.
Figure 7. Sensitivity analysis of DEM inundation potential for a category 2 SLOSH MOM surge in Manteo by tallying
inundation of Monte Carlo simulation runs. Transparency and saturation are proportionately modulated to the num‐
ber of model runs that predicted flooding.
Over most of the tested portions of Roanoke Island and Cape Hatteras, there is marginal
spatial  variation in  the  inundation area.  However,  some surprising patterns  are  evident
where there is likely to be an underlying representation limit.  In low-relief coastal plain
landscapes and barrier islands, features such as salt marshes, shrub and maritime forests,
canals and drainage ditches and narrow features such as dune crests impart variable ele‐
vation  error,  even  in  LiDAR DEMs,  and  these  may  restrict  the  accuracy  of  inundation
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models of any kind. In our study area, one area exhibited a drastically different inunda‐
tion zonation in the simulation. In Manteo (Figure 7), an extensive area was predicted to
flood in several simulation runs but not based on the original DEM. This highlights the
need  for  future  floodplain-delineation  sensitivity  research  and  a  need  to  better  under‐
stand downscaling  and surge  inundation  modeling  error  to  address  the  propagation  of
inherent versus processing error.
Figure 8. Results for Monte Carlo error analysis for a SLOSH category 2 MOM surge potential for southern Hatteras
Island.
4.4. Hurricane Irene in Norfolk case study
The SLOSH model was run using these inputs to create a modeled water surface for the op‐
erational analysis of impacts from Hurricane Irene (Figure 9). SLOSH model runs predicted
a storm surge of approximately 6.4 feet (2 m), referenced to NGVD29 vertical datum. How‐
ever, the SLOSH model does not include precipitation, wave action, and the effects of tidal
phases (spring/neap), each of which can have a significant impact on flooding. As Irene’s
landfall coincided with a spring tide and heavy rains were expected, 1.5 feet (0.5 m) of addi‐
tional urban flooding was added evenly across the modeled surface. A raster surface ap‐
proximating an 8-foot (2.4-m) water level was draped uniformly upon both 2-D and 3-D
representations of ODU. Two-dimensional maps, graphics and GIS overlay-analysis proved
valuable for determining the buildings and assets that required the most pre-storm interven‐
tion and flood-mitigation effort.
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Figure 9. SLOSH model for Hurricane Irene with storm surge values flagged near ODU campus.
The 2-D portrayal of LiDAR estimated inundation reveals the surge following the low top‐
ography of an historic creek through the middle of campus (Figure 10). Water backing up
the tributary is forced overbank onto streets, in many instances using streets as flood chan‐
nels. Figure 10 also demonstrates the simultaneous, multivariate mapping of flood inunda‐
tion depth (level of water above the ground surface) and the heights of the bases of building,
important for protecting facilities and planning for emergency services. Flooded streets and
impediments to vehicular or pedestrian traffic are also incorporated into this cartography.
Three-dimensional visualizations employing enhanced cartographic techniques were more
instructive to emergency management personnel for visualization of potential high-flood
storm conditions (Figures 11 and 12).
Based upon the flood surfaces depicted in these visualizations, emergency management and
facilities staff at the university were able to prioritize their efforts, spending time and resour‐
ces more effectively. Non-fixed assets in the two residence halls predicted to be most severe‐
ly impacted by flooding were relocated or elevated. Sand bags were deployed at critical
seepage points for several structures. Several parking lots were also cleared based on the in‐
dication that they would experience flooding of 2 feet (0.6 m) or more. Ultimately, Irene
weakened and turned towards the northwest as it passed through the Norfolk area, result‐
ing in flood heights of approximately 2 to 3 feet (0.6 to 0.9 m) which was lower than predict‐
ed by all surge forecasts.
With all storms, the amount of flooding depends on hurricane intensity, tidal phase, rainfall,
wind-driven waves, storm speed and duration, prior precipitation, and other factors [21].
ODU and southeastern Virginia were fortunate, as the northeast quadrant of the storm
which always has stronger winds and higher surge, moved off the coast rather than inland.
Despite the discrepancy between predicted and actual flooding, ODU’s modeling and visu‐
alization of Irene’s surge potential are viewed as having been a valuable resource and is
now incorporated as standard operating procedure for future hurricanes.
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Figure 10. Map of depths of flooding encroaching on campus from the Lafayette River based on maximum storm tide
for SLOSH MEOW scenario for Hurricane Irene, with depths of inundation based on cell by cell calculation from LiDAR
DEM data for high tide.
Figure 11. A 3-D ortho-perspective of Hurricane Irene maximum flooding at ODU campus. Map depicts inundation
depth superimposed over 3-D buildings and orthophotography draped on a LiDAR DEM. View north toward Lafayette
River at top and Elizabeth River at left. Inundated areas shown in blue shades connote inundation depths (as descri‐
bed in Figure 5). Building hues denote water level at first floor base height of building.
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Figure 12. D ortho-perspective of Irene-generated flooding focused on ODU with 3-D building models extruded for
perspective. Blue shades depict inundation depth (as described in Figure 5).
5. Conclusion
This review and exploratory geovisualization research found variable results when compar‐
ing traditional coastal elevation to modern LiDAR DEM elevation and in residual fine-scale
error in digital inundation models. Discrepancies in inundation predictions when using tra‐
ditional contour-based surge maps compared to contemporary digital LiDAR-based inunda‐
tion models were significant, highlighting the underestimation of potential surges in coarser
coastal topographic data. Forecasters and emergency managers should be aware of their da‐
ta sources and the potential error in maps used to make decisions. Incorrect results are pro‐
duced not only by operational and observational errors in computer models but also by
ignoring the errors inherent in elevation data sources. Future accuracy assessments should
be made for downscaled inundation models to increase realistic representation of the extent
of flooding. Even though the agreement of the areas of inundation produced by the two
models is close to 95%, three main advantages of the more recent GIS-based model have
been identified, all relate to model flexibility. The downscaling and fine-resolution error
modeling of the Monte Carlo simulation methods also highlight the existence of error even
in our modern, fine-scale LiDAR DEMs. Simulation runs showed that there is spatial varia‐
tion in DEM error that may propagate underestimates of areal flooding in surges. Thus,
floodplain mapping and emergency managers should cautiously interpret single inundation
models, as underlying error in fine-scale topographic features (a levee, for instance) could
mask the potential in some likely to be surge-affected areas. Cartographic techniques such
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as transparency and variable shading demonstrated in our chapter could also illuminate
such weaknesses and errors in the DEMs or downscaled inundation model maps.
In the event of an actual hurricane landfall, the SLOSH deterministic runs could be input to
the model resulting in a more realistic representation, rather than using inundation zones
generated by the SLOSH MOM output. Doing this would provide a clear advantage over a
static, “worst case” scenario map, and would allow emergency managers to pinpoint areas
and infrastructure that would be effected in the event of specific storm parameters and
track. Another advantage of the GIS-based model is its easy incorporation of newly availa‐
ble elevation data. In addition, digital elevation models do not typically incorporate features
such as ditches and water-control canals that can greatly alter the spatial patterns of inunda‐
tion, so DEM-processing techniques such as “stream burning” or “hydro-correction” to im‐
prove and enforce hydrologic representation in both runoff and inundation would help to
improve the accuracy of surge visualizations.
This chapter also focused on the use of SLOSH model MEOW and MOM data for the time-
delimited preparedness and response operations (particularly evacuation) of emergency
management. In the future, the ability for modeling to produce a variety of inundation mod‐
el output will expand and reduce uncertainty. Experimental runs are being conducted to
make use of output from the ADCIRC model, and these will be enhanced by improvement
of storm-track and intensity forecasts within the closing hours of landfall. The ADCIRC
model is better than the SLOSH model in many ways, but still has some of the same visuali‐
zation issues. In sum, the downscaling GIS SLOSH model produces results similar to previ‐
ous contouring and manual-digitizing techniques but has better accuracy and tends to not
overgeneralize. Although Monte Carlo analysis of inundation variability using error model‐
ing suggests broad fidelity of inundation zones, there are still areas of moderate uncertainty.
More work is needed to assess the accuracy of these downscaling models using actual storm
data and hind-casting. Nonetheless, the GIS model has many advantages; they are primarily
the model’s flexible acceptance of inputs and its cartography. With more work, emergency
managers and the public will be able to improve risk awareness and risk communication.
The array of geovisual products developed for education, public awareness, and emergency
exercises have been welcomed by communities to whom they have been presented. Photore‐
alism and 3-D building models are demonstrably versatile, providing visual communication
in static graphics, libraries of surge visualizations, animated fly-throughs, and interactive 3-
D digital globe data (such as Google Earth). The algorithms to downscale and visualize
SLOSH or other surge model forecasts at the neighborhood or finer scale have fulfilled a
need in local emergency management. The ODU case study demonstrated the integration of
surge forecast inundation, fine-scale orthophotography and cartographic symbolization of
building planimetrics, and accessibility for operational use during an emergency. Such ap‐
plications require cautious and informed use of disparate data (meteorological, geospatial,
and infrastructural). The spatial accuracy, scale, and temporal and physical uncertainties of
a phenomenon as complex as storm surge suggest the need for advanced training and judi‐
cious exercising of the use of GIS and geovisualization. Hence, academics and practitioner
communities comprising geographers, coastal modelers and engineers, emergency manag‐
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ers, and decision-makers must continue to collaborate in the development of scientific ap‐
proaches and robust tools to further refine and expand these advances for coastal disaster
management.
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as transparency and variable shading demonstrated in our chapter could also illuminate
such weaknesses and errors in the DEMs or downscaled inundation model maps.
In the event of an actual hurricane landfall, the SLOSH deterministic runs could be input to
the model resulting in a more realistic representation, rather than using inundation zones
generated by the SLOSH MOM output. Doing this would provide a clear advantage over a
static, “worst case” scenario map, and would allow emergency managers to pinpoint areas
and infrastructure that would be effected in the event of specific storm parameters and
track. Another advantage of the GIS-based model is its easy incorporation of newly availa‐
ble elevation data. In addition, digital elevation models do not typically incorporate features
such as ditches and water-control canals that can greatly alter the spatial patterns of inunda‐
tion, so DEM-processing techniques such as “stream burning” or “hydro-correction” to im‐
prove and enforce hydrologic representation in both runoff and inundation would help to
improve the accuracy of surge visualizations.
This chapter also focused on the use of SLOSH model MEOW and MOM data for the time-
delimited preparedness and response operations (particularly evacuation) of emergency
management. In the future, the ability for modeling to produce a variety of inundation mod‐
el output will expand and reduce uncertainty. Experimental runs are being conducted to
make use of output from the ADCIRC model, and these will be enhanced by improvement
of storm-track and intensity forecasts within the closing hours of landfall. The ADCIRC
model is better than the SLOSH model in many ways, but still has some of the same visuali‐
zation issues. In sum, the downscaling GIS SLOSH model produces results similar to previ‐
ous contouring and manual-digitizing techniques but has better accuracy and tends to not
overgeneralize. Although Monte Carlo analysis of inundation variability using error model‐
ing suggests broad fidelity of inundation zones, there are still areas of moderate uncertainty.
More work is needed to assess the accuracy of these downscaling models using actual storm
data and hind-casting. Nonetheless, the GIS model has many advantages; they are primarily
the model’s flexible acceptance of inputs and its cartography. With more work, emergency
managers and the public will be able to improve risk awareness and risk communication.
The array of geovisual products developed for education, public awareness, and emergency
exercises have been welcomed by communities to whom they have been presented. Photore‐
alism and 3-D building models are demonstrably versatile, providing visual communication
in static graphics, libraries of surge visualizations, animated fly-throughs, and interactive 3-
D digital globe data (such as Google Earth). The algorithms to downscale and visualize
SLOSH or other surge model forecasts at the neighborhood or finer scale have fulfilled a
need in local emergency management. The ODU case study demonstrated the integration of
surge forecast inundation, fine-scale orthophotography and cartographic symbolization of
building planimetrics, and accessibility for operational use during an emergency. Such ap‐
plications require cautious and informed use of disparate data (meteorological, geospatial,
and infrastructural). The spatial accuracy, scale, and temporal and physical uncertainties of
a phenomenon as complex as storm surge suggest the need for advanced training and judi‐
cious exercising of the use of GIS and geovisualization. Hence, academics and practitioner
communities comprising geographers, coastal modelers and engineers, emergency manag‐
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ers, and decision-makers must continue to collaborate in the development of scientific ap‐
proaches and robust tools to further refine and expand these advances for coastal disaster
management.
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1. Introduction
Iran, because of extent, geographical situation and climatic variety, is one of the disaster-
prone countries of the world. [1] Natural disasters, for example earthquake, are an unex‐
pected  event  that  cause  damage  and  destruction  to  human  life  and  health,  and  the
injured persons without others assistance are not able to meet their need. Earthquakes in
Iran and neighboring regions (e.g., India, Turkey and Afghanistan) are closely connected
to  their  position  within  the  geologically  active  Alpine-Himalayan  belt  (Table  1).  [2-5]
Earthquake  crises  disrupt  all  daily  affairs  of  society,  such  as  economic  activities,  city
services,  communication  systems  and  community  services  and  public  health.  [6]  An
Earthquake  Information  Management  System  (EIMS)  is  a  system  that  records,  collects,
keeps, retrieves and analyzes inputs, produces reports and required earthquake informa‐
tion (EI)  and renders them to the right people and organizations to manage earthquake
response activities. [7] EI is not an end in itself,  but it  helps to make better decisions in
designing policies, response planning, management of disasters, monitoring and evaluat‐
ing disaster programs and services, and reducing damages. [8]
2. Problem statement
Unfortunately, information systems in most countries are inadequate to provide the needed
management support. Earthquake loss estimates are forecasts of damage as well as human
and economics impacts that may result from future earthquakes. These estimates are based
on current scientific and engineering knowledge. [9] The “earthquake loss estimation meth‐
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odology” is a system that uses mathematical formulae and information about building
stock, local geology and the location and size of earthquake risk, economic data and other
information to estimate losses from a potential earthquake. The EIMS uses ArcGIS (geo‐
graphical information system) to map and display ground shaking, the pattern of building
damage and demographic information about a community. Once the location and size of a
hypothetical earthquake are established, EIMS will estimate the distribution of the amounts
of the following: ground shaking, buildings damaged, injured persons, damage to transpor‐
tation systems, disruption of electrical and water utilities, displacement of populations and
cost of repair of likely damage. [10-13]
Deadliest earthquake
Year Date Magnitude Fatalities Region
2005 03/28 8.7 1313 Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
2004 12/26 9.0 283,106 Off the west coast of Northern Sumatra
2003 12/26 6.6 31,000 Southeastern Iran
2002 03/25 6.1 1000 Hindu Kush region, Afghanistan
2001 01/26 7.7 20,023 India
2000 06/04 7.9 103 Southern Sumatera, Indonesia
1999 08/17 7.6 17,118 Turkey
1998 05/30 6.6 4000 Afghanistan–Tajikistan border region
1997 05/10 7.3 1572 Northern Iran
1996 02/03 6.6 322 Yunnan, China
1995 01/16 6.9 5530 Kobe, Japan
Table 1. Deadliest earthquakes by year, 1995–2005
Estimation of losses from future earthquakes is essential for preparation for disasters and it
facilitates better decision making at local, regional, provincial and national levels of govern‐
ment. An EIMS can estimate earthquake losses to support land-use planning and facility site
decisions (e.g., a map-based analysis of the potential intensity of ground shaking from a
postulated earthquake that identifies those parts of the community that will experience the
most violent shaking and the buildings at greatest risk of damage); prioritization of retrofit
or abatement programs (e.g., an estimate of building damage that provides the basis for es‐
tablishing programs to mitigate or strengthen buildings that may collapse in earthquakes by
providing estimates of damages and casualties); regional, provincial and local emergency re‐
sponse and contingency planning (e.g., estimates of casualties and of damage to buildings
and utilities); medical and relief agency preparedness and response (e.g., estimates of casu‐
alties and homelessness); and assistance planning. [11]
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In this research, I seek to answer five important questions: When are EIMS useful? What are
the essential substructures in an EIMS? What are the important functions of an EIMS? What
are the steps taken to create an EIMS? and How is an EIMS used to prepare for earthquakes?
3. Aim
In this study, the information management networks related to earthquakes in India, Af‐
ghanistan, Japan, and Turkey were compared to Iran to rationally determine the relative
strength of the EIMS in each country. Their weaknesses and strengths were determined.
And several recommendations and a model were developed to eliminate weaknesses, im‐
prove the  efficiency of  EIMS,  reduce damages  and losses  and expedite  relief  to  victims
after earthquakes.
4. Methodology
This research is empirical and the study was an analytical comparison. The data consisted of
the population of EIMS employed in India, Afghanistan, Japan, and Turkey and Iran. These
countries were chosen because they are among the countries with the most experience with
extreme events in Asia, and they all experience devastating earthquakes (Table 1).
To perform this study, I developed forms and questionnaires for data collection through
interviews and observations. The forms were developed to define standard characteristics
of  an information management system by extracting guidelines from the Joint  Commis‐
sion on Accreditation of  Healthcare  Organization (JCAHO),  the  American Health  Infor‐
mation  Management  Association  (AHIMA)  and  Canadian  Council  on  Health  Services
Accreditation (CCHSA) [14] and synthesizing the information. The questionnaire was de‐
signed to acquire the opinions of experts to enable the weighting of each characteristic of
an EIMS. In the first phase of data collection, the forms were validated and the question‐
naire  was  approved.  Internet  sources,  professional  personnel,  documents,  journals  and
books were consulted to develop the data which included EI sources, methods of record‐
ing, storing, retrieving, analyzing, interpreting, and distributing EI, national and interna‐
tional  usage  of  EI,  and  so  on.  The  Criteria  Rating  Technique  [15]  and  the  descriptive
method were  used to  analyze  findings.  Standard characteristics  of  information manage‐
ment systems were selected as criteria.
To  compare  the  importance  of  the  characteristics  of  EIMS,  experts  were  asked  to  set
weights (from 1, of low importance, to 10, of high importance) by brainstorm. The means
of the experts’  opinions of the weight of  each criterion were calculated (Table 2 and 3).
Ratings were established (ratio = weight of each criteria divided by sum) and scales (pos‐
itive = 4,  moderate = 3,  not access = 2,  negative = 1)  and scores (score = ratio*scale)  for
selected countries were calculated.
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books were consulted to develop the data which included EI sources, methods of record‐
ing, storing, retrieving, analyzing, interpreting, and distributing EI, national and interna‐
tional  usage  of  EI,  and  so  on.  The  Criteria  Rating  Technique  [15]  and  the  descriptive
method were  used to  analyze  findings.  Standard characteristics  of  information manage‐
ment systems were selected as criteria.
To  compare  the  importance  of  the  characteristics  of  EIMS,  experts  were  asked  to  set
weights (from 1, of low importance, to 10, of high importance) by brainstorm. The means
of the experts’  opinions of the weight of  each criterion were calculated (Table 2 and 3).
Ratings were established (ratio = weight of each criteria divided by sum) and scales (pos‐
itive = 4,  moderate = 3,  not access = 2,  negative = 1)  and scores (score = ratio*scale)  for
selected countries were calculated.
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Criteria/country Weight Ratio India Afghanistan Iran
Scale Score Scale Score Scale Score
1) Information sources are existed 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 3 0.33
2) Users of EI are specified 6 0.08 4 0.32 3 0.24 3 0.24
3) System has security process 6 0.08 4 0.32 2 0.16 2 0.16
4) EI is recorded and stored
systematically
7 0.09 4 0.36 4 0.36 1 0.09
5) EI is retrieved, analyzed and
interpreted systematically
9 0.12 4 0.48 2 0.24 3 0.36
6) Administrators are specified in various
functions
9 0.12 4 0.48 4 0.48 3 0.36
7) No parallel and repeated activities by
various organizations
5 0.07 4 0.28 4 0.28 1 0.07
8) EI is distributed and used in national
and international levels
6 0.08 4 0.32 4 0.32 3 0.24
9) EIMS has feedback 9 0.12 4 0.48 4 0.48 3 0.36
10) Accessibility of EI is easy and fast 8 0.11 4 0.44 3 0.33 1 0.11
Sum 73 1 4 3.3 2.32
Table 2. The EIMS characteristics evaluating in selected countries
Criteria/country Weight Ratio Japan Turkey Iran
Scale Score Scale Score Scale Score
1) Information sources are exist ed. 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 3 0.33
2) Users of E.I. are specified. 6 0.08 4 0.33 4 0.33 3 0.25
3) System has security process. 6 0.08 2 0.16 4 0.33 2 0.16
4) E.I. is recorded and stored
systematically
7 0.09 4 0.38 4 0.38 1 0.09
5) E.I. is retrieved, analyzed and
interpreted systematically.
9 0.12 4 0.49 4 0.49 3 0.37
6) Administrators are specified in various
functions.
9 0.12 4 0.49 4 0.49 3 0.37
7) No parallel and repeated activities by
various organizations.
5 0.07 4 0.27 4 0.27 1 0.07
8) E.I. is distributed and used in national
& international levels.
6 0.08 4 0.33 4 0.33 3 0.25
9) EIMS has feedback. 9 0.12 4 0.44 4 0.49 3 0.37
10) Accessibility of E.I. is easy and fast. 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 1 0.11
Sum 73 1 3.77 4 2.37
Earthquake Information= EI; Ratio = weight of each criteria/sum; Score = ratio*scale
Scales: Positive = 4, moderate = 3, negative = 1, not access = 2
Range of ranks: 1–1.6: Very weak; 1.7–2.2: Weak; 2.3–2.8: Moderate; 2.9–3.4: Good; 3.5–4: Very good
Table 3. The EIMS characteristics evaluating in selected countries (continued)
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5. Results
The results of the data collection provide answers to the five research questions. Each an‐
swer is described briefly below.
When are EIMS useful? There are four conditions that make EIMS more useful: when infor‐
mation users and addressers are specified; when time, form and the mechanism of informa‐
tion distribution are specified; when the EI is valid and reliable; and when there is fast
access to EI. Furthermore, the data received are often not helpful for management decision
making because they are incomplete, inaccurate, untimely and unrelated to the priority
tasks and functions of crisis management.
What are the essential sub-structures of an EIMS? The information compiled and surveys in‐
dicate that the essential sub-structures that must be addressed or included in an EIMS are
the nature of: crisis management, information technology, the geographic information sys‐
tem, the earthquake information system, mass media communication, cell phone communi‐
cation, capital and human resources.
What are the important functions of an EIMS? This study finds that EIMS are needed: for
fast and easy retrieval of information, which is very difficult; for extraction and access of in‐
formation for managers and related users; for integrating data from different sources; for re‐
duction of parallel and redundant activities by responding organizations; to decrease cost
and time; for assessment and monitoring of plans before and after earthquakes; to identify
training and function needs; and to formulate prevention, action and rehabilitation actions.
What are the steps taken to create an EIMS? The following steps are usually taken: establish
a joint commission of governmental and non-governmental sectors and organizations; deter‐
mine the primary participants in earthquake management; determine and formulate a plan
for a system based on general principles and goals; identify the data needed for the system;
identify the sources for the system’s informatics; identify registration, collection and storage
methods of and administrators for the system; determine the retrieval and analytical meth‐
ods of and administrators for the system; establish the information methods and distribute
them to the administrators of the system; establish methods of systematic communication
among the administrators; create a mechanism to render feedback for system improvement;
and ensure that the system and its plans and functions are dynamic and flexible.
How is an EIMS used to prepare for earthquakes? The first step in preparing for a disaster is
estimate and assess its potential impact. These estimations and assessment can provide the
basis for developing mitigation policy, developing and testing emergency preparedness and
responsing for post-disaster, and reliefing negative outcomes. [16] Reducing earthquake loss
begins before the earthquake. Loss estimates provide public and private sector agencies
with a basis for planning, zoning, building codes and development regulations, and policy
that would reduce the risk posed by violent ground shaking and ground failure. Loss esti‐
mates can also be used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to
strengthening potentially hazardous structures. Preparing to respond, understanding the
scope and complexity of earthquake damage is essential to effective preparedness. The EIMS
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Criteria/country Weight Ratio India Afghanistan Iran
Scale Score Scale Score Scale Score
1) Information sources are existed 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 3 0.33
2) Users of EI are specified 6 0.08 4 0.32 3 0.24 3 0.24
3) System has security process 6 0.08 4 0.32 2 0.16 2 0.16
4) EI is recorded and stored
systematically
7 0.09 4 0.36 4 0.36 1 0.09
5) EI is retrieved, analyzed and
interpreted systematically
9 0.12 4 0.48 2 0.24 3 0.36
6) Administrators are specified in various
functions
9 0.12 4 0.48 4 0.48 3 0.36
7) No parallel and repeated activities by
various organizations
5 0.07 4 0.28 4 0.28 1 0.07
8) EI is distributed and used in national
and international levels
6 0.08 4 0.32 4 0.32 3 0.24
9) EIMS has feedback 9 0.12 4 0.48 4 0.48 3 0.36
10) Accessibility of EI is easy and fast 8 0.11 4 0.44 3 0.33 1 0.11
Sum 73 1 4 3.3 2.32
Table 2. The EIMS characteristics evaluating in selected countries
Criteria/country Weight Ratio Japan Turkey Iran
Scale Score Scale Score Scale Score
1) Information sources are exist ed. 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 3 0.33
2) Users of E.I. are specified. 6 0.08 4 0.33 4 0.33 3 0.25
3) System has security process. 6 0.08 2 0.16 4 0.33 2 0.16
4) E.I. is recorded and stored
systematically
7 0.09 4 0.38 4 0.38 1 0.09
5) E.I. is retrieved, analyzed and
interpreted systematically.
9 0.12 4 0.49 4 0.49 3 0.37
6) Administrators are specified in various
functions.
9 0.12 4 0.49 4 0.49 3 0.37
7) No parallel and repeated activities by
various organizations.
5 0.07 4 0.27 4 0.27 1 0.07
8) E.I. is distributed and used in national
& international levels.
6 0.08 4 0.33 4 0.33 3 0.25
9) EIMS has feedback. 9 0.12 4 0.44 4 0.49 3 0.37
10) Accessibility of E.I. is easy and fast. 8 0.11 4 0.44 4 0.44 1 0.11
Sum 73 1 3.77 4 2.37
Earthquake Information= EI; Ratio = weight of each criteria/sum; Score = ratio*scale
Scales: Positive = 4, moderate = 3, negative = 1, not access = 2
Range of ranks: 1–1.6: Very weak; 1.7–2.2: Weak; 2.3–2.8: Moderate; 2.9–3.4: Good; 3.5–4: Very good
Table 3. The EIMS characteristics evaluating in selected countries (continued)
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5. Results
The results of the data collection provide answers to the five research questions. Each an‐
swer is described briefly below.
When are EIMS useful? There are four conditions that make EIMS more useful: when infor‐
mation users and addressers are specified; when time, form and the mechanism of informa‐
tion distribution are specified; when the EI is valid and reliable; and when there is fast
access to EI. Furthermore, the data received are often not helpful for management decision
making because they are incomplete, inaccurate, untimely and unrelated to the priority
tasks and functions of crisis management.
What are the essential sub-structures of an EIMS? The information compiled and surveys in‐
dicate that the essential sub-structures that must be addressed or included in an EIMS are
the nature of: crisis management, information technology, the geographic information sys‐
tem, the earthquake information system, mass media communication, cell phone communi‐
cation, capital and human resources.
What are the important functions of an EIMS? This study finds that EIMS are needed: for
fast and easy retrieval of information, which is very difficult; for extraction and access of in‐
formation for managers and related users; for integrating data from different sources; for re‐
duction of parallel and redundant activities by responding organizations; to decrease cost
and time; for assessment and monitoring of plans before and after earthquakes; to identify
training and function needs; and to formulate prevention, action and rehabilitation actions.
What are the steps taken to create an EIMS? The following steps are usually taken: establish
a joint commission of governmental and non-governmental sectors and organizations; deter‐
mine the primary participants in earthquake management; determine and formulate a plan
for a system based on general principles and goals; identify the data needed for the system;
identify the sources for the system’s informatics; identify registration, collection and storage
methods of and administrators for the system; determine the retrieval and analytical meth‐
ods of and administrators for the system; establish the information methods and distribute
them to the administrators of the system; establish methods of systematic communication
among the administrators; create a mechanism to render feedback for system improvement;
and ensure that the system and its plans and functions are dynamic and flexible.
How is an EIMS used to prepare for earthquakes? The first step in preparing for a disaster is
estimate and assess its potential impact. These estimations and assessment can provide the
basis for developing mitigation policy, developing and testing emergency preparedness and
responsing for post-disaster, and reliefing negative outcomes. [16] Reducing earthquake loss
begins before the earthquake. Loss estimates provide public and private sector agencies
with a basis for planning, zoning, building codes and development regulations, and policy
that would reduce the risk posed by violent ground shaking and ground failure. Loss esti‐
mates can also be used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to
strengthening potentially hazardous structures. Preparing to respond, understanding the
scope and complexity of earthquake damage is essential to effective preparedness. The EIMS
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can forecast damage to buildings, casualties and disruption of utilities. These estimates can
serve as the basis for developing emergency response plans and for organizing tests and ex‐
ercises of response capability.
6. About EIMS
Beginning in the late 1950s, planners began development and use of computerized models,
planning information systems and decision-support systems to improve EI management
performance. They have found tools to enhance their analytical and geospatial technologies
which may be different from one country to another. The industrialized nations are well
adapted to this information technology. They use it in many fields. Governments apply ur‐
ban information systems in all aspects of the planning process, including data collection,
storage, data analysis and presentation, planning and policymaking, communication with
the public, policy implementation and administration. The United States is the pioneer in
this field. They began working with urban information systems in the 1970s. Canada and
Australia have developed systems. And European countries like France, Germany and the
Netherlands have been successful in applying these technologies. Turkey is a latecomer in
this field because of financial constraints, their other priorities, a lack of technical expertise
and different administrative mentalities. But today, the urban information system is a popu‐
lar notion among local governments in Turkey. The first initiative of local governments to
use urban information systems was in the cities Bursa and Ayden beginning in the
mid-1990s. Since then three other metropolitan municipalities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir,
studied the digitization of maps and plans and began to create inventories of their cities.
In India, findings showed that the Disaster Information Management System (DIMS) was
launched by SRISTI. The SRISTI participated in relief and rehabilitation work in Kutch.
However, their relief work suffered immensely due to lack of information and proper plan‐
ning. When answers to important questions that were cropping up were needed – for in‐
stance, whether there is a database on the distribution of available resources and expertise
with individuals, institutions and corporations – SRISTI discovered the information wasn’t
available. This revealed the need for a system for disaster mitigation and for documenting
the experiences of individuals and organizations, which might provide a knowledge data‐
base that can assist coordination in future disasters. Thus, SRISTI initiated an effort to build
a “Disaster Management Information System.” Through this initiative, the development of a
database-driven information system for Disaster Management Authorities (DMA) in various
states, NGOs and other organizations is underway. SRISTI appealed to NGOs, relief work‐
ers, DMAs and individuals to share their experiences and volunteer their services and re‐
sources to the online database maintained on the SRISTI website. The database currently
contains information from more than a thousand volunteers who have offered their services
and resources in times of emergency. About 700 organizations and institutions are indexed
on the site, as are other resources and web links. The DMIS is a voluntary activity run with
in kind contributions of time and services by SRISTI volunteers, NGOs and, above all, civil
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institutions across the world. All the information shared with us is accessible to all, except in
cases in which the volunteer has chosen to limit access to the relevant authorities. [17-18]
7. EIMS in Afghanistan
Our research reinforces the belief that Afghanistan possesses the potential for many natural
disasters. Therefore, a DIMS, especially an EIMS, would be particularly helpful. Disaster
management is a needs a wide variety of information, needs to track different locations and
during different periods, and this information must have a set format in order that key staff
can employ the information in decisions. A new project named “Management Information
for Natural Disasters” (MIND) in Kabul and Kunduz provinces in Afghanistan has been op‐
erating since the beginning of 2012 and has been doing well for the last 8 months. Its goal
was to establish and expand a crisis information management system. It is frequently updat‐
ed and provides information to governments. MIND has increased Afghanistan’s crisis
management capacity nationally, supporting the training of disaster managers and improv‐
ing city services by building governmental organizations in management information for
natural disasters. Natural disaster management in these two provinces is primarily guided
by estimates of damages which are used to direct rescue operations. There is currently no
system to avoid or decrease disaster damages. Before and after a disaster, management is
very weak in these countries and they are therefore dependent on the UN or NGOs for re‐
sponse. Information needed for the EIMS includes the availability and distribution of re‐
sponse personnel and spatial information stored in GIS to determine the areas of greatest
destruction and locations of great danger. In this system, satellite data are crucial for identi‐
fication of crisis locations and understanding their distribution. [17,19] To record the infor‐
mation that is acquired, an Information System Unit is trained to input data and information
and to manage stations of the informative system. The DIMS for earthquakes has tended to
not be useful in many parts of the country primarily because of the lack of timely informa‐
tion from disaster areas.
8. EIMS in Japan
The Japanese DIMS is called “PHOENIX” (Preement Hyogos Emergency Management
Network for  Disaster  Information Exchange).  [20]  In  this  system,  information about  the
amount and degree of earthquake damages and on-going developments of conditions in
a  disaster  area  are  collected  and  processed.  Information  is  provided  by  agencies,  in‐
volved organizations, individuals (including those from governments, experts, volunteers
and others),  monitoring  stations  and other  data  sources  employing several  communica‐
tion methods (including the Internet, radio, print, televison and satellite).  Recording and
collecting  earthquake  information is  centralize  by  informatics  centers  of  local  society  of
province.  Japan’s  Red Cross,  Rescue  Team,  NGOs,  health  organizations  and others  [21]
do the estimating, calculating, and publishing of the information that is needed, and they
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can forecast damage to buildings, casualties and disruption of utilities. These estimates can
serve as the basis for developing emergency response plans and for organizing tests and ex‐
ercises of response capability.
6. About EIMS
Beginning in the late 1950s, planners began development and use of computerized models,
planning information systems and decision-support systems to improve EI management
performance. They have found tools to enhance their analytical and geospatial technologies
which may be different from one country to another. The industrialized nations are well
adapted to this information technology. They use it in many fields. Governments apply ur‐
ban information systems in all aspects of the planning process, including data collection,
storage, data analysis and presentation, planning and policymaking, communication with
the public, policy implementation and administration. The United States is the pioneer in
this field. They began working with urban information systems in the 1970s. Canada and
Australia have developed systems. And European countries like France, Germany and the
Netherlands have been successful in applying these technologies. Turkey is a latecomer in
this field because of financial constraints, their other priorities, a lack of technical expertise
and different administrative mentalities. But today, the urban information system is a popu‐
lar notion among local governments in Turkey. The first initiative of local governments to
use urban information systems was in the cities Bursa and Ayden beginning in the
mid-1990s. Since then three other metropolitan municipalities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir,
studied the digitization of maps and plans and began to create inventories of their cities.
In India, findings showed that the Disaster Information Management System (DIMS) was
launched by SRISTI. The SRISTI participated in relief and rehabilitation work in Kutch.
However, their relief work suffered immensely due to lack of information and proper plan‐
ning. When answers to important questions that were cropping up were needed – for in‐
stance, whether there is a database on the distribution of available resources and expertise
with individuals, institutions and corporations – SRISTI discovered the information wasn’t
available. This revealed the need for a system for disaster mitigation and for documenting
the experiences of individuals and organizations, which might provide a knowledge data‐
base that can assist coordination in future disasters. Thus, SRISTI initiated an effort to build
a “Disaster Management Information System.” Through this initiative, the development of a
database-driven information system for Disaster Management Authorities (DMA) in various
states, NGOs and other organizations is underway. SRISTI appealed to NGOs, relief work‐
ers, DMAs and individuals to share their experiences and volunteer their services and re‐
sources to the online database maintained on the SRISTI website. The database currently
contains information from more than a thousand volunteers who have offered their services
and resources in times of emergency. About 700 organizations and institutions are indexed
on the site, as are other resources and web links. The DMIS is a voluntary activity run with
in kind contributions of time and services by SRISTI volunteers, NGOs and, above all, civil
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institutions across the world. All the information shared with us is accessible to all, except in
cases in which the volunteer has chosen to limit access to the relevant authorities. [17-18]
7. EIMS in Afghanistan
Our research reinforces the belief that Afghanistan possesses the potential for many natural
disasters. Therefore, a DIMS, especially an EIMS, would be particularly helpful. Disaster
management is a needs a wide variety of information, needs to track different locations and
during different periods, and this information must have a set format in order that key staff
can employ the information in decisions. A new project named “Management Information
for Natural Disasters” (MIND) in Kabul and Kunduz provinces in Afghanistan has been op‐
erating since the beginning of 2012 and has been doing well for the last 8 months. Its goal
was to establish and expand a crisis information management system. It is frequently updat‐
ed and provides information to governments. MIND has increased Afghanistan’s crisis
management capacity nationally, supporting the training of disaster managers and improv‐
ing city services by building governmental organizations in management information for
natural disasters. Natural disaster management in these two provinces is primarily guided
by estimates of damages which are used to direct rescue operations. There is currently no
system to avoid or decrease disaster damages. Before and after a disaster, management is
very weak in these countries and they are therefore dependent on the UN or NGOs for re‐
sponse. Information needed for the EIMS includes the availability and distribution of re‐
sponse personnel and spatial information stored in GIS to determine the areas of greatest
destruction and locations of great danger. In this system, satellite data are crucial for identi‐
fication of crisis locations and understanding their distribution. [17,19] To record the infor‐
mation that is acquired, an Information System Unit is trained to input data and information
and to manage stations of the informative system. The DIMS for earthquakes has tended to
not be useful in many parts of the country primarily because of the lack of timely informa‐
tion from disaster areas.
8. EIMS in Japan
The Japanese DIMS is called “PHOENIX” (Preement Hyogos Emergency Management
Network for  Disaster  Information Exchange).  [20]  In  this  system,  information about  the
amount and degree of earthquake damages and on-going developments of conditions in
a  disaster  area  are  collected  and  processed.  Information  is  provided  by  agencies,  in‐
volved organizations, individuals (including those from governments, experts, volunteers
and others),  monitoring  stations  and other  data  sources  employing several  communica‐
tion methods (including the Internet, radio, print, televison and satellite).  Recording and
collecting  earthquake  information is  centralize  by  informatics  centers  of  local  society  of
province.  Japan’s  Red Cross,  Rescue  Team,  NGOs,  health  organizations  and others  [21]
do the estimating, calculating, and publishing of the information that is needed, and they
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send them to the relevant agencies.  PHOENIX crisis management is  designed for access
and  use  by  individuals,  local  communities  and  the  national  government.  All  satellite,
land-based and atmospheric data will be transmitted over the Internet and displayed on
local pages for Hyogo people. This system has been established for the entirety of Japan.
[20] The Hygo Province crisis  management network is  directly supervised by the prime
minister  and his/her  ministry.  According to their  documents,  this  system has been very
successful. So it is expected that after they have completed their analysis, the system will
be on-line for local, national and international users. [20]
9. EIMS in Turkey
Our findings reveals that every governmental office in Turkey has begun development of
electronic systems to meet their needs. Hence, e-government has become an important tool.
As a result, the Turkish government has resolved to provide public services online in ac‐
cordance with EU targets. As a part of this process, the prime ministry of Turkey has chosen
Istanbul as a pilot-project area where many complex governmental tasks are carried out.
Turkey is situated in an extremely active seismic zone. Since Istanbul has been growing rap‐
idly without proper planning, great precautions should be taken to mitigate and prepare for
future disasters. Therefore, Turkey has committed to build a natural disaster management
information system immediately and it is called AFAYBIS. AFAYBIS is designed as a minor
part of their e-Government system. It was based upon the information acquired in surveyes
of government and private-sector data providers. The system will use geographical analysis
to identify the regions with the greatest disaster potential. The project is also intended to
quickly and effectively create a tool for management of response and relief during and after
disasters. After an analysis of the current state of affairs was completed, the data and the
data sources were identified. The system is designed as two parts: a database and a commu‐
nication system. The communications component is to constantly update data before disas‐
ters and to provide continuous supply of data. Consequently this disaster information
system is designed according to the standards of the Turkish e-government, which is always
intended to be up-to-date. The disaster management information system that has been de‐
veloped to solve this problem will result in optimum efficiency during disaster. This system
contains the structure that determines its relationships to data and access to its information,
disaster management communication, risk mitigation and disaster preparation, and post-
disaster coordination of the prime minister, governors and other institutions. The services
and duties of the institutions are also developed into the system so as to avoid modification
of their existent organizational structures. [22] Earthquake management in Turkey, without
exception, is a problem. It is unsystematic, unplanned, static and awareness of it is low.
10. EIMS in Iran
Disaster management systems are often designed because of the lack local management.
Disasters are managed nationally in Iran and such management tends to cause disasters to
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spread, impacting many more people. [1] Despite the national approach, there is no official
department called the “Department of Earthquake Information Management System.” There
is an EIMS. Information has been recorded by hand or using computers. Management of dis‐
asters has been done through the crisis office of the health ministry. All of the universities of
Iran and the health minister are responsible for information management. This system is
equipped to communicate information from crisis offices in the country’s universities. After
an earthquake, these units are prepared to produce up-to-date information (about hospitals,
the Red Crescent Society, ambulances, facilities and other important resources) and report it
to the crisis-control office. In universities, the crisis rooms are expected to report information
as rapidly as possible. The EIMS in Iran tended to be incapable of reporting important infor‐
mation that was needed in advance of, during and after earthquakes. Defective, insufficient
and inaccurate registration of data, declaration and publication of different and contradicto‐
ry population data and a lack of reliable information disabled the development of preventa‐
tive systemic planning. To make an EIMS work in Iran, we need to provide support for
managers, and to do this, modified model of the EIMS should be designed. [1] The modified
model includes information about: the responsible organizations, their functions, and the
work-flow that were reflected in the Delphi Technique.
We offer a model that shows the relationships between organizations related to the EIMS in
Iran (Figure 1). In this model, the responsibility and function of every organization is deter‐
mined. These duties are classified according to registration and collection of earthquake da‐
ta, the storage and processing of these data, and the analysis and distribution of information
and recommendations produced by the EIMS.
11. Evaluating the effectiveness of EIMS design in each country
The highest sum of scores of the effectiveness of EIMS are found in India and the lowest
in Iran (Table 2 and 3). The weaknesses of EIMS are found in that: the EI stores system‐
atically, there are parallel and repeated activities by various organizations, and the access
to the EI is not easy and nor fast, particularly in Iran’s EIMS. In the range of ranks, Af‐
ghanistan’s and India’s systems were classified in the very good range and Iran’s was in
the moderate range. [17]
The use of mass media is imperative for communicating news and information to the public.
Responsible journalism can also help to clear up inaccurate rumors and to influence the pub‐
lic’s attitude toward preparing for disasters. Moreover, press coverage of old disasters may
provide good data to fill the gaps in circumstances where official records do not exist. How‐
ever, this study has revealed that the press has largely failed in terms of guidance toward
disaster mitigation and preparedness. It seems that media are more interested in reporting
disastrous news than informing the public of ways to avoid disasters. The Turkish media
has been more influential in urging both the public and government officials to prepare for
the earthquakes. Television appears to be a more effective tool to achieve this. [23]
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send them to the relevant agencies.  PHOENIX crisis management is  designed for access
and  use  by  individuals,  local  communities  and  the  national  government.  All  satellite,
land-based and atmospheric data will be transmitted over the Internet and displayed on
local pages for Hyogo people. This system has been established for the entirety of Japan.
[20] The Hygo Province crisis  management network is  directly supervised by the prime
minister  and his/her  ministry.  According to their  documents,  this  system has been very
successful. So it is expected that after they have completed their analysis, the system will
be on-line for local, national and international users. [20]
9. EIMS in Turkey
Our findings reveals that every governmental office in Turkey has begun development of
electronic systems to meet their needs. Hence, e-government has become an important tool.
As a result, the Turkish government has resolved to provide public services online in ac‐
cordance with EU targets. As a part of this process, the prime ministry of Turkey has chosen
Istanbul as a pilot-project area where many complex governmental tasks are carried out.
Turkey is situated in an extremely active seismic zone. Since Istanbul has been growing rap‐
idly without proper planning, great precautions should be taken to mitigate and prepare for
future disasters. Therefore, Turkey has committed to build a natural disaster management
information system immediately and it is called AFAYBIS. AFAYBIS is designed as a minor
part of their e-Government system. It was based upon the information acquired in surveyes
of government and private-sector data providers. The system will use geographical analysis
to identify the regions with the greatest disaster potential. The project is also intended to
quickly and effectively create a tool for management of response and relief during and after
disasters. After an analysis of the current state of affairs was completed, the data and the
data sources were identified. The system is designed as two parts: a database and a commu‐
nication system. The communications component is to constantly update data before disas‐
ters and to provide continuous supply of data. Consequently this disaster information
system is designed according to the standards of the Turkish e-government, which is always
intended to be up-to-date. The disaster management information system that has been de‐
veloped to solve this problem will result in optimum efficiency during disaster. This system
contains the structure that determines its relationships to data and access to its information,
disaster management communication, risk mitigation and disaster preparation, and post-
disaster coordination of the prime minister, governors and other institutions. The services
and duties of the institutions are also developed into the system so as to avoid modification
of their existent organizational structures. [22] Earthquake management in Turkey, without
exception, is a problem. It is unsystematic, unplanned, static and awareness of it is low.
10. EIMS in Iran
Disaster management systems are often designed because of the lack local management.
Disasters are managed nationally in Iran and such management tends to cause disasters to
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spread, impacting many more people. [1] Despite the national approach, there is no official
department called the “Department of Earthquake Information Management System.” There
is an EIMS. Information has been recorded by hand or using computers. Management of dis‐
asters has been done through the crisis office of the health ministry. All of the universities of
Iran and the health minister are responsible for information management. This system is
equipped to communicate information from crisis offices in the country’s universities. After
an earthquake, these units are prepared to produce up-to-date information (about hospitals,
the Red Crescent Society, ambulances, facilities and other important resources) and report it
to the crisis-control office. In universities, the crisis rooms are expected to report information
as rapidly as possible. The EIMS in Iran tended to be incapable of reporting important infor‐
mation that was needed in advance of, during and after earthquakes. Defective, insufficient
and inaccurate registration of data, declaration and publication of different and contradicto‐
ry population data and a lack of reliable information disabled the development of preventa‐
tive systemic planning. To make an EIMS work in Iran, we need to provide support for
managers, and to do this, modified model of the EIMS should be designed. [1] The modified
model includes information about: the responsible organizations, their functions, and the
work-flow that were reflected in the Delphi Technique.
We offer a model that shows the relationships between organizations related to the EIMS in
Iran (Figure 1). In this model, the responsibility and function of every organization is deter‐
mined. These duties are classified according to registration and collection of earthquake da‐
ta, the storage and processing of these data, and the analysis and distribution of information
and recommendations produced by the EIMS.
11. Evaluating the effectiveness of EIMS design in each country
The highest sum of scores of the effectiveness of EIMS are found in India and the lowest
in Iran (Table 2 and 3). The weaknesses of EIMS are found in that: the EI stores system‐
atically, there are parallel and repeated activities by various organizations, and the access
to the EI is not easy and nor fast, particularly in Iran’s EIMS. In the range of ranks, Af‐
ghanistan’s and India’s systems were classified in the very good range and Iran’s was in
the moderate range. [17]
The use of mass media is imperative for communicating news and information to the public.
Responsible journalism can also help to clear up inaccurate rumors and to influence the pub‐
lic’s attitude toward preparing for disasters. Moreover, press coverage of old disasters may
provide good data to fill the gaps in circumstances where official records do not exist. How‐
ever, this study has revealed that the press has largely failed in terms of guidance toward
disaster mitigation and preparedness. It seems that media are more interested in reporting
disastrous news than informing the public of ways to avoid disasters. The Turkish media
has been more influential in urging both the public and government officials to prepare for
the earthquakes. Television appears to be a more effective tool to achieve this. [23]
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Figure 1. The proposed model of EIMS that shows process of relationships between organizations related to EIMS in Iran
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) is responsible for producing EI and tsunami fore‐
casts and they have developed an earthquake notification system in Japan. At present, JMA
issues the following kinds of information successively when a large earthquake occurs:
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prompt reports of the occurrence of large earthquakes and major seismic intensities caused
by earthquakes within about 2 minutes after the earthquake; tsunami forecasts in around 3
minutes; expected arrival times and maximum heights of tsunami waves in around 5 mi‐
nutes; and location of the hypocenter and the magnitude of the earthquake, intensity at each
observation station, times of high tides and the expected tsunami arrival times within 5–7
minutes. To issue the above information, JMA has established an advanced nationwide seis‐
mic network with about 180 stations for seismic-wave observation and about 3400 stations
for instrumental seismic intensity observation, in addition to the approximately 2800 seismic
intensity stations maintained by local governments. [24]
12. Conclusion
The initial effort to systematically collect and analyze data in developing countries should
be undertaken by national program managers. Based on our investigation of current earth‐
quake information management in India, Afghanistan and Iran, we can stress the need for
further development of EIMS because of: the critical need for the information that must be
gathered; a concern about continuous improvement of the data made available; its ability to
help manage emergency response and relief in natural disasters (through more rapid availa‐
bility and retrieval in an EI); a need for timely reporting and feedback to managers; the need
to analyze information and render reports that define strengths, weaknesses, threats and op‐
portunities; the need for monitoring the status of healthcare services and the needs of such
services; the crucial need to coordinate activities between government and non-governmen‐
tal sectors through the EIMS; the need to reduce deaths and establish health priorities and
planning to decrease mortality after future earthquakes; the ability to use the outcomes of
crisis to determine the causes of earthquake mortalities and other problems in order to pre‐
vent future impacts; and the need to formulate strategies for disease prevention and to re‐
duce preventable deaths in earthquake zones.
A rapid response to a damaging earthquake will  reduce the loss of life,  lessen the com‐
plications that stem from injuries and secondary damage, and expedite relief  to victims.
Reliable  and  up-to-date  information  can  have  an  impact  on  the  mitigation  of  risk  and
prevention of  disaster.  Because of  the financial  and human costs  of  disasters,  the estab‐
lishment  of  a  general,  scientific  and  practical  earthquake  information  management  net‐
work is desperately needed.
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1. Introduction
The background for this study is in the complex and fragmented business environment of today
when many organisations are interdependent from each other across the globe thus making it
harder for companies to insulate themselves against a crisis event [1]. Furthermore, the media
of today is ready to inform us of any critical events around the world at a moment’s notice [2,
3]. The ‘everyone can be a journalist’ culture is encouraged by popular media requesting
photographs and video footage from individuals currently caught in an unexpected chain of
events. Today, words like ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ are featured in everyday vocabulary to grab
attention, thus resulting in a depreciation of the actual meaning of this term. Overall, an
atmosphere hungry for crisis has been created.
At the same time, there has been a plethora of international crisis demonstrating how fragile
the business environment can be. The most cited crises have been caused by nature (e.g.
tsunami, hurricanes, bushfires, floods or disease) or by man (e.g. terrorism and the current
Economic Tsunami).  In this  environment,  the Hotel  Managers’  duty of  care should also
involve  planning  and  preparing  for  unforeseen  events;  running  ‘what  if’  scenarios,
designing action plans for all departments, allocating individual responsibilities; building
back-up  capacity  and  training  their  staff  to  respond  in  appropriate  manner  to  security
concerns.  Therefore,  the aim  of  this  paper is  to highlight good procedures already prac‐
ticed  by  hotels  participating  in  this  study.  The  study Methodology  consisted  of  in-depth
interviews with Hotel Managers or Hotel Security Managers located in Hong Kong, London
and Finland. Many of these hotels were associated with large multinational chains and the
most  of  the interviewees had managed a variety of  crises situation,  often in contrasting
cultural or geographical locations.
© 2013 Niininen; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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This paper is set out in the following structure: the basic crisis management concepts are
outlined and applied to the tourism (and hospitality) settings. This is followed by a brief outline
of the methodology utilised. The findings/discussion section is structured to reflect the key
practical tips offered by the interviewees: ‘Being prepared for crisis situations’; ‘Managing costs
during crisis’; ‘Make full use of local advice’; ‘Maintaining good communication with guests’ and how
to ‘Use technology to enhance hotel security’.
2. Crisis management
Crisis management has its roots in strategic planning incorporating contingencies for unex‐
pected events. The challenge for organisations is to recognise the early ‘warning signals’ and
take appropriate action. Crisis can be classified by several variables: those resulting from internal
actions of the company vs. trends taking place in the market place or changes in the immediate
environment outside the organisation. Another approach to crisis classification is: the crisis that
can be managed vs. crisis that manage us [the organisation][3].
Generally speaking, crisis as an event is characterised by its unexpected nature inflicting severe
impact on those involved. Moreover, a crisis typically demonstrates the characteristics of
suddenness, uncertainty and time compression thus demanding immediate action from the
manager – often the crisis management decision-making is also based on incomplete facts [4,
5]. How any of these challenges are managed can determine the magnitude of the impact a
crisis will have on the organisation. Prompt and expertly dealings with a crisis situation and
those affected by this crisis can also open new opportunities for future business success [6].
Unfortunately the crisis reported in the news today will inevitably result in some financial
losses as well as human suffering. As a result some businesses will be closed or relocated. The
cynics amongst us argue that the crisis simply brought forward what was inevitable and that
a ‘natural process of weeding out the weak’ has taken place.
Regrettably crisis events are commonplace, [7] as organisations are regularly dealing with the
pre-crisis; during-crisis or post-crisis issues thus highlighting the need for an early ‘diagnosis
and treatment’ of a crisis to reduce the negative impact to the company. Moreover, a crisis can
also be a chain of events that are impossible to control or plan for, thus resulting in ‘death or
significant injuries’ to those involved, disrupt the business operations as well as damage to or
destruction of company assets. In other words, a crisis situation turns ‘business as normal’ into
impossibility [3, 6].
Tourism as  an industry  has  many characteristics  that  can make a  crisis  more  probable,
magnify the impacts of a crisis and attract extreme media coverage for the event. Firstly,
tourism is big business and often cited as the ‘largest peacetime industry’ [8] and tourism
is also advocated as the industry offering sustainable (and quick yielding)  development
opportunities  to  the  least  developed countries.  Secondly,  the  tourism industry is  highly
integrated with several other industries. In other words, the ripples of a crisis event from
the  hotels’  supply  chain  can  result  in  a  flood  of  issues/problems  for  the  business  of
providing hospitality [1]. Thirdly, the tourism industry is about the movement of people
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(i.e. all  individuals with the means and motive to travel are potential tourists).  Thus the
variety of  psychological  or  social  responses to unexpected events  from the guests  of  an
international hotel will challenge even the ‘best laid [crisis] plans’ as well as the communi‐
cations  skills  of  experienced  PR  Managers  to  maintain  calm  [2].  Fourthly,  since  the
consumption  of  a  tourism product  requires  the  customer  to  travel  to  a  destination  the
demand for  tourism products  is  sensitive  to  reports  on  security  and health  issues;  and
finally, many tourists are attracted to fragile locales particularly vulnerable to the forces of
nature (e.g. tropical weather, proximity to sea and even seismic activity) or destination with
low degree of infrastructure development (so called ‘unspoilt’ destinations) [5, 9-11].
Moreover, tourism participation is a discretionary activity for most international travelers,
many countries (or destinations) have invested heavily on new campaigns in order to acquire
the misplaced inbound tourists or to generate alternative demand from domestic travelers [12,
13]. Therefore, in tourism industry, ‘… it is no longer a question whether [a crisis] will arise,
but when and how it will be dealt with’ [7] therefore hotels’ crisis plans should be more generic
in nature, thus offering personnel accepted behavioural protocols without attempting to script
for every eventuality. The wide variety of potential crisis in the hospitality industry also
supports this argument.
3. Methodology
The findings in this paper are based on in-depth interviews conducted during October 2008.
Non-probability sampling was used to select locations due to the range of past crisis events
varying from financial crisis (e.g. current financial crisis worldwide and the financial crisis in
Finland in the early nineties), health concerns (e.g. SARS reports linked to Hong Kong) to
terrorism (e.g. the UK and London) reported in those locations. At each city, major stakeholders
from educational institutions to trade associations were approached to request contact details
for hotel managers willing to participate in research projects. Individual interview requests
were made through e-mail and the final number of interviews conducted was 12 (three in Hong
Kong; six in London and three in Helsinki).
Each  respondent  received  the  planned  interview  questions  in  advance  together  with
background  information  for  this  study  and  the  University  research  ethics  procedures.
Although General Managers were approached initially, in some cases the interview request
was  delegated to  the  Head of  Hotel  Security  thus  resulting  in  a  mixture  of  nine  Hotel
Managers and three Hotel Security experts. Collectively, the respondents hold decades of
crisis management experience across the world with focus on the hospitality industry as
well as other segments of the security industry like Police or Fire departments. Naturally,
the personal crisis experience of each person influenced the examples and policies highlight‐
ed by each individual thus making the data more rich. The ‘default’ identification for each
respondent was to code them by location e.g. ‘Hotel A, HK’ or ‘Hotel K, UK’ etc.
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during crisis’; ‘Make full use of local advice’; ‘Maintaining good communication with guests’ and how
to ‘Use technology to enhance hotel security’.
2. Crisis management
Crisis management has its roots in strategic planning incorporating contingencies for unex‐
pected events. The challenge for organisations is to recognise the early ‘warning signals’ and
take appropriate action. Crisis can be classified by several variables: those resulting from internal
actions of the company vs. trends taking place in the market place or changes in the immediate
environment outside the organisation. Another approach to crisis classification is: the crisis that
can be managed vs. crisis that manage us [the organisation][3].
Generally speaking, crisis as an event is characterised by its unexpected nature inflicting severe
impact on those involved. Moreover, a crisis typically demonstrates the characteristics of
suddenness, uncertainty and time compression thus demanding immediate action from the
manager – often the crisis management decision-making is also based on incomplete facts [4,
5]. How any of these challenges are managed can determine the magnitude of the impact a
crisis will have on the organisation. Prompt and expertly dealings with a crisis situation and
those affected by this crisis can also open new opportunities for future business success [6].
Unfortunately the crisis reported in the news today will inevitably result in some financial
losses as well as human suffering. As a result some businesses will be closed or relocated. The
cynics amongst us argue that the crisis simply brought forward what was inevitable and that
a ‘natural process of weeding out the weak’ has taken place.
Regrettably crisis events are commonplace, [7] as organisations are regularly dealing with the
pre-crisis; during-crisis or post-crisis issues thus highlighting the need for an early ‘diagnosis
and treatment’ of a crisis to reduce the negative impact to the company. Moreover, a crisis can
also be a chain of events that are impossible to control or plan for, thus resulting in ‘death or
significant injuries’ to those involved, disrupt the business operations as well as damage to or
destruction of company assets. In other words, a crisis situation turns ‘business as normal’ into
impossibility [3, 6].
Tourism as  an industry  has  many characteristics  that  can make a  crisis  more  probable,
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opportunities  to  the  least  developed countries.  Secondly,  the  tourism industry is  highly
integrated with several other industries. In other words, the ripples of a crisis event from
the  hotels’  supply  chain  can  result  in  a  flood  of  issues/problems  for  the  business  of
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the personal crisis experience of each person influenced the examples and policies highlight‐
ed by each individual thus making the data more rich. The ‘default’ identification for each
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4. Findings and discussion
The first observation during the data collection process was how well prepared all hotels
interviewed were. Most interviewees arrived with their crisis management plans, in one
incident; a major evacuation practice was due to take place later on the same day.
The probability of incidents or crisis events taking place in a hotel increases with the volume
of business and the size of the establishment; ‘when the company [the hotel or the chain of
hotels] provides thousands of bed nights every year, something is likely to happen’. One
important contributor to hospitality industry incidents or crises are the guests or visitors to
the property. The Hotel Manager can select their staff members and train them to respond to
events in the desired way. Unfortunately, such luxury does not always exist with the visitors
and guests. This is not to say that the visitors would be deliberately causing harm but the
mixture of varying cultural norms, language barriers and lack of understanding of the
prevailing condition can confuse the guests, thus causing an incident or making the crisis
control extremely difficult for the hotel employees [2]. However, clever use of the extended
Marketing Mix resulting in the market positioning, the rates charged as well as the physical
evidence of the hotel can, on one hand, discourage segments that might not respond well to the
guidance by the hotel employees. On the other hand, the physical evidence evident in a 5* hotel
can also have a surreal calming effect on visitors not used to such luxury and formality possibly
resulting in the incidental visitor to ‘be on their best behaviour’. Furthermore, policies like ‘no
Buck’s nights’ as well as good records of past visitors can also be used to discourage segments
outside the hotel’s target market.
The reported crises experienced by the respondents can be classified as internal (within their
property) and external (outside their property). The internal crises varied from technical/
power failures to death of a hotel guest and the external crises varied from mass cancellation
of hotel bookings due to the current financial crisis, to accidental or deliberate incidents of
vehicles crashing into the hotel buildings (such deliberate damage to the hotel property and
risking of human lives would be classified as terrorism) (Hotel A, HK).
All respondents referred to the Hotel Manager’s responsibility for the well being and safety
of staff and guests. In fact the Hotel Manager’s duty of care was the most commonly cited
expression across all interviews. Another conclusion from the data collected is that hotel
security was often delegated to individuals who already had responsibility for Occupational
Health and Safety (OHS). Furthermore, basic hotel security training was also cited to be part
of the overall induction to new staff members (Hotel L, UK).
4.1. Being prepared for crisis situations
All respondents advocated the importance of being prepared for crisis situations and most
respondents arrived to the interview with their Crisis Preparation Manuals. Furthermore, in
one hotel, a crisis response practice was scheduled to take place shortly after the interview.
The obvious/visual display of security measures (e.g. metal detectors at the entrance) is
appropriate for specific target segments or situations only. The examples illustrated the varied
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degree of security measures needed for mega events like the 2012 London Olympics (all
London respondents) and offering hotel services to the top politicians in the EU or other VIP
guests (Hotel E, Finland). In such instances the security protocols are set externally and
specialist security personnel is provided by the event organisers. A more common request for
additional security takes place when a corporate client uses the hotels conference facilities for
a strategically significant meeting. In these situations public access to some parts of the hotel
may be restricted (Hotel D, Finland).
The day-to-day security operations included the ‘secondary’ security role assigned to most
front  line  employees.  This  approach allows for  a  more  discrete  security  operations  and
maintaining the appropriate quality of service. For example, the concierge limits the access
to the hotel  by suspicious individuals  (Hotel  D,  Finland and Hotel  L,  UK) and front  of
house  personnel  diplomatically  offering  assistance  to  visitors  who  do  not  seem  to  be‐
long.  Such helpful  attention to visitors was also experienced by me as the ‘out of  place
interviewer’.
4.2. Managing costs during crisis
Managing costs effectively during any crisis is probably the key to being able to remain in
business during and after crisis, as any reduction in hotel occupancy rates will translate into
a drop in the revenues. However, this cost saving exercise should be conducted in a way that
allows the hotel to bounce back quickly once the demand for their services returns. For
example, short term cost cutting can result in years of Good Will from all stakeholders
disappearing, thus resulting in difficulty in securing supplies and recruiting personnel after
the crisis is over. A key cost area for service industries is the payroll, therefore if substantial
cost cutting is required to survive the current crisis. Therefore, the Hotel Manager will need
to ‘look for ways of reducing costs whilst maintaining their support to the staff’ (Hotel C, HK).
The labour cost and capacity can be reduced by asking volunteers to take vacation during crisis
(Hotel B, HK) or by changing operating procedures (Hotel C, HK). Another response to a crisis
event is to stop recruiting (Hotel G, UK).
Moreover, a significant drop in demand and revenues due to a crisis will also require cutting
costs in any area possible. For example, the supply costs for power and/or electricity can be
managed by closing areas of the property; e.g. by closing a floor and concentrating the guests
accommodation in dedicated areas will save power and allow for better utilisation of staff
(Hotel B, HK). By concentrating the fewer visitors to specific areas can also help create the
perception that the hotel is not badly hit by the current crisis situation, e.g. the worldwide
economic crisis. And finally, a drop in demand and revenues should also prompt the Hotel
Management to re-evaluate further investment plans. In conclusion, during a crisis event it is
important not to waste resources (Hotel G, UK).
4.3. Make full use of local advice
The advice to ‘make use of local advice’ that is often also offered for free, was most frequently
communicated by interviewees based in Finland and London. However, such observation
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managed by closing areas of the property; e.g. by closing a floor and concentrating the guests
accommodation in dedicated areas will save power and allow for better utilisation of staff
(Hotel B, HK). By concentrating the fewer visitors to specific areas can also help create the
perception that the hotel is not badly hit by the current crisis situation, e.g. the worldwide
economic crisis. And finally, a drop in demand and revenues should also prompt the Hotel
Management to re-evaluate further investment plans. In conclusion, during a crisis event it is
important not to waste resources (Hotel G, UK).
4.3. Make full use of local advice
The advice to ‘make use of local advice’ that is often also offered for free, was most frequently
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could be purely incidental; e.g. in Finland only three respondents were interviewed, one of
them had recent experience in providing accommodation for high ranking EU delegates (Hotel
E, Finland); the London hotels were getting ready for the 2012 Olympics, and therefore, a
greater collaboration between hotels and authorities is to be expected.
The  type  of  free  advice  offered  by  local  authorities  (as  well  as  other  organisations)  is
determined by the location of the hotel. For example, the location of the hotel will determine
the required building standards as well as the requirement for a formal rescue plan to be
lodged with the authorities, the frequency of relevant safety inspections, and the extent to
which the authorities are working with the hotels in a proactive manner (Hotel D, Finland).
Two of the London Interviewees made unprompted comments on how they ‘welcomed the
need for fire compliancy and regular inspections’ since ‘the fire certificate ensures compliance
with fire safety’. Moreover, through a thorough crisis preparedness plan the hotels were also
able to save in their insurance premiums (Hotel G, UK). Furthermore, ‘regular fire inspections
help hotels enhance/update their fire safety plans’ (Hotel L, UK).
The closer links between the London Metropolitan Police and the hotels had also resulted in
the Police issuing regular updates on specific criminal activities targeting hotels as well as
fraudulent individuals to watch out for (Hotel L, UK). Finally, the time to develop positive
relationships with authorities like the police or fire/rescue departments is during the quiet
times, as good links to the authorities would be needed during crisis (e.g. Hotel L, UK; Hotel
D, Finland).
4.4. Maintaining good communication with guests
In a large hotel good customer records are the basis for excellent customer relations. These
records will allow the hotel to learn about their frequent guests and to keep their loyal
customers (e.g. Hotel D in Finland). However, such inside knowledge should not be used to
exhaust the guests with direct mail but rather preserve such communications for times when
there is a need to attract business (Hotel L, UK). Furthermore, good guest history [and incident
reports] also help dealing with complaints that may be received later.
Accurate record keeping should not be limited to the Customer Relations Department but
be a standard across all the departments within the hotel. Moreover, all well documented
procedures  can  also  stop  a  minor  incident  from becoming  a  major  crisis.  For  example,
accurate temperature control in food preparation processes, maintenance work carried out,
and even the details  of  deliveries  taken,  may be questioned months after  the guest  has
departed.  One Hong Kong based Hotel  Manager  (Hotel  A)  commented on guests  from
several months ago inquiring whether they had been served milk products sourced from
China at any stage during their visit to the hotel. These guests had heard international news
reports  about  contaminated  baby  milk  in  China  and  wanted  to  know  if  any  food  or
beverages consumed in the hotel could have traces of such contaminated milk (for more
on  milk  contamination  in  China  please  see  [14]  ).  This  example  highlights  the  need  of
thorough record keeping across all departments within the hotel, as these files are needed
to reply to a concerned guest whether they have been exposed to any external health risks
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during their stay at the hotel (Hotel A, HK). For example, international news reports on
poor air quality, polluted rivers or even faulty air-conditioning units near the hotel location
could cause some negative word-of-mouth if the hotel is not able to demonstrate appropri‐
ate duty of care through well maintained records.
Hotels also provide the venue and catering for different types of events. Such functions serve
specialist menus to groups up to several hundred guests. The participants of these specialist
events can continue their celebrations in various independent restaurants outside the hotel
and may even conclude the night with a snack from a street vendor. A guest suffering from
food poisoning might blame the hotel for their symptoms even when they are not able to
identify all food items consumed during their celebrations. A hotel can eliminate false
accusations of poor food hygiene by preserving/freezing a small sample of food prepared for
a major banquet. If required, the hotel can get the preserved food samples analysed by an
independent laboratory before accepting any liability (Hotel B, HK). Finally, the prevalence of
food allergies today requires detailing and standardising the ingredients for every item on the
menu (Hotel D, Finland).
4.5. Use of technology to enhance hotel security
Technology can be used to enhance the overall hotel security and cameras in corridors as well
as other public spaces are the norm today (Hotel D, Finland). Well positioned cameras and
other visible security measures are welcomed by the guests as they increase the perception of
security (Hotel I, UK). However, excessive use of cameras can give the impression of specific
security problems on the premises (Hotel L, UK). Electronic key cards are also the norm today
and the CCTV is viewed invaluable in securing the hotel premises (Hotel K, UK).
Recording security cameras at key positions, alarms and motion sensors indicating unauthor‐
ised access, as well as digital monitoring of access to the premises, were nominated as common
tools for maintaining hotel security. The hotels in Finland were already using external security
agencies to monitor their alarms as well as patrol the premises (Hotel D). Some of the London
based hotels were considering such an option as well (Hotel G).
The Internet and e-mail were seen as a tool for enhancing the hotel security as well as a potential
risk to the operations or the image of the hotel. The need for up-to-date firewalls to protect the
hotels’ computer networks was highlighted by some of the interviewees (e.g. Hotel D, Finland).
Furthermore, the need to backup the data together with alternative communications channels
outside the primary premises was also identified (e.g. Hotel B, HK; Hotel, UK). Moreover,
licence plate readers were installed in the garage of one busy London hotel (Hotel L, UK).
Finally, the collaboration between hotels and the police also involved e-mail alerts of scams
targeting hotels complete with photographs of the suspects the hotels should look out for
(Hotel D in Finland; Hotel K, UK).
Finally, many types of technology was utilised by all interviewees in maintaining the hotel
security, and to some extent overt security measures facilitated by technology (e.g. electronic
key cards, security cameras in public places) are now expected by the hotel guests. However,
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customers (e.g. Hotel D in Finland). However, such inside knowledge should not be used to
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there is a need to attract business (Hotel L, UK). Furthermore, good guest history [and incident
reports] also help dealing with complaints that may be received later.
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be a standard across all the departments within the hotel. Moreover, all well documented
procedures  can  also  stop  a  minor  incident  from becoming  a  major  crisis.  For  example,
accurate temperature control in food preparation processes, maintenance work carried out,
and even the details  of  deliveries  taken,  may be questioned months after  the guest  has
departed.  One Hong Kong based Hotel  Manager  (Hotel  A)  commented on guests  from
several months ago inquiring whether they had been served milk products sourced from
China at any stage during their visit to the hotel. These guests had heard international news
reports  about  contaminated  baby  milk  in  China  and  wanted  to  know  if  any  food  or
beverages consumed in the hotel could have traces of such contaminated milk (for more
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other visible security measures are welcomed by the guests as they increase the perception of
security (Hotel I, UK). However, excessive use of cameras can give the impression of specific
security problems on the premises (Hotel L, UK). Electronic key cards are also the norm today
and the CCTV is viewed invaluable in securing the hotel premises (Hotel K, UK).
Recording security cameras at key positions, alarms and motion sensors indicating unauthor‐
ised access, as well as digital monitoring of access to the premises, were nominated as common
tools for maintaining hotel security. The hotels in Finland were already using external security
agencies to monitor their alarms as well as patrol the premises (Hotel D). Some of the London
based hotels were considering such an option as well (Hotel G).
The Internet and e-mail were seen as a tool for enhancing the hotel security as well as a potential
risk to the operations or the image of the hotel. The need for up-to-date firewalls to protect the
hotels’ computer networks was highlighted by some of the interviewees (e.g. Hotel D, Finland).
Furthermore, the need to backup the data together with alternative communications channels
outside the primary premises was also identified (e.g. Hotel B, HK; Hotel, UK). Moreover,
licence plate readers were installed in the garage of one busy London hotel (Hotel L, UK).
Finally, the collaboration between hotels and the police also involved e-mail alerts of scams
targeting hotels complete with photographs of the suspects the hotels should look out for
(Hotel D in Finland; Hotel K, UK).
Finally, many types of technology was utilised by all interviewees in maintaining the hotel
security, and to some extent overt security measures facilitated by technology (e.g. electronic
key cards, security cameras in public places) are now expected by the hotel guests. However,
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the underlying guideline for the use of technology in hotels was the need to ‘protect the privacy
of our guest’ (Hotels H and L, UK),
5. Conclusions
The main contribution from this study is the accumulation of practical advice that all Hotel
Managers can utilize, regarding of the size of their hotel. The practical advice offered by the
participants of this study is based on accumulation of decades hotel management experience
across the globe. The findings from these interviews can be grouped under the following
headings: Being prepared for crisis situations; Managing costs during crisis; Make full use of local
advice; Maintaining good communication with guests; and the Use of technology to enhance hotel
security. The need to offer high levels of service, local collaboration as well as the secondary
security related responsibilities of all existing staff were another overlapping theme through‐
out the interviews.
The findings of this study could be presented as a benchmark for good practice for crisis
prevention in large international hotels. The examples cited by the interviewees covered crisis
situations from small accidents to terrorism or accidental death within the premises.
The limitations of this study are, therefore, outcome of the limited resources (time and funding
for data collection) and the bias towards large, international hotels. The timing of the data
collection also coincided with the Economic Tsunami of 2008 where the signs for economic
slowdown were already evident (reduced advance bookings, lower than usual occupancy
rations as well as the cancellations of large bookings).
The conclusion of this paper should also cite two quotes reflecting the many years of crisis
management experience by the Interviewees: ‘every cloud has a silver lining’ (Hotel K, UK)
and that hotels can ‘come out of crisis stronger’ (Hotel I, UK)
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1. Introduction
Cities survive earthquakes and rebuild with improved urban strategies, architectural de‐
signs and building technologies. This chapter will present a detailed analysis of the re‐
sponse, recovery, planning and rebuilding processes after the Lisbon earthquake and
compare them to the recent events in Christchurch, New Zealand. Archival research from
libraries and museums in Portugal will inform the historical analysis, and interviews and of‐
ficial documents from New Zealand relief and reconstruction agencies will underpin the
contemporary analysis. The study aims to identify opportunities and challenges in facilitat‐
ing good urban design in the process of recovering from a natural disaster, using case stud‐
ies which are separated by over 250 years, but which both attest to the centrality of urban
design in the reconstruction process.
2. Lisbon 1755
This section will look at the Lisbon earthquake and its aftermath, with a view to understand‐
ing how design, leadership and governance processes contributed to the production of an
18th century, state-of-the-art urban quarter in the wake of a national tragedy. Particular at‐
tention will be paid to the coincidence of enlightened political, economic and technical skills
which were judiciously applied to the re-planning of the city. By many counts the thinking
was modern, and bears a worthwhile comparison to the recent seismic events in Christ‐
church, which will be the subject of the second part of the chapter.
© 2013 Brand and Nicholson; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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3. The event
An estimated 8.4 magnitude earthquake in Lisbon on the morning of All Saints’ Day in 1755
reverberated throughout the Iberian Peninsula, Madeira, the Azores, and North Africa. Tsu‐
namis affected the Caribbean and the Atlantic coasts of Europe [1]. Of a population of
250,000, up to 20,000 people perished in the quake, tsunami and fires that followed [2]:
At this moment the earth shook, the sea rose up foaming in the harbour and dashed to
pieces the ships lying at anchor. The streets and squares were filled with whirling masses of
flame and cinders. The houses collapsed the roofs crashing down on shattered foundations.
Thirty thousand inhabitants were crushed beneath the ruins [3]
.
Aid came from Portugal's colonies and her allies and trading partners England, Germany
and Holland. Strategically, local merchants donated a 4% surcharge on imports to the relief
effort which gave them critical political influence in determining new land uses for the re‐
construction [4].
Figure 1. Panoramas of Lisbon before the 1755 earthquake [various authors] Museu da Cidade de Lisboa
4. Recovery: A vision of economic and political reform
The man in charge of the reconstruction effort, the Minister of State (1756-1777), Sebastião
José de Carvalho e Melo, was decisive and commanding in his response to the disaster, relief
and the forward planning of the city and his leadership in the crisis cemented his political
power over his adversaries until the death of his supporter King José I in 1777. The King
would make him the Marquis of Pombal 15 years after the earthquake in recognition of his
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leadership during the crisis. In a swift and articulate response to the emergency, the city was
immediately surveyed and new construction was prohibited. Looters were publicly hung
and able-bodied deserters were prevented from leaving the city and pressed into relief work
by the army. Monasteries and public squares were filled with the homeless, and tent cities
occupied by merchants and nobles sprouted (King José I and his family occupied an exten‐
sive tent and pavilion court in the hills of Ajúda at the edge of Lisbon for some months after
the earthquake). Pombal moved about the city directing the recovery operation from his mo‐
bile headquarters a carriage which he had commandeered from the royal family.
What followed in the next two years was the ruthless and all-encompassing implementation
of a radical plan which would change the political landscape and dramatically improve Por‐
tugal’s economic position in Europe. The Terreiro do Paço (Figure 1) or Palace Square, had
evolved as an elongated, spatially contained, urban space at the edge of the Tagus River in
association with the Ribeiro Palace. In the wake of the earthquake the space was reconfig‐
ured, along with the adjacent central Baixa district, as the Praça do Comércio, a formal axial
square surrounded by monumental public edifices where the business of an empire could be
effectively conducted.
Pombal’s previous roles as political envoy to London and Vienna and Minister of Foreign
Affairs and War (1750-1756), where he oversaw town planting in Brazil, had seen him devel‐
op sophisticated ideas on mercantilist economic reform and coherent town planning. In the
reconstruction of Lisbon’s heart he found the perfect vehicle for both. The aim was to create
a modern political centre where commerce could thrive. He had, in his ministerial role, over‐
seen the dismantling of the Portuguese inquisition, the secularisation of education, and the
nationalisation of industry [5]. He therefore favoured an institutional shift away from the
old nobility (whom he considered corrupt and impractical) and the Jesuits, to the city's com‐
mercial elites who had helped finance the reconstruction. A strategically timed and imple‐
mented legal re-configuration of property ownership in the Baixa, transferred land from the
aristocracy and ecclesiastic authorities to emerging merchant elites, whose collective eco‐
nomic enterprise would eventually succeed in rebuilding Portugal’s indigenous economy.
The waterfront square was edged with public buildings, which encompassed business, city
government, and customs and exchange, in an effort to stimulate local trade and industry,
and reverse high local unemployment levels and the traditional dominance of foreign mer‐
chants.
Urban renewal in the aftermath of the earthquake was appropriate for other reasons. Portu‐
gal had entered an era of nation-building with the consolidation of her borders in in 13th and
14th centuries. By the 16th century, Lisbon’s image and role as the capital of a nation and a
vast empire stretching from Angola to Macau was considered important, and urban embel‐
lishment was funded by gold and diamonds from Brazil. During the reign of King João V
significant new urban projects were planned in the west of the city to boost the capital’s sta‐
tus. The Águas Livres Aquaduct in 1728 is the best example of a new project that combined
the provision of infrastructure with urban-scaled monumentality. Other projects included
the construction of the vast and extravagant convent -palace at Mafra, the interior embellish‐
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ment of 65 medieval and baroque churches and the building of dozens of new places of wor‐
ship in the neoclassical style.
More significantly, Enlightenment-thinking from Northern Europe opened up the possibil‐
ity of a scientific explanation for disaster rather than a religious one, rendering reconstruc‐
tion  a  rational  rather  than  a  superstitious  exercise,  while  the  destruction  of  a  splendid
European court generated political uncertainties and revolutionary possibilities. As part of
the reconstruction exercise, Pombal surveyed the populace in search of technical and sci‐
entific data about the earthquake, and his findings pointed to new methods in construc‐
tion. Liquefaction had been observed in the riverside areas, so new buildings there were
constructed on timber piles driven into the soil  to act  as anti-seismic stabilisers.  Timber
buildings had survived the quake better  than masonry buildings,  so new buildings had
internal seismic frames added to their fabric. The new streets were widened so that even
if the buildings on both sides had collapsed, there would remain an evacuation passage
between them [6].
Ana Araújo [7] suggests that the press of the time stimulated a pan-European debate about
issues of pragmatic responsiveness to natural disasters and unity of action across national
borders. It was certainly the first example of a truly international relief effort after a calamity
of such magnitude. Fact and fiction merged in the minds of the populace, fuelled by exag‐
gerated emotive accounts of the catastrophe printed in cheap popular news pamphlets [8].
These served to fuel superstitious terrors, displays of religious fanaticism and dire predic‐
tions associated with natural phenomena such as Halley’s Comet which was expected to ap‐
pear in 1757 or 1758. The auto da fé, (act of faith, or public burning of heretics) held in the
Terreiro in June 1756 was devised as a collective atonement for the earthquake of the previ‐
ous year [9].
The event also presented political opportunity for the Minister of State to distribute anti-Jes‐
uit propaganda in the capitals of Europe via anonymously authored opinion pieces in major
newspapers [10]. Pombal co-opted some of the most influential men of the day in literature
and science [11] to disseminate news and views about earthquake recovery, the necessity of
repressive civil protection measures adopted post-disaster, and public health and welfare in‐
terventions. In the interests of civil obedience, state terror replaced the religious fear of the
past.
5. Experience and expertise
The group charged with the recovery and rebuilding of Lisbon were an elite cohort of mili‐
tary engineers whose routine duties involved cartography, architecture and town planning,
including the design and construction of infrastructure, (roads, aqueducts, ports, defence
structures and fortifications) and associated buildings. They were a geographically mobile
and flexible group of men, deployed in situations ranging from the frontier towns at outer
reaches of the global Portuguese empire, to its busy cosmopolitan centre of trade and com‐
merce. Their expertise embodied a high level of practical knowledge gained from work in
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the field as well as state of the art scientific knowledge. Their training via an apprenticeship
system at the University Coimbra, represented a productive intersection of the knowledge
embodied in foreign treatises such as those of Alberti and Vitruvius, and the real world they
encountered in their active service.
Their approach to the built environment appears to privilege the site-specific adaptation of
useful typologies, while giving a high priority to public space and infrastructure (especially
port infrastructure, given that so many of the Portuguese colonial settlements and feitórias
(trading posts) were coastal)[12]. Their sensitivity to the scale differential between the city and
the building via a unified architectural language is a notable aspect of the Lisbon plan. Many of
the best military personnel were in Lisbon at the time of the earthquake, and others joined them
for the special mission of rebuilding the capital. Their designs were infused with the utopian‐
ism of the Portuguese school of the rational and civic-minded town planning demonstrated in
new world cities such as Goa, Rio, Macapà and Luanda [13].
In 1910, cavalry officer Christovam Sepúlveda published Manuel da Maya e os Engenheiros
Militares Portuguêses no Terromoto de 1755 (Manuel da Maya and the Portuguese Military
Engineers in the 1755 Earthquake) [14] which identified Maia’s central role as the strategist
in the planning and rebuilding exercise. Jacôme Ratton [15] identifies military architect Eu‐
génio dos Santos as the person who formulated the principles of the reconstruction.
Sepúlveda highlights two important aspects of  the organisational  culture of  the military
engineers. The first was their adherence to hierarchy, discipline and teamwork in military
operations  and  the  second  was  the  heavy  investment  they  made  in  strategic  planning.
Maia’s role in executing both these practices is evident in the terms of reference for the re‐
construction that  were which embodied in the Dissertacão and other  critical  supporting
official documents published in the late 1750s. Manuel da Maia’s 1755 Dissertacão [16] de‐
scribes the strategic solution for the rebuilding of Lisbon after the 1755 disaster. In addi‐
tion  to  emphasising  leadership,  Sepúlveda  deemed  the  teamwork,  training  and  field
experience of this group of elite military engineers in the colonial realm as essential prep‐
aration for the task.
There was ample regional  and local  precedent  for  disaster  recovery as  earthquakes had
plagued Lisbon since its founding. A seismic event on the 26th of January 1531 had struck
the city with equal force, but produced a far less acute political reaction due to the rela‐
tive social stability at the time [17]. The Portuguese had certainly benefited from the study
of other disasters such as the 1666 fire of London and the numerous volcanic events of in
Sicily,  particularly those affecting the city of Catania.  Maia had been involved for many
years in surveying and engineering projects around Lisbon, and this formed the basis of
his  knowledge to  reconstruct  the  city.  Critically  he had been involved in  the surveying
and building of the Main Fortification Line in 1716, the Águas Livres Aquaduct, between
1720 and 1730, and the Santa Isabel survey in the 1740s. This deep knowledge of the ter‐
rain subsequently allowed him to swiftly prepare the alternative plans. He authored the
Dissertacão which described the methods and processes leading up to the publication of
the 1756 plan (Figure 2).
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entific data about the earthquake, and his findings pointed to new methods in construc‐
tion. Liquefaction had been observed in the riverside areas, so new buildings there were
constructed on timber piles driven into the soil  to act  as anti-seismic stabilisers.  Timber
buildings had survived the quake better  than masonry buildings,  so new buildings had
internal seismic frames added to their fabric. The new streets were widened so that even
if the buildings on both sides had collapsed, there would remain an evacuation passage
between them [6].
Ana Araújo [7] suggests that the press of the time stimulated a pan-European debate about
issues of pragmatic responsiveness to natural disasters and unity of action across national
borders. It was certainly the first example of a truly international relief effort after a calamity
of such magnitude. Fact and fiction merged in the minds of the populace, fuelled by exag‐
gerated emotive accounts of the catastrophe printed in cheap popular news pamphlets [8].
These served to fuel superstitious terrors, displays of religious fanaticism and dire predic‐
tions associated with natural phenomena such as Halley’s Comet which was expected to ap‐
pear in 1757 or 1758. The auto da fé, (act of faith, or public burning of heretics) held in the
Terreiro in June 1756 was devised as a collective atonement for the earthquake of the previ‐
ous year [9].
The event also presented political opportunity for the Minister of State to distribute anti-Jes‐
uit propaganda in the capitals of Europe via anonymously authored opinion pieces in major
newspapers [10]. Pombal co-opted some of the most influential men of the day in literature
and science [11] to disseminate news and views about earthquake recovery, the necessity of
repressive civil protection measures adopted post-disaster, and public health and welfare in‐
terventions. In the interests of civil obedience, state terror replaced the religious fear of the
past.
5. Experience and expertise
The group charged with the recovery and rebuilding of Lisbon were an elite cohort of mili‐
tary engineers whose routine duties involved cartography, architecture and town planning,
including the design and construction of infrastructure, (roads, aqueducts, ports, defence
structures and fortifications) and associated buildings. They were a geographically mobile
and flexible group of men, deployed in situations ranging from the frontier towns at outer
reaches of the global Portuguese empire, to its busy cosmopolitan centre of trade and com‐
merce. Their expertise embodied a high level of practical knowledge gained from work in
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the field as well as state of the art scientific knowledge. Their training via an apprenticeship
system at the University Coimbra, represented a productive intersection of the knowledge
embodied in foreign treatises such as those of Alberti and Vitruvius, and the real world they
encountered in their active service.
Their approach to the built environment appears to privilege the site-specific adaptation of
useful typologies, while giving a high priority to public space and infrastructure (especially
port infrastructure, given that so many of the Portuguese colonial settlements and feitórias
(trading posts) were coastal)[12]. Their sensitivity to the scale differential between the city and
the building via a unified architectural language is a notable aspect of the Lisbon plan. Many of
the best military personnel were in Lisbon at the time of the earthquake, and others joined them
for the special mission of rebuilding the capital. Their designs were infused with the utopian‐
ism of the Portuguese school of the rational and civic-minded town planning demonstrated in
new world cities such as Goa, Rio, Macapà and Luanda [13].
In 1910, cavalry officer Christovam Sepúlveda published Manuel da Maya e os Engenheiros
Militares Portuguêses no Terromoto de 1755 (Manuel da Maya and the Portuguese Military
Engineers in the 1755 Earthquake) [14] which identified Maia’s central role as the strategist
in the planning and rebuilding exercise. Jacôme Ratton [15] identifies military architect Eu‐
génio dos Santos as the person who formulated the principles of the reconstruction.
Sepúlveda highlights two important aspects of  the organisational  culture of  the military
engineers. The first was their adherence to hierarchy, discipline and teamwork in military
operations  and  the  second  was  the  heavy  investment  they  made  in  strategic  planning.
Maia’s role in executing both these practices is evident in the terms of reference for the re‐
construction that  were which embodied in the Dissertacão and other  critical  supporting
official documents published in the late 1750s. Manuel da Maia’s 1755 Dissertacão [16] de‐
scribes the strategic solution for the rebuilding of Lisbon after the 1755 disaster. In addi‐
tion  to  emphasising  leadership,  Sepúlveda  deemed  the  teamwork,  training  and  field
experience of this group of elite military engineers in the colonial realm as essential prep‐
aration for the task.
There was ample regional  and local  precedent  for  disaster  recovery as  earthquakes had
plagued Lisbon since its founding. A seismic event on the 26th of January 1531 had struck
the city with equal force, but produced a far less acute political reaction due to the rela‐
tive social stability at the time [17]. The Portuguese had certainly benefited from the study
of other disasters such as the 1666 fire of London and the numerous volcanic events of in
Sicily,  particularly those affecting the city of Catania.  Maia had been involved for many
years in surveying and engineering projects around Lisbon, and this formed the basis of
his  knowledge to  reconstruct  the  city.  Critically  he had been involved in  the surveying
and building of the Main Fortification Line in 1716, the Águas Livres Aquaduct, between
1720 and 1730, and the Santa Isabel survey in the 1740s. This deep knowledge of the ter‐
rain subsequently allowed him to swiftly prepare the alternative plans. He authored the
Dissertacão which described the methods and processes leading up to the publication of
the 1756 plan (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. A Topographical Plan of the city of Lisbon [Carvalho and Mardel] 1755 Museu da Cidade de Lisboa
6. Planning: The dissertacão
The town planning principles for rebuilding Lisbon were established within 5 months of the
event, in Part I of the Dissertacão, which directed that options for both rebuilding and relo‐
cating the city be considered. There was an impetus to rebuild and relocate the court in a
better place (either at Bélem or São João dos Bem-Casados) which opened up the possibility
for locating new public buildings in the Baixa. Layouts were subsequently developed by
military architects Eugénio dos Santos and Carlos Mardel.
Part ll of the Dissertacão was comprised of a legal decree in May 1756 that governed land
ownership, construction and finance for the rebuilding of the devastated centre, and a set of
development rules for areas of expansion at the periphery. Part III of the Dissertacão was
comprised of the alternative plans, which covered a range of rebuilding and relocation op‐
tions. Maia presented six options investigating variations of street widening, ground re-lev‐
elling, adjusted building heights, all contributed to a radical new block morphology,
residential-building typology (with trade and craft premises at ground level) and sense of
urban scale [18]. A prefabricated, technically innovative and stylistically simplified four-
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storey building type was developed. This building ingeniously incorporated fire walls that
extended above the roof line and earthquake resistant diagonally braced, timber load-bear‐
ing cages called gaiola that sat independently within the masonry perimeter walls. Building
components were prefabricated on a large scale off-site, allowing speedy on-site assembly
with minimal traditional craft involvement [19].
The plan ultimately chosen, incorporated the following mechanisms and characteristics
which are documented by Claudio Montiero [20]:
1. A standardised building type
2. A standardised construction solution incorporating fire separations and seismic frames
3. A rational and generous public space network based on pre-existing places
4. The use of the rubble from the ruins to raise and regularise the levels of the Baixa by 1.2
metres, and reclaim new land from the Tagus
5. A disregard of property ownership boundaries (especially the location of churches) so
as not to compromise the rigorous geometry of the new plan
This formed the basis for the legal provisions of the legal decree of June 1758 which finalised
the plan. It had taken two years for the plan and the legal and financial exchanges to align.
A year later, in June 1759, re-building finally commenced.
These critical ownership reforms relied on Pombal’s public credibility and private influence
at Court. The period was dogged by multiple conspiracies, including a palace coup in 1756,
and an assassination attempt on the King in 1758. These behind-the-scenes machinations
lengthened the plan’s implementation time, but unlocked the heart of the city as a centre of
trade and commerce, thereby better serving the emerging merchant class and challenging
the historic power of nobility and clergy. The plan largely preserved the places and names
of the historic city and retained the location, hierarchy and functions of three main squares
(with the re-naming occurring later). Churches that had been free-standing were now inte‐
grated into the Baixa blocks.
The Praça do Comércio doubled the size of the former Terreiro do Paço, by reclaiming land
from the river Tagus. The new square’s symmetry, focusing on an equestrian statue (flanked
by the animals of Portugal’s far-flung continental empires), and the triumphal arch to the
main street, Rua Augusta, constituted the axis of the plan as a whole. The post-earthquake
square had a statue of King José I at its heart but perimeter uses were designated for func‐
tions of state, with the palace itself relocated to the city edge at Ajúda [21]. While symboli‐
cally, a royal statue still stood at the centre of Lisbon, functionally it was now a place for
commercial enterprise (Figure 3). Blocks were configured in a simple proportional and com‐
positional system that supported elegant and environmentally comfortable street sections
and public-space footprints. There was a hierarchy of three main streets, each 60 palms
wide, that were named for the guilds (Rua da Prata, Rua do Ouro or Silver and Gold Streets
respectively), cross streets that were named for church and parish interests, and North-
South streets, each of widths of 40 palms, that were also named for guilds.
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Figure 3. Praça do Comércio [Rick Allender] 2007
The streets determined the building fabric. The building heights were to be no higher than
the width of the streets and thus set a new standard for access to light and air in an urban
building. A system of dividing dwellings by floors, with retail at ground-level and artisans’
workshops at basement-level, was developed. The arrangement of three floors of identical
apartments plus an attic above the ground-level floor was the origin of modern mixed-fami‐
ly ownership in Portugal, and the typology represented the potential for a mixing of classes
in one edifice, each with its own separate entrance. Both shops and apartments were built to
be rented, thus facilitating urban housing as a form of property investment.
The plan’s implementation was directed by José Monteiro de Carvalho, who materialised
the abstract rules for scale and the architectural features of the urban blocks at a large scale,
while enforcing technical standards such as fire compartments between tenancies, new sew‐
er locations and the cage structures. He was also attentive to the finer details of serial design
elements required for cast-steel balconies, the ashlar masonry trim to building bases and
openings, and consistent window and door joinery profiles (Figure 4). Up to this time he
had been in charge of demolition, which earned him the nickname Bota-Abaixo or knock-it-
down.
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Figure 4. century standardised building types in Chiado District [Diane Brand] 2004
This aesthetic and technical system became the basis for re-planning Lisbon as a whole, es‐
pecially around the new palaces, and in areas developed at higher densities in the western
part of the city. The scheme set the tone for a future direction of urbanism in Lisbon that
embodied a new rational Cartesian pattern but which was firmly anchored in a traditional
morphology. Over time the plan set aesthetic, technical and legal precedents but these were
not fully appreciated until the modern era, when separate built environment professional
disciplines such as architecture and planning emerged and their histories were fully re‐
searched.
7. Rebuilding
Claudio Monteiro [22] suggests that legislative reform enacted during the reconstruction of
Lisbon was driven by the plan’s necessary transformation of the structure of urban property
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ownership, and the careful reconciling of individual rights with the security of future invest‐
ment. The reconstruction plan and the resultant legislative reform were the tools that
brought about eventual political and economic reform. Pombal’s aim was to consolidate the
power of the King while at the same time modernising the nation’s legal, economic and so‐
cial structures.
The measures used to achieve these included:
1. The surveying of existing buildings at the time of the earthquake to avoid disputes dur‐
ing reconstruction, especially when an overhaul of the land ownership arrangements
was contemplated (Wren’s plan for London after the fire in 1666 had been frustrated by
an inability to rationalise the nobility’s ownership of the large estates in central Lon‐
don).
2. A prohibition on constructing or reconstructing buildings before the plan’s approval:
a. Outside of Lisbon, to stop the city growing randomly and
b. Within Lisbon, to prevent the rebuilding of buildings partially destroyed by fire (less
than one third of the original buildings were in a habitable condition and no alternative
accommodation existed apart from tent cities and timber shacks erected in public
spaces).
The plan was approved two and a half years after the earthquake, and the first lots were re‐
constructed three and a half years later. Nevertheless, illegal urban development had
sprung up in spite of harsh enforcement of the decrees.
3. Freezing rents and freezing the price of construction materials, to combat speculation,
eviction and exploitation around the shortage of construction materials and rental ac‐
commodation. This was done by restricting any new lease agreements to perpetual
leases or long-term rental contracts.
4. Creating the conditions for legal, religious and political reform by freely compensating
and transferring pre-existing property ownerships into newly agreed formats
5. The complete demolition of the Baixa to make way for a despotic but utopian and pro‐
gressive plan [23]
8. Compensation
Land within the Baixa was immediately appropriated by the state and re-allocated, with
preference given to existing land owners, leaseholders or administrators for nobles, the
church or the crown. Compensation was based only on site area, and not the post-earth‐
quake building condition. New lots were allocated on the condition that redevelopment
would be completed within five years, effectively rendering the exercise a land re-adjust‐
ment operation rather than an exercise in eminent domain, while preventing long-term
speculation of development leap-frogging.
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Undersized lots, oversized lots and lots eliminated by the creation of new public spaces or
streets were paid fair land swap or cash compensation in proportion to the frontage width
of the site. Cash payments were necessary since there was a greater total area for public
space in the new plan and therefore an undersupply of new sites. Maia proposed a propor‐
tional reduction of all buildable areas to account for improved amenity as a result of more
public space in new areas. The chief surveyor of the inspections, Alexandre José Montanha
divided the Baixa into seven zones of value, thus setting up a financial mechanism by which
properties were exchanged or compensation calculated with a ‘premium payment’ embed‐
ded for superior sites adjacent to public space.
In  this  way  the  plan  created  value.  The  overall  effect  was  to  replace  certain  types  of
landowners (nobles and secular clergy) with merchants, sparking what Subtil called ‘po‐
litical earthquakes’ in Portuguese society [24]. The compensation system and plan stimu‐
lated investment from the business community who had financed the reconstruction (via
credit  or purchase).  This in effect led to a significant redistribution of wealth,  a consoli‐
dation of economic power among the middle class,  and a new degree of upward social
mobility.  The  move  also  unlocked  the  encumbrances  and  liens  strictures  embedded  in
the medieval  property codes that  had inhibited clean development processes within the
city.
Complete execution of the plan took over 40 years. An initial displacement of Lisbon’s pop‐
ulation to the west immediately after the earthquake inhibited the uptake of property in the
centre. The ancient elites also retreated, taking the court sector with them.
9. Authoritarian processes
Authoritarian processes were the key to the effective reconstruction of Lisbon. Pombal was
appointed by the King to his position as Minister of State and he used this mandate to cen‐
tralise political power by removing the Senate from the state decision-making processes and
from the implementation of the Baixa plan, thereby breaking a longstanding tradition of lo‐
cal autonomy in planning and taxation matters. The institutional makeup of the reconstruc‐
tion process evolved as the pragmatics of the situation dictated, with two complementary
bodies emerging: The first was the Lisbon Neighbourhoods Inspectorate as the civil defence
responder in 12 neighbourhoods city-wide. This agency was also instrumental in clearing
debris, removing and burying bodies, executing surveys and re-allocating land. The second
was the Public Works Department which was formed to implement the plan, and projects
including public spaces and new buildings. The technical team, comprising of army officers
in the civil administrative hierarchy, originated at the Lisbon Public Works Draughting Of‐
fice (Casa do Risco da Obras Públicas) which later became the Public Works Department. This
reduced, focused and disciplined chain-of-command, facilitated the absolute control re‐
quired for such sweeping changes to the urban space configuration and the resulting shift in
political and economic hegemony.
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The first order of business was the creation of the public realm, with new streets, squares
and gardens. Public health was foregrounded with upgraded sanitary infrastructure, water
supply and transport systems given priority. The construction of essential public buildings
for trade and business continuity such as the Customs Building in Praça do Comércio was
also critical as they served an influential special-interest group. Reconstruction took roughly
until 1807 to complete, ironically coinciding with the royal family’s flight to Brazil as Napo‐
leon’s troops massed on the border during the Peninsular Wars.
10. Urban design opportunities
A pamphlet at the time of the 1755 disaster optimistically stated that ‘Lisbon could not have
suffered a more fortunate tragedy’, indicating the potential the populace saw in the recon‐
struction process [25]. A major aspect of this fortune clustered around the implementation of
a good example of urban design, one that was ground-breaking for its time and which still
ranks as outstanding. The plan proceeded with a new gridded layout for the Baixa quarter,
based on the disaster and re-planning precedents of the fires in London and Rennes, and the
earthquake in Catania and planning precedents such as the 1620, 1673 and 1714 extensions
to Turin [26]. Among precedents for the Baixa Plan were Wren's 1666 plan for London (new
street alignments and property subdivision), new Turin (the regularised geometry of public
space and city blocks) and the Place Royale, Place Vendôme and the Royal Palace at Bor‐
deaux (the continuous articulated facades, marked entry points and arcaded bases of the
buildings which framed the public space) [27]. It represented a successful example of con‐
temporary urban disaster and urban design knowledge of in 18th century Europe.
The Terreiro do Paço was reconstructed and renamed the Praça do Comércio (Figure 5).
Rubble from the earthquake was recycled (eliminating the disposal problem) and an area
of land equal in size to the original square was reclaimed, extending the urban platform
into  the  Tagus.  The  reconstruction  of  Lisbon  presented  an  opportunity  to  integrate  the
waterfront square into the urban fabric. The new monumentally scaled square used sym‐
metry and architecture to integrate a complex of buildings embracing the space into the
urban fold, and created a powerful central axis penetrating into the city behind via Rua
Augusta,  thereby  linking  the  square  to  the  Rossio  (Lisbon's  other  principal  square)  be‐
yond.  Pombal’s  project  redressed the  problems that  had beset  the  Terreiro  as  an urban
square.  Certainly the architectural  and urban legibility  of  the square was enhanced,  the
buildings were better scaled to city blocks and there was more permeability to the Baixa,
with vistas  along Rua da Prata,  Rua Augusta and Rua do Ouro.  However,  the authori‐
tarian method of delivery required the subordination of individual property rights to the
public  interest,  with  new  development  and  construction  precisely  defined  within  the
strict constraints of the plan. The effect was also to subordinate architecture to urban de‐
sign,  with  exacting  and  specific  controls  placed  on  building  envelopes,  construction
methods, uses, appearance and materials.
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The following section discusses urban design initiatives arising from a series of devastating
earthquakes in the new world city of Christchurch, New Zealand and compares them to the
18th century event in Portugal. Two years after the earthquakes, urban design strategies to
rebuild the broken city have been formulated but are not yet implemented.
11. Christchurch 2010 and 2011
Christchurch was planned in the mid-19th century as the last Wakefield settlement to be
established by a  private  colonization enterprise  called the  New Zealand Company.  The
company was involved in the establishment of six urban centres in New Zealand: Well‐
ington  [1839]  Wanganui  [1840],  Nelson  [1841],  New  Plymouth  [1842],  Dunedin  [1848]
and Christchurch [1850].  The New Zealand Company brought  more than 9,000  hopeful
settlers to New Zealand up until 1843 [28], with each of the towns achieving numbers of
between 1000  and 4000 in  the  first  years  of  settlement.  Christchurch was  sponsored by
the Church of  England and aspired to recreate a stable agrarian,  hierarchical  society on
fertile land, between the Pacific coast  and the Southern Alps on terrain purchased from
the local  Ngai Tahu tribe.  A rectangular grid was surveyed onto flat  swampy land and
adjusted  where  necessary  to  accommodate  the  Avon/Otakaro  River,  which  meandered
across  the  site.  The  diagram  of  the  city  incorporated  the  grid,  the  river,  two  diagonal
roads  registering  the  principal  transport  routes  to  the  port  of  Lyttelton  and  the  main
road north,  a  cross-shaped central  square  (where  a  cathedral  was  later  built),  a  market
adjacent to the Avon River, two asymmetrical peripheral squares, and parklands provid‐
ing  generous  and varied public  and recreational  space.  In  June  2010  the  city  was  New
Zealand’s second largest, with a population of 376,700.
12. Events
In the early morning of Sunday the 4th of September 2010 a magnitude 7.1 earthquake locat‐
ed 40 km west of Christchurch on an east-west fault, not previously identified, struck the
city. The fortuitous timing of the event explains the lack of fatalities but there was wide‐
spread damage to unreinforced masonry (URM) structures [walls and chimneys] in Christ‐
church and surrounding towns. Nineteenth century URM shop fronts collapsed into main
thoroughfares in the CBD, and there was widespread liquefaction to eastern suburbs’ resi‐
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The first order of business was the creation of the public realm, with new streets, squares
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dential areas close to rivers. This earthquake triggered a series of aftershocks that moved
progressively closer to the city, culminating in a shallow, 5km deep, M 6.3 earthquake on
February 22, 2011 (Figure 6) centred at Lyttelton. This too occurred on an unidentified fault.
This second major event resulted in 181 deaths, with more than half of these occurring in the
collapse of the Canterbury Television Building. This earthquake caused further significant
damage and collapse to URM structures in the CBD, more liquefaction to eastern suburbs’
residential areas close to rivers and rock falls and landslides to the south and southeast. The
result is that between 50% and 70% of buildings in the CBD are likely to be condemned for
demolition with the discovery that many structures are out of vertical axis alignment due to
differential settlement and the realization that the repair of others is uneconomic.
Figure 6. A 6.3 magnitude earthquake strikes Christchurch on February 22nd 2011 [Gillian Needham]
The civil defence response was immediate, with international urban search and rescue terms
arriving from nations such as Australia and Japan to relieve local emergency services. Emer‐
gency response centres were swiftly established in parks, and sports and community build‐
ings, with temporary accommodation provision in the form of tents, caravans, and
prefabricated houses deployed by the Department of Housing and Construction. The entire
CBD was cordoned off and placed under police and army jurisdiction for an extended peri‐
od, leaving many businesses without access to their premises. The slow and uneven process
of insurance compensation has led to businesses relocating to other centres in New Zealand
or locally to the western edge of the city close to the airport. The entertainment centre of the
city has re-established itself in the west along Riccarton Road. With more than half of Christ‐
church’s listed heritage buildings (250) located in the CBD, the city’s patrimony has been
particularly hard hit with more than 100 demolitions to date. The iconic Anglican Cathedral,
the Catholic Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament and the Canterbury Provincial buildings
suffered significant damage (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Canterbury provincial buildings post-earthquake [Diane Brand] 2011
13. Recovery
After the second earthquake it was clear that existing central and local government agencies
were not equipped to facilitate recovery operations, and The Canterbury Earthquake Recov‐
ery Authority (CERA) was formed on March 29, 2011 as a special government agency for the
co-ordination of the recovery and rebuilding activities in Canterbury. The Canterbury Earth‐
quake Recovery Act [29] gave unparalleled (in New Zealand terms) authoritarian powers to
the Minister of Earthquake Recovery, The Right Honourable Gerry Brownlee, although in
practice the powers have been exercised only with the agreement of the cabinet (the govern‐
ment’s executive level ministerial group). In particular the CER Act allows a recovery plan
approved by the minister to override the requirements of New Zealand planning legislation
frameworks embodied in the Resource Management Act, the Conservation and Reserves
Acts and large parts of the Local Government Act (although not the funding provisions, and
the Land Transport Act).
The government’s response to the Canterbury earthquakes occurred in an environment of
mistrust between national and local government, characterised by the dissolution of the re‐
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gional council, Environment Canterbury, in March 2010, and the quite different leadership
styles of the mayor and the minister. Part of the reason for the distrust lay in the different
underlying political philosophies, with the ruling national government espousing a ‘shrink‐
ing government’ position together with the sales of government assets as a means of reduc‐
ing the national deficit. In contrast, local government in general, and in particular the
Christchurch City Council (CCC) supported maintaining the level of local government serv‐
ices as a minimum, with the CCC pursuing a clear position of holding onto city assets in
city-owned holding companies and using these to generate income or reduce tax liabilities.
In 2011, the government introduced an amendment to the Local Government Act aimed spe‐
cifically at limiting the services local governments could provide and the levels of rate in‐
creases they could introduce. The CER Act specifically excluded the minister from making
changes to the funding provisions of the Local Government Act and there have been con‐
tinuing discussions about the allocation of costs between national and local government
ranging from the emergency response costs to repair and rebuilding costs. The national gov‐
ernment has clearly stated on a number of occasions that it believes that the CCC should sell
some of its assets to fund the recovery bill.
The CER Act  established a  new government  agency to  oversee  the  recovery  of  Canter‐
bury and the government’s  investment in the rebuilding of  Christchurch.  The act  speci‐
fies  that  the  minister  can  direct  the  city  council,  but  does  not  clearly  establish  the
respective roles of the organisations,  or create any direct  organisational links or lines of
management  apart  from  general  requirements  to  consult.  The  newness  of  the  govern‐
ment agency CERA, coupled with the pre-existing responsibilities of the council,  has led
to a lack of clarity about their respective roles, with duplication happening at a number
of levels between the two organisations.
The CER Act specifically required the CCC to develop a draft recovery plan for the central
city in nine months for the minister’s approval, including public consultation. Planning for
the rest of the Christchurch metropolitan area was the responsibility of CERA. The Draft
Central City Plan (CCP)[30] was completed in eight months, however the minister spent a
further seven months reviewing it. When the minister received the draft he endorsed the vi‐
sion contained in the first volume, with the exception of the proposed transport changes, but
he set aside the proposed regulations for further investigation [31]. The ‘blueprint’ plan [32],
subsequently approved by the minister, broadly adopted the range of major infrastructure
projects proposed in the Draft CCP and retained the majority of the proposed regulations
including the reduced height limits. The major changes from the Draft CCP was the removal
of the regulations requiring improved environmental performance from buildings (the
BASE assessment developed with the NZ Green Building Council), the removal of the finan‐
cial incentives for rebuilding proposed by the council and the removal of the majority of the
transport provisions pending further investigation.
The Canterbury earthquakes resulted in extensive land damage and areas of liquefaction,
particularly in the eastern part of the city (Figure 8). The resulting changes in elevation in‐
cluded some areas in the Port Hills rising by up to 500 millimetres while areas around the
estuary and Avon River subsided by more than 500 millimetres (Figure 9). In extensive areas
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the cost of land remediation, flood protection and/or the restoration of services made it un‐
economic to rebuild on the terrain. The government assessed all residential land in Christ‐
church and the surrounding towns based on extensive geotechnical studies and eventually
classified them as either ‘green’ (fit to rebuild) or ‘red’ (unfit to rebuild). Subsequently, the
government has set about purchasing more than 6,000 houses in the residential red zone
based on the 2009 rateable valuations. The houses are generally either clustered in low lying
areas around the Avon River and Estuary or vulnerable to rock fall in the Port Hills.
Figure 8. Liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (2011) New Zealand Aerial Mapping Ltd for LINZ
The retreat of settlement along the Avon River and Estuary in Christchurch has provided a
microcosm of the kinds of issues likely to be faced by many coastal cities worldwide, if sea
level rises predicted over the next century occur [33]. The model of strategic retreat, from
vulnerable areas may become relevant in many other areas. While the Christchurch model
has addressed the issues of strategic retreat and attempted to manage the economic impact
on residents, no attempt has been made to address the impacts at a community level. How‐
ever, a map showing the areas where ‘red zoners’ have relocated reveals a scattered pattern
determined by the prices and availability of houses, rather than any managed attempt to re‐
locate communities.
The CER Act facilitated the immediate use of earthquake rubble for reclamation work to ex‐
tend the container port at Lyttelton. This would have been difficult and protracted under the
RMA. The port is one of the key economic drivers for the Canterbury economy, and the port
extension reflects the changing scale and technologies of port logisitics. The CER Act has al‐
so been used to fast-track residential subdivisions, thereby short circuiting the currently pro‐
tracted consent and environment court processes. The intention has been to free up
residential land so that people who have been displaced by the earthquakes, and workers
arriving in Christchurch to assist with the rebuild can be adequately housed. In doing so,
the minister has confirmed the overall urban form proposed in the Greater Christchurch Ur‐
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ban Development Strategy which sets out urban limits, greenfield residential areas and
housing densities, targets for intensification, urban design outcomes and key transport corri‐
dors (although these measures are currently being challenged through the courts). The need
to dispose of a huge quantity of rubble in a very short timeframe, and to expedite the provi‐
sion of new housing stock to replace that damaged and destroyed are common issues for
cities struck by earthquakes. Both Lisbon and Christchurch used authoritarian powers to ad‐
dress these issues in a timely and economically beneficial manner.
Figure 9. Lidar Map of Christchurch showing ground level changes (2010) COMET
14. Compensation
After  a  wave  of  earthquakes  that  plagued  New  Zealand  between  1929  and  1942  (the
worst of  which was the M7.8 Hawkes Bay earthquake of 1931 which completely devas‐
tated  the  cities  of  Napier  and  Hastings),  the  Labour  Government  created  the  Earth‐
quake and War Damage Commission. The commission eventually insured all  residential
properties,  including  the  land  (up  to  $100,000  for  buildings  and  $20,000  for  contents)
against  damage from natural  disasters  [34].  Commercial  property  must  be  privately  in‐
sured. In early 2010,  the EQC had reserves of NZD 5.6 billion backed by a government
guarantee. However the total insurance estimate for the Christchurch earthquakes is up‐
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wards of  NZD 30  billion  [35]  and represents  the  worst  natural  disaster  in  a  developed
nation  relative  to  size  of  economy.  Private  insurance  fared  no  better,  with  the  market
dominated  by  only  5  principal  providers,  several  of  whom  have  struggled  to  pay  out
claims without government assistance.  The compensation for damage is  an on-going sa‐
ga  of  bureaucratic  complexity,  delays  and individual  suffering  which  has  been  exhaus‐
tively  documented  by  the  nation’s  media.  Policy  neglect  had  contributed  to  the
underinsurance of the majority of New Zealand homes, with EQC covering a quarter of
the average value of  a  New Zealand home,  and maximum premiums still  at  their  1973
level  of  NZD 67.50 per annum in spite  of  advice to increase these in 2008.  A premium
for  land  insurance  had  never  been  charged,  but  this  type  of  damage  turned  out  to  be
the most  expensive.  While  the annual  EQC premiums were raised in the immediate af‐
termath of  the earthquakes,  policy revision in the insurance sector is  still  under consid‐
eration.  Discussions  include  the  introduction  of  land  insurance,  better  processes  of
alignment  between land use decision making in  territorial  local  authorities  and disaster
insurance agencies,  and the level of future risk-sharing between EQC and private insur‐
ers [36].
15. Experience and expertise
Local government manager Warwick Isaac, who was overseeing the demolition of buildings
in Christchurch, was appointed to lead the Central Christchurch Development Unit (CCDU)
which is tasked with leading the rebuilding of the central city. Dubbed ‘the demolition
man’, a Tom Scott cartoon has him lamenting “If I had known you were going to put me in
charge of the rebuild Minister I wouldn’t have pulled so much down.” Both the council’s
Draft Central City Plan and the 100-day Blueprint subsequently produced by the CCDU
were prepared by multidisciplinary teams led by urban designers. Although the approaches
were fundamentally different, with a community-led bottom-up process for the Draft Cen‐
tral City Plan and a technocratic top down ‘masterplan’ in the Blueprint, both documents
were ‘design-led’ in that they used design as the key method of developing the plans with
built environment professionals (urban designers, landscape architects, architects) holding
the key leadership roles responsible for developing plan content.
The Draft Central City Plan was developed by a multidisciplinary in-house team of council
staff that included seconded team members from national and international consultancies
including Gehl Architects from Copenhagen. Hugh Nicholson, the Principal Urban Designer
at the Christchurch City Council, was responsible for delivering the content of the plan. The
team included urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers, economists, plan‐
ners, community advisers, communication specialists, sustainability advisers and recreation
and open space planners.
The 100-day Blueprint was prepared by a consortium of design companies led by Boffa Mis‐
kell, a local company specialising in landscape architecture, urban design and landscape
planning. The consortium included local architects Warren and Mahoney and Sheppard and
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ban Development Strategy which sets out urban limits, greenfield residential areas and
housing densities, targets for intensification, urban design outcomes and key transport corri‐
dors (although these measures are currently being challenged through the courts). The need
to dispose of a huge quantity of rubble in a very short timeframe, and to expedite the provi‐
sion of new housing stock to replace that damaged and destroyed are common issues for
cities struck by earthquakes. Both Lisbon and Christchurch used authoritarian powers to ad‐
dress these issues in a timely and economically beneficial manner.
Figure 9. Lidar Map of Christchurch showing ground level changes (2010) COMET
14. Compensation
After  a  wave  of  earthquakes  that  plagued  New  Zealand  between  1929  and  1942  (the
worst of  which was the M7.8 Hawkes Bay earthquake of 1931 which completely devas‐
tated  the  cities  of  Napier  and  Hastings),  the  Labour  Government  created  the  Earth‐
quake and War Damage Commission. The commission eventually insured all  residential
properties,  including  the  land  (up  to  $100,000  for  buildings  and  $20,000  for  contents)
against  damage from natural  disasters  [34].  Commercial  property  must  be  privately  in‐
sured. In early 2010,  the EQC had reserves of NZD 5.6 billion backed by a government
guarantee. However the total insurance estimate for the Christchurch earthquakes is up‐
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wards of  NZD 30  billion  [35]  and represents  the  worst  natural  disaster  in  a  developed
nation  relative  to  size  of  economy.  Private  insurance  fared  no  better,  with  the  market
dominated  by  only  5  principal  providers,  several  of  whom  have  struggled  to  pay  out
claims without government assistance.  The compensation for damage is  an on-going sa‐
ga  of  bureaucratic  complexity,  delays  and individual  suffering  which  has  been  exhaus‐
tively  documented  by  the  nation’s  media.  Policy  neglect  had  contributed  to  the
underinsurance of the majority of New Zealand homes, with EQC covering a quarter of
the average value of  a  New Zealand home,  and maximum premiums still  at  their  1973
level  of  NZD 67.50 per annum in spite  of  advice to increase these in 2008.  A premium
for  land  insurance  had  never  been  charged,  but  this  type  of  damage  turned  out  to  be
the most  expensive.  While  the annual  EQC premiums were raised in the immediate af‐
termath of  the earthquakes,  policy revision in the insurance sector is  still  under consid‐
eration.  Discussions  include  the  introduction  of  land  insurance,  better  processes  of
alignment  between land use decision making in  territorial  local  authorities  and disaster
insurance agencies,  and the level of future risk-sharing between EQC and private insur‐
ers [36].
15. Experience and expertise
Local government manager Warwick Isaac, who was overseeing the demolition of buildings
in Christchurch, was appointed to lead the Central Christchurch Development Unit (CCDU)
which is tasked with leading the rebuilding of the central city. Dubbed ‘the demolition
man’, a Tom Scott cartoon has him lamenting “If I had known you were going to put me in
charge of the rebuild Minister I wouldn’t have pulled so much down.” Both the council’s
Draft Central City Plan and the 100-day Blueprint subsequently produced by the CCDU
were prepared by multidisciplinary teams led by urban designers. Although the approaches
were fundamentally different, with a community-led bottom-up process for the Draft Cen‐
tral City Plan and a technocratic top down ‘masterplan’ in the Blueprint, both documents
were ‘design-led’ in that they used design as the key method of developing the plans with
built environment professionals (urban designers, landscape architects, architects) holding
the key leadership roles responsible for developing plan content.
The Draft Central City Plan was developed by a multidisciplinary in-house team of council
staff that included seconded team members from national and international consultancies
including Gehl Architects from Copenhagen. Hugh Nicholson, the Principal Urban Designer
at the Christchurch City Council, was responsible for delivering the content of the plan. The
team included urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers, economists, plan‐
ners, community advisers, communication specialists, sustainability advisers and recreation
and open space planners.
The 100-day Blueprint was prepared by a consortium of design companies led by Boffa Mis‐
kell, a local company specialising in landscape architecture, urban design and landscape
planning. The consortium included local architects Warren and Mahoney and Sheppard and
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Rout as well as specialist convention centre and stadium designers. The team was led by
landscape architects Don Miskell and Rachel De Lambert and urban designer Marc Bailey.
16. Planning
Within three months of  the February earthquake,  an extensive public  consultation exer‐
cise  was  undertaken  with  the  people  of  Christchurch  to  help  shape  the  future  plan  of
the  devastated  city.  The  website  shareanidea.org.nz  generated  58,000  hits  and  engaged
the  public  in  four  key  areas:  move  (transportation),  market  (business),  space  (public
place  and  recreation)  and  life  (mixed  uses),  across  traditional  and  social  media  net‐
works.  This  was  followed by an interactive  expo,  10  community  workshops,  100  stake‐
holder  meetings  and  a  professional  competition  for  5  selected  sites.  An  unprecedented
level  of  public  participation generated 106,000 ideas over six weeks and these informed
the development of the Draft Central City Plan.
One  of  the  firm  assumptions  underlying  the  Draft  Central  City  Plan  was  the  mainte‐
nance  of  the  existing  street  and  land  ownership  patterns.  In  part  this  recognised  the
strong urban form provided by the existing grid and its  heritage values.  In part  it  was
in  response  to  initial  estimates  that  suggested  50%  of  the  buildings  in  the  commercial
core  might  be  demolished  (subsequently  this  looks  to  be  greater  than  60%).  This  im‐
plied  that  there  was  still  a  substantial  residual  value  in  the  remaining  buildings  and
services  which the  city  could not  afford to  lose.  In  terms of  broad urban design objec‐
tives,  both the draft  CCP and the Blueprint  set  out  to provide an enhanced network of
green open spaces  based around the  Papa o  Otakaro (Avon River  Park)  and Cathedral
Square,  to  rebuild  a  more  compact  intensive  low-rise  commercial  core,  to  increase  the
number and density of  inner-city residents,  and to promote mixed-use developments in
areas surrounding the core. The plan also proposed more sustainable transportation sys‐
tems, including a light-rail system from the university to the CBD, that would eventual‐
ly  connect  into  a  regional  rail  network  and  a  grid  of  cycle-ways.  The  redevelopment
clustered around a  set  of  core  projects  seeded by government,  which were  designed to
attract  investment  and rebuilding  in  the  CBD and these  included a  greening  of  Cathe‐
dral Square, a sports hub, a convention centre, a central library and a hospital campus.
One of the more controversial urban design proposals in the Draft CCP was a reduction in
height limits to 28 metres or seven stories. Christchurch was the first major Australasian city
to propose a low-rise urban form, moving away from the modernist podium and tower
model of development. The reasons for this were partly the high level of community sup‐
port for low-rise buildings and their desire to create a more human-scale environment with
better environmental conditions, including improved sunlight access and reduced wind fun‐
nelling. Additionally, economic modelling indicated that due to the increased foundation
and structural costs required to build higher than six to seven storeys, the most economical‐
ly viable built-form with the highest rate of financial return was in this height range. The
final reason was to address the oversupply of commercial land in the core, by rebuilding a
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more consistent intensity of development over the area of the core, avoiding the spikes of
oversupply and undersupply provided by the tower model. There was a strong backlash
from the business community against the proposed height limits and this was one of the
provisions that the national government set aside when it reviewed the Draft CCP. However
at the end of the review, they reconfirmed the height limits based primarily on the economic
impact assessment and the land supply issues.
Figure 10. The CCUP Blueprint (2012) CCUP
The Draft CCP proposed using built-form restrictions to further promote a compact com‐
mercial core, with a higher intensity of development through the use of incentives and by
limiting development potential outside the core. The Blueprint adopted a far more interven‐
tionist approach by establishing a ‘green frame’ (reinstating nineteenth century parklands)
and compulsorily acquiring large areas of land surrounding the core. The long-term future
of the proposed frame is not entirely clear. Some parts of it appear to be intended as perma‐
nent open spaces, some parts such as the health precinct are earmarked for campus-style
commercial development, while other parts appear to form a potential land bank for release
once land in the core has been fully developed.
In summary, the Draft CCP adopted a multifaceted approach to recovery that incorporated
a wider range of projects and implementation tools. The vision balanced incentives and reg‐
ulation to deliver major catalyst and public space projects, alongside sustainability, housing,
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Rout as well as specialist convention centre and stadium designers. The team was led by
landscape architects Don Miskell and Rachel De Lambert and urban designer Marc Bailey.
16. Planning
Within three months of  the February earthquake,  an extensive public  consultation exer‐
cise  was  undertaken  with  the  people  of  Christchurch  to  help  shape  the  future  plan  of
the  devastated  city.  The  website  shareanidea.org.nz  generated  58,000  hits  and  engaged
the  public  in  four  key  areas:  move  (transportation),  market  (business),  space  (public
place  and  recreation)  and  life  (mixed  uses),  across  traditional  and  social  media  net‐
works.  This  was  followed by an interactive  expo,  10  community  workshops,  100  stake‐
holder  meetings  and  a  professional  competition  for  5  selected  sites.  An  unprecedented
level  of  public  participation generated 106,000 ideas over six weeks and these informed
the development of the Draft Central City Plan.
One  of  the  firm  assumptions  underlying  the  Draft  Central  City  Plan  was  the  mainte‐
nance  of  the  existing  street  and  land  ownership  patterns.  In  part  this  recognised  the
strong urban form provided by the existing grid and its  heritage values.  In part  it  was
in  response  to  initial  estimates  that  suggested  50%  of  the  buildings  in  the  commercial
core  might  be  demolished  (subsequently  this  looks  to  be  greater  than  60%).  This  im‐
plied  that  there  was  still  a  substantial  residual  value  in  the  remaining  buildings  and
services  which the  city  could not  afford to  lose.  In  terms of  broad urban design objec‐
tives,  both the draft  CCP and the Blueprint  set  out  to provide an enhanced network of
green open spaces  based around the  Papa o  Otakaro (Avon River  Park)  and Cathedral
Square,  to  rebuild  a  more  compact  intensive  low-rise  commercial  core,  to  increase  the
number and density of  inner-city residents,  and to promote mixed-use developments in
areas surrounding the core. The plan also proposed more sustainable transportation sys‐
tems, including a light-rail system from the university to the CBD, that would eventual‐
ly  connect  into  a  regional  rail  network  and  a  grid  of  cycle-ways.  The  redevelopment
clustered around a  set  of  core  projects  seeded by government,  which were  designed to
attract  investment  and rebuilding  in  the  CBD and these  included a  greening  of  Cathe‐
dral Square, a sports hub, a convention centre, a central library and a hospital campus.
One of the more controversial urban design proposals in the Draft CCP was a reduction in
height limits to 28 metres or seven stories. Christchurch was the first major Australasian city
to propose a low-rise urban form, moving away from the modernist podium and tower
model of development. The reasons for this were partly the high level of community sup‐
port for low-rise buildings and their desire to create a more human-scale environment with
better environmental conditions, including improved sunlight access and reduced wind fun‐
nelling. Additionally, economic modelling indicated that due to the increased foundation
and structural costs required to build higher than six to seven storeys, the most economical‐
ly viable built-form with the highest rate of financial return was in this height range. The
final reason was to address the oversupply of commercial land in the core, by rebuilding a
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more consistent intensity of development over the area of the core, avoiding the spikes of
oversupply and undersupply provided by the tower model. There was a strong backlash
from the business community against the proposed height limits and this was one of the
provisions that the national government set aside when it reviewed the Draft CCP. However
at the end of the review, they reconfirmed the height limits based primarily on the economic
impact assessment and the land supply issues.
Figure 10. The CCUP Blueprint (2012) CCUP
The Draft CCP proposed using built-form restrictions to further promote a compact com‐
mercial core, with a higher intensity of development through the use of incentives and by
limiting development potential outside the core. The Blueprint adopted a far more interven‐
tionist approach by establishing a ‘green frame’ (reinstating nineteenth century parklands)
and compulsorily acquiring large areas of land surrounding the core. The long-term future
of the proposed frame is not entirely clear. Some parts of it appear to be intended as perma‐
nent open spaces, some parts such as the health precinct are earmarked for campus-style
commercial development, while other parts appear to form a potential land bank for release
once land in the core has been fully developed.
In summary, the Draft CCP adopted a multifaceted approach to recovery that incorporated
a wider range of projects and implementation tools. The vision balanced incentives and reg‐
ulation to deliver major catalyst and public space projects, alongside sustainability, housing,
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arts and transport projects. The blueprint focuses more deliberately on national government
priorities, providing a regulated vision embodied in a range of catalyst projects that involve
rebuilding critical public and economic infrastructure such as the hospital and the conven‐
tion centre. At the second anniversary of the first earthquake, the city has started to rebuild
with 1000 building consents in the past 12 months. Processes are being put in place by
CCUP to fast track significant projects through an urban design board process while the
CCC Urban Design Panel is doubling in size to cater for the anticipated increasing volume
of resource consent applications.
17. Conclusion
Events in Lisbon and Christchurch stand apart in chronology, severity and extent, recovery
management, and design outcome, but have sufficient in common to draw some interesting
and relevant conclusions to 21st century disaster-response strategies. Prime amongst these is
the use of urban design as a revitalisation mechanism, as it is a natural aspiration to want to
rebuild a devastated metropolis anew, correcting the mistakes of the past by implementing
new and state-of-the-art practices to envision a better city.
Lisbon suffered not only a cataclysmic earthquake but also a devastating tsunami and fire.
Fortunately for Christchurch the latter two stressors were absent, and 250 years of improved
planning, seismic and fire engineering performance, reduced the relative death toll from
building collapse while generous provision of public space allowed the population to escape
to safer areas. Christchurch, in achieving this high level of technical preparedness, is much
indebted to Lisbon which pioneered many contemporary post-earthquake response strat‐
egies. Two hundred and fifty years before the terms resilience or sustainability entered the
built environment lexicon, their guiding principles were applied in Lisbon. Pombal’s engi‐
neers made the decision to rebuild in the same location, but not before investigating six al‐
ternative sites and researching the technical failures that led to the high death toll. In so
doing they were embedding in the plan the future sustainability of the city and built in resil‐
ience for future seismic events, not only for themselves but also for others who chose to fol‐
low their example.
The civil defence emergency response was, for the first time in history, an international one,
with Portugal’s trading partners stepping in to assist. The necessary revenue for recovery
was raised via import taxes levied by local businesses. Exploitative behaviours were cur‐
tailed by punishing looters, freezing rents and the price of materials. The immediate survey‐
ing and demolition of the area reduced the territory to a uniform and indisputable condition
in terms of future claims. Prior to any rebuilding, a post-disaster analysis was conducted to
establish which buildings had survived and why. These investigations led to a number of
technical innovations that required a new formal and technical building typology. This sim‐
ple and elegant solution to rebuild the city relied on three crucial pillars: the complete dem‐
olition of the devastated Baixa, the re-drawing of property lines, and an urban design plan
that integrated these technical provisions into a best-practice vision (based on solid interna‐
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tional precedent) for a commercial rather than an institutional centre for Lisbon. The imple‐
mentation of these strategies was only possible due to the authoritarian nature of the
governance system at the time, and an emergency response which delivered this power uni‐
laterally into the hands of the Minister of State.
A similar approach is clearly not possible or appropriate in a modern democracy, although
the potential exists and was contemplated within the New Zealand legislation introduced to
affect recovery plans in Christchurch. The national government has committed substantial
leadership resources and legislative support to the recovery of Christchurch and the Canter‐
bury region. Of particular note has been the strategic land use withdrawal from the residen‐
tial red zone, the on-going demolition of dangerous buildings, and the proposed major
infrastructure and facilities as catalyst projects. The authoritarian powers provided through
the CER Act have enabled these initiatives to occur with the minimum of delay or inappro‐
priate process, although some delays have occurred due to the lack of clarity about the re‐
spective roles of the council and CERA. The Draft CCP proposed an integrated plan for the
central city, while the blueprint approved by the minister focuses on rebuilding the major
infrastructure and facilities and leaves out much of the 'glue' - the smaller scale projects that
hold the big moves together. The absence of urban residential typologies or social housing
to accommodate earthquake victims from the list of prioritised projects, overlooks the ca‐
pacity and necessity of embedding these in the plan as community or capital investment op‐
portunities in the way they were in the Lisbon plan. The council currently intends to
continue with a number of these smaller projects in tandem, so the end outcome may well
be the same albeit encapsulated in two plans rather than one. The major omission of the ma‐
jority of the transport provisions is the subject of a further study.
The Draft CCP and the approved blueprint have both been led by urban designers and
shaped by urban design propositions, in particular a low-rise, more intensively developed
city based on economic factors with high quality green and public spaces shaped for people.
The extent to which they can replicate the success of the Lisbon reconstruction is at least in
part subject to international economic forces and remains to be seen. Equally important is
the clarity developed around future urban design controls. While these exist in the Draft
CCP, the minister has side-stepped council involvement in consent processes and set up a
new consent authority to oversee central-city consents, with one representative each from
the council, CERA and Ngai Tahu, (with no articulated formal role for Christchurch City Ur‐
ban Design Panel). This body has a mandated consent turnaround of 5 working days as
compared to the usual 20- to 85-day timeframe (depending on levels of compliance).
The top-down process enacted in the Lisbon earthquake or more recently the Kyoto earth‐
quake, and the bottom-up process followed after Hurricane Katrina, sit at either extreme of
the continuum of possible response management strategies to natural disasters. A balance
between these extremes is more feasible, the balance depending on the socio-cultural and
economic context and the governance systems in place at the time of the crisis.
Communication Technologies have had a major impact on response capability in the inter‐
vening centuries between Lisbon and Christchurch. Tsunami early warning systems and in‐
ternational media networks give instant alerts of impending disasters allowing preparation
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arts and transport projects. The blueprint focuses more deliberately on national government
priorities, providing a regulated vision embodied in a range of catalyst projects that involve
rebuilding critical public and economic infrastructure such as the hospital and the conven‐
tion centre. At the second anniversary of the first earthquake, the city has started to rebuild
with 1000 building consents in the past 12 months. Processes are being put in place by
CCUP to fast track significant projects through an urban design board process while the
CCC Urban Design Panel is doubling in size to cater for the anticipated increasing volume
of resource consent applications.
17. Conclusion
Events in Lisbon and Christchurch stand apart in chronology, severity and extent, recovery
management, and design outcome, but have sufficient in common to draw some interesting
and relevant conclusions to 21st century disaster-response strategies. Prime amongst these is
the use of urban design as a revitalisation mechanism, as it is a natural aspiration to want to
rebuild a devastated metropolis anew, correcting the mistakes of the past by implementing
new and state-of-the-art practices to envision a better city.
Lisbon suffered not only a cataclysmic earthquake but also a devastating tsunami and fire.
Fortunately for Christchurch the latter two stressors were absent, and 250 years of improved
planning, seismic and fire engineering performance, reduced the relative death toll from
building collapse while generous provision of public space allowed the population to escape
to safer areas. Christchurch, in achieving this high level of technical preparedness, is much
indebted to Lisbon which pioneered many contemporary post-earthquake response strat‐
egies. Two hundred and fifty years before the terms resilience or sustainability entered the
built environment lexicon, their guiding principles were applied in Lisbon. Pombal’s engi‐
neers made the decision to rebuild in the same location, but not before investigating six al‐
ternative sites and researching the technical failures that led to the high death toll. In so
doing they were embedding in the plan the future sustainability of the city and built in resil‐
ience for future seismic events, not only for themselves but also for others who chose to fol‐
low their example.
The civil defence emergency response was, for the first time in history, an international one,
with Portugal’s trading partners stepping in to assist. The necessary revenue for recovery
was raised via import taxes levied by local businesses. Exploitative behaviours were cur‐
tailed by punishing looters, freezing rents and the price of materials. The immediate survey‐
ing and demolition of the area reduced the territory to a uniform and indisputable condition
in terms of future claims. Prior to any rebuilding, a post-disaster analysis was conducted to
establish which buildings had survived and why. These investigations led to a number of
technical innovations that required a new formal and technical building typology. This sim‐
ple and elegant solution to rebuild the city relied on three crucial pillars: the complete dem‐
olition of the devastated Baixa, the re-drawing of property lines, and an urban design plan
that integrated these technical provisions into a best-practice vision (based on solid interna‐
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tional precedent) for a commercial rather than an institutional centre for Lisbon. The imple‐
mentation of these strategies was only possible due to the authoritarian nature of the
governance system at the time, and an emergency response which delivered this power uni‐
laterally into the hands of the Minister of State.
A similar approach is clearly not possible or appropriate in a modern democracy, although
the potential exists and was contemplated within the New Zealand legislation introduced to
affect recovery plans in Christchurch. The national government has committed substantial
leadership resources and legislative support to the recovery of Christchurch and the Canter‐
bury region. Of particular note has been the strategic land use withdrawal from the residen‐
tial red zone, the on-going demolition of dangerous buildings, and the proposed major
infrastructure and facilities as catalyst projects. The authoritarian powers provided through
the CER Act have enabled these initiatives to occur with the minimum of delay or inappro‐
priate process, although some delays have occurred due to the lack of clarity about the re‐
spective roles of the council and CERA. The Draft CCP proposed an integrated plan for the
central city, while the blueprint approved by the minister focuses on rebuilding the major
infrastructure and facilities and leaves out much of the 'glue' - the smaller scale projects that
hold the big moves together. The absence of urban residential typologies or social housing
to accommodate earthquake victims from the list of prioritised projects, overlooks the ca‐
pacity and necessity of embedding these in the plan as community or capital investment op‐
portunities in the way they were in the Lisbon plan. The council currently intends to
continue with a number of these smaller projects in tandem, so the end outcome may well
be the same albeit encapsulated in two plans rather than one. The major omission of the ma‐
jority of the transport provisions is the subject of a further study.
The Draft CCP and the approved blueprint have both been led by urban designers and
shaped by urban design propositions, in particular a low-rise, more intensively developed
city based on economic factors with high quality green and public spaces shaped for people.
The extent to which they can replicate the success of the Lisbon reconstruction is at least in
part subject to international economic forces and remains to be seen. Equally important is
the clarity developed around future urban design controls. While these exist in the Draft
CCP, the minister has side-stepped council involvement in consent processes and set up a
new consent authority to oversee central-city consents, with one representative each from
the council, CERA and Ngai Tahu, (with no articulated formal role for Christchurch City Ur‐
ban Design Panel). This body has a mandated consent turnaround of 5 working days as
compared to the usual 20- to 85-day timeframe (depending on levels of compliance).
The top-down process enacted in the Lisbon earthquake or more recently the Kyoto earth‐
quake, and the bottom-up process followed after Hurricane Katrina, sit at either extreme of
the continuum of possible response management strategies to natural disasters. A balance
between these extremes is more feasible, the balance depending on the socio-cultural and
economic context and the governance systems in place at the time of the crisis.
Communication Technologies have had a major impact on response capability in the inter‐
vening centuries between Lisbon and Christchurch. Tsunami early warning systems and in‐
ternational media networks give instant alerts of impending disasters allowing preparation
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or evacuation. Cell phone networks, satellite communications and GPS tracking and posi‐
tioning technologies contribute to more effective search and rescue operations. Collective
media and social network platforms pressure reconstruction authorities to deliver on their
promises in a timely manner. The internet collapses the time required for widespread public
consultation leading to more effective community buy-in into new urban proposals.
In Christchurch, the lack of alternative design proposals from official sources has been a re‐
sponse to the short timeframes imposed by the government. This is less concerning or neces‐
sary given the wide consultation undertaken to reach the plan outcome. Again in spite of
the 250-year separation and with different professional actors, Lisbon and Christchurch had
good levels of technical expertise available to generate an urban design-led reconstruction
effort using current contemporary urban theory around sustainability and resilience plan‐
ning in combination with deep local knowledge.
The technical planning and architectural detail is not yet present in the Christchurch plan
and will be managed by planning consent processes that have not yet been well defined. Lis‐
bon provides an excellent model for reinventing a modern local urban type (a mixed-use,
low-rise, multi-tenancy, structurally sound and fire-protected building) and designing an
urban block morphology that reflects a historical vernacular. This will be the fabric that
weaves the plan framework and the demonstration projects into a real city.
New Zealand government agencies in charge of engineering, building and construction
standards have not yet integrated the lessons from the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes into up‐
graded performance codes. As a nation located on a chain of islands on the Pacific ‘ring of
fire’, uptake of resilience strategies like those in enlightenment Portugal must encompass
flexible governance systems, high-level technical expertise in national, regional and urban
planning sectors, and innovative architectural, communications, engineering and material
technologies. This in combination with communities helping themselves is the best insur‐
ance against future calamity.
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or evacuation. Cell phone networks, satellite communications and GPS tracking and posi‐
tioning technologies contribute to more effective search and rescue operations. Collective
media and social network platforms pressure reconstruction authorities to deliver on their
promises in a timely manner. The internet collapses the time required for widespread public
consultation leading to more effective community buy-in into new urban proposals.
In Christchurch, the lack of alternative design proposals from official sources has been a re‐
sponse to the short timeframes imposed by the government. This is less concerning or neces‐
sary given the wide consultation undertaken to reach the plan outcome. Again in spite of
the 250-year separation and with different professional actors, Lisbon and Christchurch had
good levels of technical expertise available to generate an urban design-led reconstruction
effort using current contemporary urban theory around sustainability and resilience plan‐
ning in combination with deep local knowledge.
The technical planning and architectural detail is not yet present in the Christchurch plan
and will be managed by planning consent processes that have not yet been well defined. Lis‐
bon provides an excellent model for reinventing a modern local urban type (a mixed-use,
low-rise, multi-tenancy, structurally sound and fire-protected building) and designing an
urban block morphology that reflects a historical vernacular. This will be the fabric that
weaves the plan framework and the demonstration projects into a real city.
New Zealand government agencies in charge of engineering, building and construction
standards have not yet integrated the lessons from the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes into up‐
graded performance codes. As a nation located on a chain of islands on the Pacific ‘ring of
fire’, uptake of resilience strategies like those in enlightenment Portugal must encompass
flexible governance systems, high-level technical expertise in national, regional and urban
planning sectors, and innovative architectural, communications, engineering and material
technologies. This in combination with communities helping themselves is the best insur‐
ance against future calamity.
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1. Introduction
‘One of the best ways to understand a system is to disturb it.’ [1]
1.1. Resilience
There are two types of resilience: engineering resilience, and ecological resilience. [2] Engi‐
neering resilience is drawn from environmental sciences where the resistance to disturbance
and rate of return to an optimal equilibrium is paramount. It is predicated on understanding
the componentry of a system, the universal applicability of resilience principles, and its
‘efficiency, constancy and predictability’ [3] – all attributes at the core of engineers’ briefs for
fail-safe design.
Ecological resilience (ex ecological sciences) is about the interrelatedness of a system’s
components and forces; how a system can undergo change and still retain function and
structure; how it can self-organize; and how it can increase the capacity for learning and
adaptation. [4] Evolution exemplifies ecological resilience: it is a force (within a system) that
uses random mutations of components (of a system) to lasting advantage. But it is hard to
predict how it will work. The characteristics of ecological resilience are immeasurable, different
at different scales, dependent on persistence, change and unpredictability, balanced by
multiple equilibria, and accepting of experimentation, knowing that it is safe to fail. These
characteristics may not always be apparent, but will probably surface when there is a disturb‐
ance, when there is a need to adapt. [5] Nature tells us, paradoxically, that it is perhaps a
mistake to try too hard to avoid shocks; that stability lets risk accumulate without providing
capability or capacity to deal with disaster; and that volatility actually keeps things manageable
[6].
In the wake of apocalyptic disturbances, such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes, the
concept of resilience has penetrated recent urbanism theory. But which type of resilience?
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Engineering resilience, one would think, should have a stranglehold on urban design. The
environment of the city – the makeup of the entire field of the city including its landscape, its
infrastructure and its buildings – is the componentry of the urban system that needs to ‘bounce
back’ quickly and efficiently to facilitate recovery after a disturbance. It is the focus of engi‐
neers, planners and city makers as they piece together recovery.
Yet a city’s contextual interrelationships are often the result of its non-linear processes [7]. The
nested but discontinuous scales of the building plot, the street block, the neighbourhood and
the region [8] demonstrate that a city’s morphology is structured like an ecological system.
Furthermore, systems-based urbanist theories share ecological sciences’ resilience concepts of
diversity, modularity, variability and innovation. [9] Hence, we can examine a city’s recovery
after disturbance in terms of its ecological resilience, in which the agents of adaptation would
be urban designers, institutions / government and, more often, community driven by a
changing social, cultural, political, economic and environmental contexts.
After a disturbance in nature, competitive forces are at large, creating tensions between the
pre-existing trying to re-establish; the aspirants who want to do better; and competition who
invite innovation and change, often through experimentation. Does the same happen in a city?
How do the agents of adaptation in a city – the government, the urban designers, the com‐
munity – know how, where and at what scale they can innovate? What is innovation in urban
design?
1.2. Innovation
Innovation, whose etymology comes from the Latin word meaning to change, is bilateral. It
entails something ‘new’, and it entails systematic implementation. The ‘new’ may be new
needs, but it may also be ‘old’ needs that are met in ‘new’ ways. It can entail ‘new’ products,
‘new’ processes, ‘new’ values, or ‘new’ technologies. It differs from invention which refers
more specifically to ideation: innovation is a change to a system.
The relationship between innovation and disturbance is at the core of commerce and economics
literature. Joseph Schumpeter described the distinguishing trait of innovation as ‘creative
destruction’, [10] in which the ‘new’ wipes out the ‘established’, calling it radical innovation.
Henderson and Clark subsequently recognised slower moving, ‘incremental’ innovations
where systems’ architecture may be enhanced rather than destroyed [11]. Tushman et al
highlighted the important role of the consumer in innovation: a change to a market is a change
to the system, even if it is not accompanied by a new technology [12]. Verganti points out that
this process, which culminates in society accepting new ‘meanings’ of old technologies, is not
necessarily led by consumer feedback, but is more often ‘design- driven’. [13] Research and
development, often by and through design, is thus fundamental to innovation.
Innovation is also one of the hallmarks of a resilient ecological system. ‘A resilient system
would subsidise experimentation – trying things in different ways – and offer help to those
who are willing to change. Enabling innovation is an important way of creating space…
Resilience thinking is about embracing change and disturbance rather than denying or
constraining it’…When rigid connections and behaviours are broken ‘opportunities open up
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and new resources are made available for growth….the warning bell to a resilient thinker is
increasing preoccupation with process… a resilient approach would advocate initiating a
disturbance or freeing things up to recapture the dynamics of a growth phase.’ [14]
So what does urban design innovation look like? Sola de Morales suggests that the Carrer de
Ferran, an urban intervention undertaken in the mid 19th century that widened and straight‐
ened a cross street in medieval Barcelona, was ‘unquestionably the most innovative urban
intervention in the old town…. It was innovative not just in form, but also in its ideological
and political underpinnings … [where] the new forms were the driving force of a new era,
cultured, egalitarian and progressive, in contrast to the old feudal and aristocratic stratifica‐
tion.’ [15] Not as radical as Haussmann’s contemporary transformation of Paris, the one
kilometre long Carrer de Ferran project (see figure 1) resulted in a modest nine metre street
width, and took 40 years to implement. But it established a significance to the role of the city’s
cross axes which informed later moves such as Gran Via, Carrer Ample and Cerda’s Eixample.
Carrer de Ferran’s innovation was that it set a new agenda for the city’s form because the cross
streets catalysed exponential growth. But perhaps more importantly Carrer de Ferran suggests
that innovation in urban design is not just stylistic or typological, and does not have to be large
scale or transformative, but is significant when it rethinks the political, social and civic context
with broad catalysing implications. In urban design this is usually a slow process. ‘It is very
difficult to identify clearly the turning points in the history of the city.’ [16]
Urban design has, of course, always heralded the importance of context, milieu and networks.
So does the psychology of creative thinking and the management of knowledge creation. In
psychology divergent thinking, the foundation of creativity and innovation, is thought to
emanate when designers and artists draw together previously unconnected threads in their
context to create the ‘new’. [17] Management theory also recognises how new knowledge
emerges from tacit or intuitive knowledge via externalisation and socialisation. [18] In urban
design, more so than in other spatial design disciplines, social, political, historical and
environmental contexts provide the basis for design solutions. But the parallels often stop there
usually because urban design practice, unlike urban design theory, uses context objectively
(like an engineering science) rather than symbiotically (like an ecology). [19] The problem is
compounded by conservative governments and property owners who usually resist broad‐
scale changes to a city: the reality of institutional democracy and Benthian utilitarianism tends
to nullify risk and untie the link between creativity and its application in the public domain.
Ann Forsyth [20] suggests the opportunity for urban design innovation may be best achieved
through academic research because it is ideally placed to take time to explore data and
technique, experiment, and ground ideas to remove risk. The large scale effect of Jane Jacobs'
thesis on urban systems, [21] and the research into low impact urban ecology provide evidence
of the innovative outcomes of research. But it does not have to be the exclusive domain of
academics. If recovery could occur at a pace that will allow everyday research and experi‐
mentation to occur, a disturbance may be the ideal opportunity to investigate the potential for
innovation, when the system is exposed, when new players are involved in adaptation, when
cultural shifts occur in the relationships between people, governments and place, and a new
kind of thinking alters the way contexts are interpreted.
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Figure 1. Carrer de Ferran, clockwise from top left: the new street cuts horizontally through the old city; street view;
and the street forms the plumb line for the Cerda plan of Barcelona. ( source: Sola de Morales, M. Ten Lessons on Bar‐
celona. COAC: Barcelona; 2007.)
1.3. Innovation after disturbance
In the past, post-disaster adaptation has had divergent consequences. It has led to abandon‐
ment (Antigua in Guatemala, 1773) and irrevocable structural change (Lisbon, 1755) [22]. But
broadscale change is usually the exception. Having experienced numerous tremors in the
nineteenth century and becoming adept at recovery, San Francisco rebuilt the city without
changing its street pattern after the major 1906 earthquake. After the Great Kanto Earthquake
of 1923, despite authorities’ unusually ambitious plans [23], the Japanese citizens wanted
stability and relief and strongly opposed major changes to the urban structure. The desire to
quickly rebuild their lives promoted rapid rebuilding of the city according to traditional
protocols [24]. A similar scenario has arisen after the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and
2011, where the seemingly ‘safe’ option of building back what was there before is an accepted
objective in recovery management. The community reiterates, just get ‘back to normal’. There
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are Freudian parallels: loss leads to grieving which ends when the mourner accepts a substitute
for what was lost. [25] The collective memory of the citizenry errs towards a replacement for
the known, rather than experimenting for the new.
But building back does not necessarily tap into the latencies in a system that an earthquake
exposes. The Government’s focus in Christchurch on like-for-like replacement of engineered
structures (roads etc.) with some improvements – also known as ‘betterment’ – is a risk averse
strategy, built from the remit of engineering resilience. [26] In an interesting development,
Christchurch’s Port Hills’ communities want to rethink the irretrievably lost recreational
amenity – not just the infrastructure of transport and utility services, but also the infrastructure
of landscape - which was what attracted people there in the first place (see figure 2). The loss
of natural and cultural assets has elevated the government-community conflict over what the
map of infrastructural recovery includes and looks like. The government wants to just rebuild
the roads and utility services; the community wants something that was not there before: a
new pathway along the coast that might cement the new-found social capital, might foster the
diversity of lost recreation facilities, and might provide an ‘essential’ redundancy - an access
route for when the only main road is blocked by landfall. It is an innovation with the potential
to create a new typology of pathways across the city, with far reaching impact on health, culture
and environment. But it is the inherent uncertainty of qualitative outcome, its experimental
nature that deters Government. Therein lies the paradox of ecological resilience: it needs to be
capable of failure to succeed.
Can we be sure that change is productive? As an experiment, is it not subject to failure?
In a more radical case Tangshan in China, after its 1985 earthquake, reformatted their urban
structure in accordance with the then-current (but now-outdated) recovery planning mantra
that spreads the components of settlement far enough apart to minimise the impact of a
disaster. Institutionally it seems sound, but it left no options for the diversity that urban‐
ism theorists [27] champion. Not surprisingly,  problems have arisen because the change
was too one-dimensional and predictable. It’s hard for Tangshan to reverse this: ‘the wide
streets, low rise buildings and lack of an identifiable centre of a post-earthquake reconstruc‐
tion have left it somewhat lacking in what some have called “urbane refinements” [28].
Such  an  approach  to  dispersed-ness  is  not  really  palatable  in  modern  urban  theory  as
humanity  faces  environmental  issues  of  potential  resource  depletion,  increased catastro‐
phes  [29]  and  inexorable  population  growth  [30].  Can  we  experiment  without  creating
Tangshan’s irreversible problems?
1.4. Clues
Scale may provide a clue. Innovation is obviously less risky when experiments occur on the
small scale as opposed to the neighbourhood scale or the regional scale. But we are concerned
here with urban design, and as scale gets broader government traditionally has an increasingly
influential role as the agent of adaptation unless, of course, there is competition from com‐
munity. If, at the broadest scale, risk-averse economics dominate, if community is sidelined,
if the blanket approach of ‘building back’ or ‘building back better’ is politically adequate, and
if fast-tracked formulaic change and mono-functional planning are preferred, the systems of
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Figure 2. The collapse of Christchurch’s Port Hills in the 2010/11, where fallen cliff faces have not only led to loss of
property, but have also threatened access and recreation opportunities. There is now tension between community
and government on the rebuilding of the road, pathways and other open space facilities (sources top: N. Jones; below:
BeckerFraser Photos).
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research and experimentation that are embedded in ecological resilience are unable to gain
traction. To achieve ecological resilience at larger scales and buy time for design research,
perhaps there needs to be a greater involvement by community in public space design, because
the community has more time to explore options and understand their implications and
meaning, more time to understand what is ‘possible in a system’. [31] Not surprisingly
ecological resilience theories place emphasis on society: the concepts of social capital and
overlapping governance are important threads in social and urban theories of resilience [32].
Context provides another clue, especially the cultural context. Cultural context is invariably
woven into the physical context of the city and its landscape. Cognitive forces such as the
memory of an earthquake provide a re-reading of physical context and how it might change
to satisfy the need for safety. The sweeping destruction may seldom effect structural innova‐
tion, but it will shift cultural perceptions of what is important and valued, which could affect
the redesign of the spatial language of the urban fabric. So, if communities have a say in public
space design, the ensuing change in cultural context will influence adaptation of urban fabric,
initiating innovation in the meaning of public space and its role in the recovery process. Public
space potentially could mean something ‘new’ after an earthquake.
This chapter discusses how innovation might, at appropriate points, be a catalyst for recovery,
what influences it and what it contributes to the resilience of an urban system. By looking at
case studies we are able to match community adaptation with urban morphological change
and establish a basis for evaluation of a fine grained resilience. To do this we have looked at
the newly constructed open spaces of Kobe after its 1995 earthquake, after it has ‘recovered’
(normally considered to be a 10 year period). [33] We highlight five urban parks that show
how innovation operates at the urban and community scale as a key part of recovery. We
review the way people adapt their land holdings, their attitudes to community and their
activities in a city after a major disturbance.
2. Kobe’s earthquake
2.1. Kobe’s urban morphology pre 1995
In 1868, when the Meiji restoration opened Japan to international trade, Kobe was one of the
key ports that facilitated Japan’s transformation from commercialisation to industrialization
[34].The geomorphological transect of Rokko Mountains, lowlands and deepwater harbour all
within close proximity had served a string of rice farming, fishing and merchant communities
administered by the centralised nationalistic state of Japan’s hierarchical shogunate. By the
1920s two of the most powerful steel fabricators in the world had appropriated most of the
port for its plant. Institutional planning for urbanisation focused on industrial and transport
infrastructure. But urban governance of built form and urban parks was poor. [35] As the non-
rural population grew with factory employment, the rice paddy was adapted as the template
of urban residential structure: the paddy fields were reclaimed for low-rise housing, often sold
to multiple owners, with plots set out in a dense, finely-grained matrix accessed by a squared
network of alleys; the raised edges of the paddy field formed a gridded city road network in
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100 metre squares; in plan, the squares (cho) rotate with the topography to form terraces, once
part of the paddy field system’s hydrology, now the definition of neighbourhoods (see figure
3). Open space was located on the periphery or in conjunction with temples, and as such there
was a lack of spatial diversity in the size of parks. There was no doubt a strong reverence for
nature in the large urban parks, but many of the smaller urban parks ‘increasingly in the hands
of municipal bureaucrats, became hard-surfaced and functionalist, with cookie-cutter layouts
and standardized equipment, and remained so for much of the twentieth century.’ [36] They
were rarely part of the housing pattern. Streets provided the main setting for community life
and activity.
During WWII American bombs laid waste much of the city, but Japan modernised in a
programmatically functional way: building highways and transport and industrial infrastruc‐
ture. Private land units were unaffected, except when the land readajustment instruments
juggled free holdings to make way for wider arterial roads or transport routes [37]. Moderni‐
sation was not deferential to the value of open space within the city: city planners focused on
efficiencies of transport while few controls were exercised over private development. As a
result, Kobe faced the 3rd millennium as a dense and vibrant city rich in street culture with a
strong sense of identity afforded by its neighbourhood densities. Unlike the disappearing cities
of Fordist modernism [38], Kobe’s wartime disasters had primed the city for diversification
when its industrial plant became uncompetitive in a bullish Asian economy. The earthquake
of 1995 was a further catalyst for change.
2.2. Kobe post 1995
The earthquake caused significant damage to the infrastructure of transport, the port areas,
and to the traditional housing areas. The government’s response was typical engineering
resilience - infrastructure was replaced as quickly as possible, upgraded with improvements
to meet modern standards [39]. ‘The object of recovery is to aid victims to get back to normal
life…measures are conducted as swiftly and smoothly as possible’ [40]. In some places
Modernist practices such as streets widening, high rise buildings, and local parks of one hectare
were introduced – a universal approach to urban planning without input from local culture.
It appears that the government pursued recovery as a means of renewing fabric, without
addressing change in community culture. Shin Nagata was a model. The streets and built form
were all transformed to create a safe and accessible urban setting, where density was relocated
vertically. But the change was not really innovation: more a reversion to globally established
standards.
Modernisation did not coalesce altogether with Japanese culture. A grass roots planning
movement called Machizukuri (community-building) emerged out of citizen participation and
community organisation in the 1980s and a reaction to globalised modernism [41]. After Kobe’s
earthquake, community action galvanized because of the slow and somewhat inhumane
response of the national government to the earthquake victims [42]. Machizukuri and gov‐
ernment contested the urban landscape. Land readjustment, park design and street layouts all
became areas of tension, where the community sought to address the lessons of the earthquake
and experiment in the way they might shape their public spaces. Although some commentators
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Figure 3. From top left: Rice paddies formed the basis of Kobe’s street and block grid (Source: Ishihama et al. Nikon
No Bi Vol 14 Kansai. Kokusai Joho Sha. (1968) ); typical cho layout and street grid (Source: Miyasada Akira , cited in
Yasui, E. Community vulnerability and Capacity in Post-Disaster Recovery: the cases of Mano and Mikura Neighbour‐
hoods in the wake of the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. Unpublished PhD thesis. UBC. (2007)); aerial view of Kobe in 1861
(Source: Kobayashi, I. Kobe: 100 years of urban history. Unpublished paper. 2003.); typical street scenes in traditional
housing (M. Bryant).
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have dismissed Machizukuri as being characterised by ‘long-drawn-out procedures’ that
‘generally operate only at very closely limited spatial reference levels’ [43], some of the
outcomes that have emanated in the aftermath show an innovation in the way open space has
been researched and re-imagined by community will.
3. Five parks
There are five parks that seem to demonstrate various aspects of innovation in post- earthquake
Kobe. All of the parks were slow to emerge, being built as part of the ‘development restoration
period’, the final phase of recovery identified by Haas [44] and which Mileti [45] identified as
a social process as well as a physical process. Each shows an approach to innovation that
demonstrates an ecological resilience, where experimentation in form was driven not by
institutional compliance, but by the changing community values that sought to integrate the
disparate but important threads of Modernisation, social heritage, grass-roots politics and the
memory of the disaster. The latter influence is pervasive: the earthquake became part of the
consciousness of the community, a trigger for formal change. Not surprisingly, four out of five
are bottom-up community-designed parks. The other is a government design commission
which tests the social norms embodied in the formal idea of an urban park.
3.1. Rokko Kaze No Sate Koen
Traditional typologies of urban open spaces are either a place of respite, or a place of civic
activity. The former are often dressed like an Arcadian idyll, the latter a fusion of simplicity
and activity. Suburban parks often sit somewhere between these two, mixing both, without
inventing the new. But can there be another typology?
Rokko Kaze No Sate Koen (see figure 4) is the ultimate community park, built in Rokko Michi, a
dense urban area. The park was established after land readjustment established a one hectare
space and government agreed to community involvement in the design. The land readjustment
took six months; but the design of the park took seven years, mainly because there was so
much interaction, discussion and research amongst the political atmosphere of an empowered
community. The idea for the park embodied respite. Trees, vegetation and open space were
paramount. The park also incorporated places for civic activity. A community centre was
prominently positioned to frame an edge of the park; a baseball pitch was defined; and an
outdoor gathering space and activity areas addressed needs of children and adults.
But what is interesting and innovative was that each of these somewhat traditional ideas was
interpreted in a way that could only have come out of the experience of living through an
earthquake. Play areas were dominated by water bodies, that had pumps and wells that
anticipate the next disaster. Seats were designed to be adapted for cooking pits, or toilets. Tree
species were selected for edible fruit. The park’s form provided for recreation and civic activity:
the design was a deliberate gesture that embodied intensity of activity throughout and a
diversity of spaces in an otherwise everyday setting. But it also addressed the social need for
the community to be self-sufficient for the next disturbance.
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Is it a short lived over reaction to a crisis? Maybe, but, because it also tells the story of what
these people experienced, why this place is significant, and how it serves as a physical
memorial of the crisis that passed, it embodies the grieving process of the community. The
park’s innovation is not in the stylistic physical detail, but in how it has intensified the
recreational and social programmes of a community in a small park. It is another way of
thinking what a suburban park’s role might be in Japan. The park needs to embody memories
as well as Arcadian and civic interventions to make a place resilient. In doing so it liberates
the neighbourhood of institutional overtones and allows adaptation to take place.
Figure 4. Rokko Kaze No Sate Koen: clockwise from top right: Aerial image of Rokko michi before the earthquake
(Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan), showing location of future park; photo of plan of park; children
playing beside water pump; children playing beside seat which has potential to act as toilet; vegetable gardens and
community centre. (Photos by P. Allan)
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Suburban parks want to be all things to all people: to do this they need to be a size that can
reflect the needs of its catchment of population and fulfil recreational / civic roles. What if they
don’t? What if they are just there to provide open space, and what if they are just there as a
symbol of the neighbourhood and its legibility. The pocket parks in Matsumoto (see figure
5) assume this role, and they do it not by concentrating the essence of the neighbourhood in
one place, but by creating 10 more or less identical parks in 10 more or less identical chome,
in a necklace that threads its way across the neighbourhood.
Figure 5. Photo of maps of Matsumoto showing parks before and after in each of the chomes; image of one of the
pocket parks (Photos by P.Allan).
Formally there is not much that distinguishes these parks. They each form an off-centre
centerpiece to a modest chome – the 100m square Japanese street block. Each is within 50 metres
of all the houses in its chome, and no more than 100metres from each other. Each park is tiny:
20m x 20m, and each has a gravel area, a few playground equipment pieces, a water pump
and a clock. Placing each in the heart of the neighbourhood is relatively orthodox piece of
urban planning, but they don’t have the diversity to accommodate the broad range of needs
of the community. Instead they just repeat themselves. Inefficient? Redundant? Yes, but these
are some of the hallmarks of a resilient system.
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The urban experiment is their size and proximity to each other. Institutional land readjustment
urged this neighbourhood to adopt a large 1 hectare park, but the community pursued an idea
that each chome wanted spatial structure to match the scale of their chome. So ten parks were
created. The simple modularity of the system shows the importance of the neighbourhood of
chome as an urban unit fundamental to Kobe’s settlement. There are, of course, antecedents
to this idea, not the least of which is embodied in Spanish colonization and their laws of the
Indies, which some commentators say emanate from earthquakes and the need for accessible
open space. [46] The integration of this idea in a modernist planning framework is extraordi‐
nary, because efficiencies are sacrificed to achieve a greater sense of legibility and ownership.
The size of community is an important aspect often disregarded in urban planning which is
preoccupied with a critical mass that creates efficiencies. Matsumoto represents another
innovate approach to open space because it experiments with the size of parks rather than their
formal or programmatic content.
And the clocks serve as a reminder of the bonds of the small community in times of disaster.
3.3. Minato No Mori
Can a downtown urban park be a community park? If there is no one living around a park,
how does it become part of the everyday lives of people who know each other? How does it
come part of their identity, their collective memory? And if it is surrounded by multistory
intersecting motorways, doesn’t it look like urban planning gone wrong? More often the
prescription for the siting of urban parks entails natural beauty, lots of residents nearby, and
a civic ambience.
Minato No Mori is an urban park that breaks the rules. It is a large urban parkland space,
divorced from the harbour, badly connected to the city’s business district and framed by
motorways. Yet it is here, on disused railyards, that community driven by a newly found
momentum of social capital (not government driven by mitigation of impact) resolved to create
an oasis in the city’s transport infrastructure, and in so doing challenged the monofunctional
infrastructural systems that dominate urban planning.
The three hectare park (see figure 6) has a reasonably traditional structure: a large flexible
centre dominated by a grass space, and an intense edge either programmed for community
gardens and play, or planted with forest. In one area is a traditional physical memorial to the
earthquake. In another are the defacto memorials: the community spaces that provide lifelines
to the next event: a place for gathering and camping, an elevated area for viewing problems,
water tanks and place for food security. It is framed not by well-proportioned buildings, as
urban formula would suggest, but by spaghetti of an overhead road system.
The approach exemplifies diversity and its role in resilience in a number of ways. Firstly it
shows that parkland can diversify monofunctional pieces of infrastructure, so as to say space
under freeways is not wasted. It also shows the unorthodoxy that freeways are not necessarily
alien scaled objects in an urban landscape, but rather a piece of topography that can be
addressed and integrated. And finally it shows at the detailed scale the importance of diversity
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in park planning: spatial diversity in elements that drive different programs and also temporal
diversity that recognises that the park can fulfil functions at different times.
But the need for diversity is not just what this place is about. It also shows a willingness to
experiment in the city grid, to free up rigid ideas of monofunctional connections and allow for
growth in new ways. In this way the park is more than a formal expression of diversity in
urban design it is also an expansion of the potential for community to colonise the infrastruc‐
ture of the city.
3.4. Komagabayashi cho 1 chome
Some places weather the impacts of earthquakes and continue to operate as before. But
sometimes the impact of a disturbance warrants investigation to reveal the latencies that have
Figure 6. Minato No Mori framed by motorways, built on former railway land by the community. Aerial photo: Geo‐
spatial Information Authority of Japan. Top photo: Amakawa Yoshimi, Bottom photos: M.Bryant.
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not been exposed before. Some of the traditional residential areas of Shin-nagata were left intact
by the earthquake, and after some repair to building stock the area more or less continued to
operate as it had. No need to intervene? Perhaps not. But one of the legacies that the earthquake
left was an understanding of why open space was important. It was something to be treasured.
But there was no room for park in a traditional neighbourhood with multiple ownerships. The
only open space in many of these traditional places was disused plots not much bigger than
400metres square, which generally felt ‘unhealthy… unattractive… unsafe… insecure...
inactive’. [47] The community in cho 1 chome rehabilitated their alleyways with signs for safety
and developed a pocket park in one of the disused lots to amplify the qualities of living in a
traditional neighbourhood place, and feeling safe (see figure 7).
The park was rehabilitated as simple community space, prepared for the next disaster. It had
a water pump, a seat, some flat space and tree planting for shelter and shade. Compared to
previous examples this is less overwhelming as a piece of innovation. But the minimal nature
Figure 7. Aerial photo of cho pre earthquake; pavement signage and photo of pocket park established after earth‐
quake destruction left vacant space. Aerial photo: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. Photos P. Allan
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of the transformation is the park’s point of difference. The community- based designers left
the traditional Japanese settlement pattern relatively untouched. The subtle interventions
created beauty and the potential for recovery: a place that integrated community meeting areas
and a pathway system that gave directions within a community to find safety. It shows that
resilience is not so much embodied in changing form, but in changing community attitudes.
This project questions the hierarchical thinking of traditional post-earthquake recovery. It
suggests that, even if an earthquake causes little physical destruction, and even if communities
have limited resources, there may still be a significant psychological impact that encourages
communities to change the physical fabric of their neighbourhoods in innovative ways and
retain the unique alleyways and densities of their traditional settlement patterns.
3.5. Waterfront park
The final case study is not a community project. It is an institutional project, designed by one
of Japan’s great architects, Tadao Ando. The park shows qualities that are unusual for a
waterfront: its formal expression is a series of garden-scaled rooms mostly screening the
harbour view; its spatial language controls and frames the vast scenery rather than confronting
it; and its programme is contemplation, achieved at a human scale, not at the scale of industrial
waterfronts. The outcome is a sense of safety. In so doing Ando reinterprets Japanese culture
in a globalized modern context.
Waterfront parks have been following a formula for the last 50 years when heavy industry has
been forced out, containerization shipping has made ports more efficient and cities have sought
to diversify. Kobe was undergoing this transformation prior to the earthquake, and the
Waterfront Park was intended to be part of the gentrification of industrial space by drawing
on the industrial or archaeological heritage. But an earthquake has a way of wiping out the
heritage: needing to start anew, the tableau rasa. So how can a park cling to its context when
the context has been erased?
Tadao Ando’s Waterfront Park at HAT (see figure 8) is exemplar of rethinking spaces in parks
using the historical context of Japans garden culture [48]. It subdivides space for community
ownership rather than as a grand gesture where one can see all. It does this formally by creating
a series of park spaces – empty gardens separated by walls. The interconnected walls create a
maze of connections, but also allow spaces for people to contemplate – not dissimilar to
traditional Japanese gardens which embody Taoism. It abandons the idea that a park needs to
be open with surveillance. The spaces in the park provide areas where people can gather but
be apart. The tension between the need for gathering and privacy is summarized perfectly. In
many ways this park is a memorial to that attitude and to the spirit of Kobe. In this way the
park is an innovation not only in form but in reinventing the Japanese psyche in a modern
setting.
4. Discussion
There are some important considerations from this collection of projects.
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Firstly, a caveat: it may be too early and too subjective to say whether the experiments were
an innovative-defining success that could add knowledge to the generic ideas of open space
design. The projects are each intertwined with a specific community, a specific place and a
specific spatial morphology, and so the innovations will take time before they germinate
elsewhere, if at all.
Secondly there is clearly an innovation in process of park procurement that has occurred as a
result of the earthquake. This process stemmed from the competitive and catalytic tension
between the agents of adaptation; between the institutional planning agencies and the small
scale designers of the Machizukuri. The competition was not just over control of the outcome,
but over the process. While both government and community had a role in rebuilding urban
fabric, the design of each park was hard fought by the community, and the outcome appears
to be highly treasured. Furthermore, each park then took a long time to come to fruition,
because they each took time to be researched, debated and explored at the micro scale of the
community after the earthquake. Each of these projects became (perhaps unintentionally)
experiments in the social processes of form making, where the social processes were more
important and more innovative than the formal outcomes. This long and risky and unpredict‐
Figure 8. Ando’s contemplative Waterfront Park, with ‘community rooms’. Photos: P. Allan; aerial view from Jodidio,
P. Ando: Complete Works. Hong Kong: Taschen. 2007
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able procurement process, precipitated by competition, was itself an innovation, a new way
of producing public space.
Thirdly, and leading on from the above, the innovative processes led by the communities has
generated an innovation in cultural contexts through spatial change. Importantly, the formal
solutions are not necessarily novel: each seemed to take the typical model of the modern park
– a non-Japanese urban model of the small park, the neighbourhood park and the urban park.
What is interesting is that each park explored cognitive transformations in the idea of public
space and what it offered as a place of safety, and as a place of memory. They each had a new
social and political meaning. The most material form of these transformations, which have
become apparent in the spatial language, is in the divergent ideas of intensity, repetition,
diversity and redundancy. It appears that these principles are important qualities in urban
design because they demonstrate a re-reading of the physical context and a shift in culture and
thereby demonstrate capacity for ecological resilience.
5. Conclusion
This study lays down an important challenge for urban designers and government agencies
working in recovery after disasters. Undoubtedly there will always be a need to patiently work
in the interest of citizens in building back what existed prior to any disaster, to replace what
was lost and to provide a stronger urban fabric, one with better engineering resilience. But pre-
empting or excluding community involvement in the recovery process can actually make
communities more vulnerable [49]. And avoiding risk at all costs will not strengthen com‐
munities against all possible disasters. Although ecological resilience attributes, like innova‐
tion, are unlikely to dominate recovery of urban fabric, they need to be addressed in some way,
just as much as engineering resilience does.
Designers therefore need to play a strategic role, negotiating between community and
government, while also leading research and experimentation. In this process designers can
help find the best way to achieve outcomes for the community with design interventions that
are tactical and yet responsive, and assist government with cost effectiveness and timeliness.
Part of this approach will entail an understanding of a community’s cultural context and how
that may be influenced by spatial design. Spatial design by itself may have little meaning. But
small scale experiments in public space can be developed in some sort of partnership with
active communities to develop an acute understanding of how spatial design can positively
affect cultural context and cognitive memory.
The ecological resilience approach is a good model for public space design because, even
though it may entail a lot of design research, it suggests that interventions can be targeted and
relatively minimal, generated from the ‘bottom-up’, with whatever is at hand. This kind of
design is about adjusting, encouraging innovation and redundancies, making ‘space’, explor‐
ing new ways and relationships between community and place.
The Kobe examples provide a basis to build up a body of knowledge on how the process of
adaptation after disturbances may galvanise innovation and reinforce ecological resilience.
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The success of the outcomes may not be clear for some time: they may not be stylistically
creative, and perhaps need even more research, but they may, instead of entrenching the status
quo of the ‘efficient’, provide a basis for a new way of thinking about space that addresses the
persistence of communities.
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1. Introduction
Disasters, both natural and man-made and involving the massive destruction of habitats, have
been with us since the beginning of time. While responses have varied by countries, depending
on their population, wealth and culture; and while the magnitude of disaster has also varied,
as does the capacity for a country to respond, each country strives to restore its infrastructure
to at least its original state, if not better.
At  the  same  time,  affordable  housing  is  also  a  persistent  and  world-wide  imperative.
Common strategies to respond to this need include subsidy, reducing quality, simplifica‐
tion and self-help (Katz et al, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Thorns, 2006; FAS 2008a; Gurran et al,
2008).  Subsidy,  involving  agency  payment  for  part  or  all  of  the  costs  of  housing  (and
seeking  to  recovery)  has  been  challenged  by  issues  relating  to  internal  objectives  and
external teaming initiatives (Bratt, 2002, FEMA 2008a). Quality has been compromised by
issues  relating  to  longevity,  generosity,  politics  and  lack  of  agreement  about  the  mini‐
mum  acceptable  level  of  service  to  be  provided  (Anderson  et  al,  2003;  FEMA  2008b,
Lindberg et al, 2010). Simplification refers to the stripping of any superfluous details such
as decoration, outdoor spaces and methods of construction and delivery. Self-help refers
to  the  potential  for  self-building  and  in  some  cases  self-financing  (Harris,  1999;  Brede‐
noord  and  van  Lindert,  2010;  HUD,  2007,  Leishman,  2012).  These  policies  have  been
implemented to differing degrees of success, but affordability crisis persists (RAND, 2008b).
The prospect of more frequent and more extreme exceptional weather events, engendered by
climate change, further exacerbates the housing affordability crisis. Nowhere is the intersection
of these two issues—post disaster recovery and affordable housing—more intense than in the
recovery programmes following a disaster such as an extreme weather event. In the face of
growing public awareness and concern for global warming and the potential for climate
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change, the challenges of post-disaster recovery and affordable housing have been intensified
with a resurgence of interest in sustainability and green building (Hamin, 2008; Levine et al,
2007; Hayles, 2010). The new imperative for sustainable construction demands that any new
housing be able to weather and mitigate damage from future extreme weather events. No
longer is it sufficient to simply temporarily house victims of a disaster. Post-disaster recovery
goals demand that this be accomplished using community processes and that new structures
are better and stronger, will mitigate damage from future events and will be culturally
appropriate (Berke et al, 1993; Comerio, 1998; Kennedy et al, 2008). All this must be achieved
within the constraint of affordability.
This chapter explores the problem of providing affordable and sustainable housing in the
context of a post-disaster recovery both in the short term and in the longer term. It focuses
specifically on the sustainable construction strategies adopted by various US government
agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. It begins with a description of the response to
the hurricane and the unexpected new housing issues that it created. The chapter then explores
the sometimes conflicting mandates of federal and state housing providers as well as the
providers of affordable housing within the context of a ‘sustainability aware’ design com‐
munity. Finally, it identifies some of the broader implications that can be drawn from this case
study.
2. Hurricane Katrina and the housing market
Hurricane Katrina devastated the US Gulf Coast in August 2005, inflicting major damage on
housing, commercial property and infrastructure (Elliott and Pais, 2006; Nigg et al, 2006;
Popkin, et al, 2006; FAS, 2008b). While the US has had longstanding experience coping with
hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina was the first to impact the central urban area of a major city.
Prior to Katrina, the housing stock in the New Orleans region consisted of a mix of single-
family dwellings, multi-dwelling units and mobile homes (Nigg et al, 2006). The majority of
these were owner-occupied. Most rental housing was privately owned (as opposed to state-
owned) and consisted of both single-family homes and multi-unit dwellings purposely built
for rental.
During the hurricane, as could be expected, poorly constructed housing sustained greater
damage then did housing of better construction (Elliott and Pais, 2006). It was common to find
that lower-income families inhabited the more poorly constructed housing (Peacock et al,
2007). Rental housing was generally more poorly constructed than owner-occupied housing.
Despite the widespread extent of the damages to housing stock throughout the region, there
were significant differences in the extent and intensity of damage among submarkets (Johnson,
2006). The most severely affected subset was the multifamily rental submarket—almost 80
percent of such units were damaged, and one-third of all multifamily rental units suffered
severe or moderate damage. About one-half of the single-family residences (owned and
rented) suffered damage, and almost 20 percent of all single-family units were severely or
moderately damaged (RAND, 2008a).
Approaches to Disaster Management - Examining the Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters206
Following the hurricane, there was a significant increase in demand for affordable rental
housing. While the US had typically relied on market forces to supply the bulk of its rental
housing requirements, in this instance, the market did not respond as expected (Popkin, et al,
2006). Instead of rushing to rebuild rental housing, many private investors delayed or
indefinitely deferred the decision to rebuild. This is evident in the rates of recovery by housing
type (Katz, 2008). The rate of recovery moved more rapidly for single-family dwellings than
for multifamily units and it was higher for moderately damaged buildings than for severely
damaged units. It was also especially true for most severely damaged properties of uninsured
and underinsured homeowners and landlords (for example those with multi-unit rental
properties). Landlords with severely damaged buildings faced with “overheated” construc‐
tion costs and financing shortfalls had the ability to “take their investment money elsewhere,”
delaying rebuilding until the market cooled off. This was deemed to have been particularly
true for the ‘mom and pop’ landlords who depend heavily on the cash flow from rents (Gulf
Renewal, 2007 McCarthy, K and Hanson M, 2008).
In addition to those homeowners seeking to restore their housing, some homeowners were
not happy with the directions that their former neighbourhoods were taking in the rebuilding
process, so they took the cash from their insurance to rebuild elsewhere, often out of state
(Johnson, 2006). As a result, the number of private landlords dropped significantly following
the hurricane, the proportion of renters relative to owners increased, the demand for affordable
housing increased (also inflated by the influx of low-paid construction workers—many of
whom were migrants) and the ‘market’ showed signs of not recovering fast enough to meet
demand, putting added pressure on the state to provide affordable housing—fast (Gulf
Renewal 2007, Quarantelli, E. 1995).
2.1. Federal emergency management response to Hurricane Katrina
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina struck, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA,
2008b) provided temporary emergency housing, drawing from their existing inventory of
temporary trailers and the purchase of 102,000 additional travel trailers. The FEMA trailers
were a mix of new and used small trailers (18.5 m2), larger travel trailers (37 m2), and even
larger mobile homes (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. FEMA travel trailer types
Designed for mobility and rapid deployment, the trailers were provided on wheels for ease
of movement into trailer parks or onto individual lots. To meet the massive demand, the
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new  trailers  were  manufactured  using  the  least  expensive  and  most  readily  available
materials and methods, then constructed in haste with little time spent drying out in the
factory. This was to backfire later when trailers were found to not only be unsustainable
due to their relative expense and short life expectancy, but that they were unhealthy for
the occupants (Popkin, et al, 2006).
In addition to the trailers, FEMA had also ordered 25,000 Building America Structural
Insulated Panel (BASIP) homes (see Figures 2 and 3). The program for the house design was
developed in the 1970s and, like the travel trailers they were designed for temporary shelter,
for periods that do not exceed 18 months (Thomas-Rees, 2006). These houses differ from travel
trailers both in terms of size and construction. Seeking a more sustainable housing option, the
proposed BASIP house design uses prefabricated insulated panels for walls and the roof,
resulting in greater energy efficiency and improved durability. Each unit has 3 bedrooms and
2 bathrooms and have been designed for expansion through the joining of a second unit to
create a ‘double wide.’ Other proposed features included special shutters to provide future
hurricane protection and solar shading, a retractable awning for solar shading and an addi‐
tional square area.
Figure 2. BASIP Homes
Some of the other sustainable features include the potential for integration of photovoltaics to
meet power needs in situations where utilities have not been restored or during times when
service is interrupted (Thomas-Rees, 2006). In terms of external appearance however, BASIP’s
homes look very much like a larger version of the FEMA trailer only with a pitched roof.
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Overall, the FEMA travel trailers were widely criticized for providing less than desirable
temporary housing (Majority Staff Report, 2008). The Internet is filled with personal accounts
of unhappy occupants, reports of unhealthy living conditions and overall dissatisfaction.
Although the travel trailers were never intended to be used long term (i.e. their use was limited
to 18 months), the extended use of travel trailers following disasters of this nature was common
in the southern US, with people continuing to live in them for many years. As of mid-August
2007—two years after the hurricane, 60,000 people were still living in ‘temporary’ shelter
FEMA trailers in Louisiana and Mississippi (Blueprint for Gulf Renewal)
2.2. State response to loss of housing
While the federal government focussed its efforts on the provision of emergency shelter, the
state governments response tended to look further into the future in search of a more holistic
and sustainable housing approach that took in the entire urban community (Hassett and
Handley, 2006). It became readily apparent to Governor of Mississippi, Hayley Barbour, and
his advisors that the so-called temporary shelters had, by necessity, become more permanent
fixtures. With their interest in affordable housing models, state officials wanted to go beyond
the Band-Aid solutions previously employed for disaster recovery and introduce a more
sustainable solution (Peacock et al, 2007). This prompted the governor to employ New Urbanist
planner Andres Duany to explore other possibilities. Duany has argued that that shelter is not
enough, that a sustainable model had to be fast, flexible and able to transition from temporary
shelter to temporary housing and on to permanent housing (Evans-Cowley, 2009). Only
through this capacity to transition would costs stay reasonable. Moreover, Peacock et al
Figure 3. BASIPS park in LaPlace, St John Parish, LA.
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Figure 2. BASIP Homes
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planner Andres Duany to explore other possibilities. Duany has argued that that shelter is not
enough, that a sustainable model had to be fast, flexible and able to transition from temporary
shelter to temporary housing and on to permanent housing (Evans-Cowley, 2009). Only
through this capacity to transition would costs stay reasonable. Moreover, Peacock et al
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(2007) point out that the capacity of an individual family household to recover is inextricably
tied to housing recovery.
Figure 4. The original Katrina Cottage
The houses envisaged by Duany and his partner and wife, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, were
developed as temporary shelter which could be located in new green-field sites, or at the rear
of existing properties, as in-fill properties on vacant pockets of land or could even provide
additional dwelling spaces for guests or aging relatives. Initial affordability was achieved
largely through their small size. Challenging a group of architects to find an alternative to the
FEMA trailer, Duany found what he was looking for in a cottage designed by architect
Marianne Cusato (see Figure 4). Her house became known as the 'Katrina cottage', named after
the hurricane that prompted it's inception. Seeking an intermediate size somewhere between
the 18.5 m2 and 27.8 m2 FEMA trailers, the first cottage was designed at 27.8 m2. The cottages
were kitset, using prefabricated panels specially designed for hurricane conditions and able
to withstand high wind-load conditions and excessive moisture without incurring damage or
destruction. In sum, to meet with new objectives, the cottages had to be sustainable, to be able
to mitigate damage from future storms, to be appropriate to regional conditions, culture and
climate and deliverable by all major delivery methods. This vision extended beyond simple
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cottage design to an all encompassing community design, avoiding the less than desirable
temporary community plans formerly employed (Talen, 2008; Evans-Cowley, 2009).
Other designers continued to build on Duany and Plater-Zyberk’s ideas, expanding the
original Katrina cottage idea to 20 different cottage models, including the Kernel House, which
was designed to grow from an initial 46.4 m2 module to a 120.7 m2 home with added wings
(See Figure 5).
Figure 5. Kernel cottages designed for expansion
These projects attempted to create sustainable post-disaster recovery housing, but one of the
more sustainable and interesting is the Green Mobile Project (see Figure 6), which ‘represents
a blend of key emergency housing needs with energy efficient and affordable housing that can
serve as a temporary or permanent dwelling--emphasizing innovative site design features,
green building technologies, durability, expandability with an open interior design that can
be adapted to varied family needs. The units, therefore, result in ‘reduced energy consumption
and affordable living’ (United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC
2007, FEMA website).
Figure 6. MSU architecture professor Michael Berk shows a model of GreenMobile.
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2.3. Post-disaster recovery housing becomes affordable (and desirable)
Meanwhile the prototype Katrina cottage had caught the imagination of designers throughout
the southern US, eliciting a host of Katrina copies with varying degrees of sustainable con‐
struction. Currently there are dozens of listings on the Internet for Katrina cottages that
available for rent (Lane, 2008, Benfield, 2010). They are being used for long-term housing and
for uses including vacation homes, granny cottages and home offices (Benfield 2010, Stark,
2006). The trailers arrived on site ready to inhabit, flexible for use in a variety of situations and
as temporary dwellings, they did not require building consent. The following quotes from the
Internet illustrate the range of uses and locations that the cottages have been deployed, well
beyond their intended post-disaster recovery housing based in the New Orleans region.
“The Katrina cottage - with living quarters about the size of a McMansion bathroom - is now
appealing to people well beyond the flood plain. Californians want to build one in their
backyards to use for rental income to help with the mortgage payment. Modestly paid kayakers
in Colorado see it as a way to finally afford a house. Elsewhere, people envision building one
so a parent can live nearby.” (M Cusato, Katrina cottage designer)
"We have lot sizes that are too small for a... single-family, detached household, so the idea is
to bring in these extremely attractive dwellings to provide affordable housing," (City council‐
lor, Connecticut)
‘Meanwhile, in the iconic new urbanist resort town of Seaside, Florida, Katrina Cottages are
being employed for a small educational facility’ (Kaid Benfield)
"A developer in Virginia wants to do some as affordable houses. People see it and realize it's
a dignified way to live." (M Cusato)
Driven by the desires of the public, the US had found a desirable housing model suited not
only to post-disaster recovery, but to the wider development of sustainable, community-
oriented, affordable housing.
3. Conclusions and discussion
The Hurricane Katrina experience has graphically shown the critical importance of planning
and designing post-disaster recovery housing well before the disaster strikes. This advanced
planning and design needs to be conducted at both the level of the individual dwelling as well
as the community in which that dwelling will be located. It is also critical that these advanced
designs be tested particularly when trialling new technologies and processes (Miller, 2006). It
is also vital that leadership for these design initiatives be initiated by both the federal and the
state government (Bathurst, et al 2011). Once these are initiated, it is imperative that commun‐
ities and local businesses become fully engaged in the evolutionary design processes prior to
the disaster (Popkin, 2006; Cowley-Evans, 2009; Talen, 2008).
In planning and designing post disaster recovery housing, it is important to work backwards,
from a sustainable housing model that is suited to the needs of the current rental market, but
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adaptable for disaster situations. It is also critical to develop the manufacturing technologies
and delivery processes that can be ramped up in large numbers and in short time frames. These
are best resolved well before any emergency arises. This is the only way to get beyond the
constraints imposed by supply and demand economics.
The experience of the post-disaster recovery period in the US following Hurricane Katrina
suggests that it is possible to build sustainably and affordably, but it is difficult (Johnson,
2007). The following lessons regarding sustainability and affordability can be gleaned from
the events that took place in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:
1. There is no such thing as ‘temporary’ with respect to housing, post-disaster recovery or
otherwise. Sustainable housing is more than a discrete ‘product’. It must also be consid‐
ered as a cultural artefact that has particular meaning for the community within which it
is located.
2. Significant cost and waste results from non-cooperation between agencies. Conflicting
organisational objectives must be aligned in order to achieve long-term sustainable
solutions.
3. Even in the most liberal capitalist society, the government should endeavour to lead the
way by providing well-researched advanced design solutions. The government needs to
play an important role modelling function in facilitating a desirable outcome that will
allow the market to follow.
The convergence of post-disaster recovery and sustainable housing research practices has
fortuitously created important new directions and opportunities. While the solutions that were
created in response to Hurricane Katrina might be vastly different from those appropriate for
Third World countries or other cultural settings, the process for ‘getting to sustainable,
affordable housing’ is more universal in its application. Any new housing must, within the
confines of what is affordable, be able to weather and mitigate damage from future extreme
weather events, be culturally appropriate, and strengthen community structures. This leaves
us with only one major remaining challenge: Who is deserving of sustainable affordable
housing? One intriguing possibility has been put forward by a Californian architect from one
of the oldest architectural firms based in that state:
‘One of the problems that I see with it, and I probably shouldn't say this, is that it looks nice.
I think the government has a very hard time giving things away to people or underwriting
things that go beyond some sort of bureaucratically understood minimal gesture’.
The political reality that this architect alludes to is that a significant proportion of the wealthier
sectors of society are resistant and vocal about granting the very poor considerably better
housing stock to that prior to what they had (or perceived to be had) prior to the disaster. In
a post-disaster recovery situation this political and socio-cultural hurdle is mitigated by a
combination of public sympathy to widespread loss and the benchmark of the pre-existing
housing. Overall, replacement housing should be of equal or only marginally better ‘value’
than that which existed before. In the cases of the extreme poor, the homeless, or those without
property, establishing these benchmarks seem to pose an insurmountable problem.
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Approaches to Disaster Management regards critical disaster management issues. Ten 
original research reports by international scholars centered on disaster management 
are organized into three general areas of hazards and disaster management. The 
first section includes discussions of perspectives on vulnerability and on evolving 
approaches to mitigation. The second section highlights approaches to improve data 
use and information management in several distinct applications intended to promote 
prediction and communication of hazard. The third section regards the management 
of crises and post-event recovery in the private sector, in the design of urban space and 
among the victims of disaster. This volume contributes both conceptual and practical 
commentary to the disaster management literature.
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